

A simultaneous strike of 12 A from Kolomyia to Dorohoy and further south along the river. Prut and 9 A from the east to Khushi, Iasi, bypassing Chisinau from the south, encircle and capture the Romanian troops deployed in the northern part of Bessarabia; after which, a decisive offensive to the south along the river. Prut, encircle the enemy in the southern part of Bessarabia north of the river. Danube.

V. Grouping of forces. [Cm. table 4.] The 12th

army is deployed on the front from Ustseryka to the mouth of the river. Zbruch, having the main grouping in the Kutly, Dzuruv, Sniatyn section.

The border on the left is Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany, r. Prut (all for 12 A) ... **5th Army** -

deployed from the mouth of the river. Zbruch to Kamenka (80 km south [th] - [east] Soroka on the Dniester River), having the main grouping in the Tsviklevtsy, Star. Ushitsa.

The border between the 12th and 5th armies of the river. Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany, all points for 12 A inclusive ...

The 9th army is deployed from Kamenka to the mouth of the river. Dniester, having the main grouping in the Dubossary, Tiraspol section. The border

between the 5th and 9th armies: r. Savranka, st. Popelyukhi, Kamenka, Kopacheni, Pyrlitsa, all points inclusive] for the 9th army ...

Table 4.

Planned grouping of troops of the Southern Front

Армии	Корпуса	Дивизии, бригады, арtpолки	Орудия	Танки	Броне машины
12-я	13-й СК	139-я, 60-я, 62-я СД; 23-я, 24-я тбр; 376-й, 168-й, 305-й арtp РГК	446	407	50
	8-й СК	124-я, 72-я, 146-я СД; 5-я, 10-я, 26-я тбр; 324-й, 375-й, 135-й арtp, 316-й артдив РГК	396	459	60
	17-й СК	131-я, 58-я СД; 38-я тбр; 315-й артдив РГК	294	168	—
	15-й СК	7-я, 141-я СД; 120 арtp РГК	250	46	—
	КМГ	2-й (3-я, 5-я КД), 4-й (16-я, 34-я КД) КК, 81-я МСД	172	253	48
192-я СД			40	—	—
Всего			1598	1303*	158
5-я	49-й СК	44-я, 80-я, 135-я СД; 36-я, 49-я тбр; 137-й, 331-й арtp, 34-й артдив РГК	349	259	26
	36-й СК	169-я, 130-я СД; 330-й арtp РГК	180	2	—
Всего			529	261	26
9-я		140-я СД, 381-й арtp	107	4	—
	35-й СК	173-я, 95-я СД; 522-й арtp РГК	225	—	—
	37-й СК	30-я, 147-я, 176-я СД; 14-я, 21-я тбр; 317-й, 110-й, 124-й, 320-й, 203-й арtp РГК	443	328	27
	7-й СК	164-я, 51-я СД; 4-й тбр; 430-й, 429-й, 397-й арtp РГК	263	248	—
	КМГ	9-я, 32-я КД; 15-я МСД	64	96	—
	55-й СК	25-я, 74-я СД	78	100	—
150-я СД (резерв)			66	—	—
Всего			1246	776	27
Итого			3373	2340	211

* Another 300 tanks were expected to replenish the shortage.

VI. Operation planning. The

task of the front is performed by one front operation. The scope of the operation: the width of the front is 540 km, the depth of the operation is up to 300 km, the duration of the operation is 11–12 days.

Preparatory stage - Operation preparation and occupation
armies on the night before the start of the starting position.

Stage 1 - The defeat of the opposing enemy forces, the introduction of the 12th and 9th armies into the breakthrough of the KMG on the front and the exit of the rifle corps of the armies into the operational depth. The duration of the stage is two days.

Stage 2 - Exit of KMG 12 and 9 armies to the Iasi region and completion
operational encirclement of the Romanian army in Northern Bessarabia. The
duration of the stage is two days. **Stage 3** -

Tactical completion of the encirclement and capture of the enemy. Regrouping of
forces for actions to encircle the Romanian troops in South Bessarabia.

The duration of the stage is two days. **Stage**

4 - Actions in South Bessarabia. Duration 5–6 days.

VII. The course of development of the operation and the tasks of the troops

in stages. 12 army. The 12th Army performs the main task in the general plan of
the front's operation. Delivering the main blow from Kolomyia to Chernivtsi, the troops of
12 A have the immediate task of destroying the Chernivtsi grouping together with 5 A
and in the future, developing success on Iasi along the river. Prut, in cooperation with 9
A, surround and capture the entire grouping of Romanian troops in the northern part of
Bessarabia.

The fulfillment of this task by the troops of the 12th Army is ensured primarily by
the successful actions of the KMG, which was thrown into the gap from the morning of
the second day of the war.

On the appointed day, the troops of the 12th Army, with the support of strong
artillery and close and constant air support, strike with forces of up to nine infantry
divisions with all tank formations on the Chernoguz, Russki-Banyliv, Hliveste front in
the general direction of Chernivtsi. By the end of the B-1, they have the task of reaching
the line of Komareshti, Bobeshti, Drachinets, in order to let the KMG into the breakthrough
in the morning as part of the 2nd and 4th CC and all tank brigades of the army with
landing detachments on tanks (landing detachment of 7 people] on the BT and 4 people
on the T-26 shooters and sappers), tentatively at the Storozhinets, Mikhalcha front. For
the transfer of tank brigades to the KMG, the latter by order of the Commander 12 A

concentrate by the end of B-1 in the areas: two brigades - Storozhinets, one Bobeshti brigade and two - in the Drachinets area.

Simultaneously with the KMG, the 81st Motor Rifle Division with the BT tank brigade is introduced into the breakthrough in the direction of Storozhinets and further south, ensuring the movement of the army from the side of the river. Seret [Siret] and cutting off the enemy's

retreat to the west. By the end of V-2, the troops of 12 A have the task of reaching: KMG - the line of Dorokhoy, Darabani, 81 motor rifle divisions with the BT brigade - the district of Bresht, Buchenya, Po stump; rifle corps - line Khliboka, Molodna, Sankoutsy.

192 Guards Rifle Division, covering the flank of 12 A, advances on Seletin. Upon reaching this area, the barrier detachment covers the Seletin - Ustse-Putilas direction, and with the main forces goes to the Vikoverkhni [y] area. In the future, the 192nd Guards Rifle Division enters the reserve of the 12th Army.

To reliably provide the army from the direction of Suceava, by order of the commander of the 12th army, the 139th rifle division is advanced through Chudyn with the task of occupying and defending the Kostitsa, Seret [Siret] line.

By the end of V-3, 12 A, developing success in a southerly direction, KMG reaches the Trusheshti, Uricheni region, having 81 motorized rifle divisions with a brigade in the Beluseni region. By the same time, KMG 9 A has the task of reaching the Iasi region. Thus, by the end of V-3, the operational encirclement of the enemy is brewing, and in order to eliminate the only possibility of the enemy leaving the encirclement on the night of V-4 through Pashkany, it is planned to throw two adbrs into the Tirgu Frumos area with the task of joint actions of the adbr and 81 motor rifle divisions with the brigade allow the enemy to withdraw to the west and secure the KMG from the side of Pashkana.

In V-4, KMG 12 A captures the Iasi area and, in cooperation with 9 A, completes the operational encirclement of the enemy. On the same day, 3 adbrs are thrown into the Totoeshti area with the task of finally cutting off the escape routes of Iasi and Pashkany.

According to the plan of action, rifle corps 12A go to B-6 in the area of operations of the KMG, allocating part of the forces for tactical encirclement and capturing the enemy, together with the 5th and 9th armies. The rest of the forces and KMG, without stopping, continue to move in a southerly direction to fulfill the further task of the front.

13 sk, as it advances, deploys 60 and 62 rifle divisions along the river. Seret [Siret] in order to cover the rear of 12 and 5 A when they operate in a southerly direction.

5th

army. The immediate task of 5 A is to encircle and capture the Chernivtsi grouping of the enemy by joint actions with 12 A; in the future, advancing along the eastern [full] bank of the river. Prut in cooperation with 12 and 9 A, encircle the Romanian troops in the northern part of Bessarabia.

49 sc crosses the river. Dniester on the front of Bagovitsa, Star[aya] Ushitsa and develops an offensive in the direction of st. Larga, Balasinesti. Upon completion of the immediate task, further actions of the 49th sk are developing along the eastern [full] bank of the river. Prut with the task of actively tying up the units of the Romanian army operating in the northern part of Bessarabia, and not allowing them to retreat to the west until the outflanking mobile group 12 A leaves.

36 sk, demonstrating on the first day by the forces of the reinforced regiment, in cooperation with parts of the UR, a crossing over the river. Dniester in the area of Kalus, Mogilev-Podolsk, in the morning B-2 is forcing the river with the main forces of the corps. Dniester near Yampol, Soroca. Advancing on Balti, the corps has a task

similar to 49 sk. By the end of B-6, corps 5A enter into direct tactical interaction between themselves and units 12 and 9A, completing the tactical encirclement and capture of the enemy in the area south-west of Balti.

Upon completion of the immediate task of the front, the corps of the 5th army transferred to the front reserve and concentrated in the area north of Iasi.

9th

army. Tasks 9 A, inflicting the main blow south of Chisinau in the direction of Khushi, encircle, in cooperation with 12 and 5 A, the Romanian troops located in the northern part of Bessarabia.

The immediate task of 9 A is to force the river. Dniester and capture the city of Chisinau, covering their further actions by advancing a barrier with forces of up to two divisions in a southerly direction against possible enemy counterattacks from

the south. The main forces of 9 A are forcing the river. On the Dniester front, Cellars, Tiraspol, and with the direct and close support of aviation, capture the city of

Kishinev. With the release of the main forces to the front of Chimisheny, Novo-Nikolaevka, let the KMG into the 5th kk [with] all tank [ovy] brigades of the army and 15 motor rifle divisions.

55 SC from the area of Ovidiopol, Roksolany, Baraboy crosses the Dniester estuary and, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, takes possession of Akkerman and the Bugaz

lighthouse. By the end of B-1, troops of 9 A go out: KMG to the Gancheshty, Mileshty, Bardar region, rifle corps to the line: Chisinau, Dzhemana, Novo-

Kaushani. KMG, 35 and 37 sk develop success in the western direction; The 7th Corps advances into a barrier with the task of advancing in a ledge behind the left flank of the main forces of the army in the south-west [rear] direction, to provide them from the south. 55th Rifle Corps (25th and 74th Rifle Divisions) advances in the direction of Sarat in close

and constant cooperation with the Navy. 140 sd in the morning B-1 forces the river. Dniester in the area: Rybnitsa with the task of actively tying up the opposing enemy and preventing him from retreating to the west.

By the end of B-2 army troops: KMG is forcing the river. Prut and is concentrated in the area north of Khushi. The rifle corps of the main grouping reach the line of Trushany, Girly, Mileshty; 55 sc - p. Sarat, having mastered Col[ony] Old[aya] Sarat. The 140th division enters the line of Pechesty, Kuyzovka.

Further actions of KMG on the western bank of the river. Prut in the direction of Iasi and turning 35 sk to the north, units of 9 A enter into operational interaction with units of 12 A, squeezing the encirclement of the enemy.

By B-6, the tactical encirclement of the enemy ends with the 35th battalion reaching the line: Cochen-Flocheny, Buchumeny and 140th Rifle Division -

Glinzheny, Teura. 55 sk, reaching the boundary of the river. Kogilnik, goes on the defensive until the further task

of the front is completed. The main forces upon reaching the river. The Prut provide a foothold on the western bank of the river.

Rod with the capture of Khushi. From V-6, the troops of 9 A, leaving 35 sk and 140 sd to complete the capture of the Romanian troops in the northern part of Bessarabia, proceed to carry out the further task of the front - to actions south along the river. Rod.

VIII. Basing and tasks of aviation.

Aircraft basing according to the attached map. Air Force tasks:

1) Close and direct interaction of the Air Force with ground forces on the field during the breakthrough of the enemy's fortified zone and in the development of success. 2) Struggle

for air supremacy by massed air operations on airfields and air combat with enemy air forces. Depth of impact on airfields to the eastern spurs of the Carpathians.

3) Covering KMG and the main grouping 12 and 9 A. Assistance and direct support to KMG 12 A by all the forces of the Air Force 12, 5 A and the Air Force of the front. 4)

Violation of command and control of enemy troops, destruction of it headquarters and the destruction of communication lines by aircraft using cats.

5) Prohibition of advancing enemy reserves into the area of operations of the front armies from Klauzenberg, Jassy, Roman, Byrlad. 6) Establishing continuous surveillance of the movement of advanced units by assigning special aircraft and squadrons of observation and communications ... Bombing and shelling at settlements not occupied by enemy troops is prohibited ...

XI. Front reserve. The

reserve of the front is: 8th RD - Chertkov, 17th RD - Kamenets Podolsk, 86 sd - Dunaevtsy, 100 sd - Vasilievka, Frunzovka.

8.17 and 86 sd, upon their arrival and concentration, with the development of the operation, they will follow in the direction of the main blow of the front, having the mission of reinforcing the army troops operating in the decisive direction. Separation of the reserves of the army of the first echelon - 50-60 km.

XII. Naval Forces of the Black Sea Fleet. For the purpose

of closer interaction between land and sea forces, the Black Sea Navy is operationally subordinate from 10.00 23.6 to the Military Council of the 9th Army. The tasks set before the Black Sea Fleet are: 1)

Direct and close cooperation with the 55th Corps for the protection of the Black Sea coast Odessa, Ochakov. 2) Fire assistance from the naval artillery of the 25th and 74th Rifle Divisions (55

Rifle Corps) during their crossing of the Dniester Estuary and further development of the offensive along the Black Sea coast. 3) Elimination of the possibility of the appearance and actions of ships

the enemy along the sections of the coast occupied by troops of 9 A.

4) Observation of the ports of Romania, blocking the Black Sea coast from the Dniester estuary to the Sulina branch of the river. Danube inclusive.

[...]

Evacuation of prisoners:

6 points of acceptance and transfer of prisoners of war of the NKVD are being deployed: Snyatyn - 100 people, Kamenetz-Podolsk - 500 people, Mogilev-Podolsk - 300 people, Rybnitsa - 300 people, Tiraspol - 500 people, Ovidiopol - 300 people POW camps: Kozelytsyn,

Poltava region, Putivl,

Sumy region, Staro Belsk. The duration of the stay of prisoners of war at the transfer points is 1–2 days. Within 10 days, it will be possible to pass through the transfer points

an average of 20,000-25,000 prisoners.

Collection and evacuation of trophy property: 1)

For the collection and accounting of trophy property, they are allocated in parts commands, according to a special directive Komtroysk.

2) Recorded trophy property is sorted by type and destination and guarded until evacuation. 3)

The evacuation of trophy property goes back empty through the DEPs to the corresponding public warehouses with / with. Sending property is on the waybill for each type of property.

4) In the government warehouses, trophy property is stored and accounted for separately and sent to the rear by order of the contenters departments of the armies at the direction of the Military

Council"[854] . In addition, a draft directive of the command of the Southern Front No. A-1 / 00144 ss / s was delivered to Moscow:

"First. Focusing on the Chernivtsi direction up to seven front, one GSB, one cd; in the direction of Balti, Iasi up to 3 pd and 2 cd; in the Chisinau region and to the south, up to 6 pd and two cd, the Romanian army continues to strengthen at the turn of the Cheremosh, Dniester, Prut and Seret [Siret] lines. **Second.**

According

to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, troops of the Southern Front are deployed on the state border with Romania, consisting of 12, 5 and 9 armies.

The naval forces of the Black Sea are moving from 22.00 21.6 to operational subordination of the Military Council of the Southern Front.

The command of the troops of the Southern Front was entrusted to me by the People's Commissar of Defense.

Third. 12 A. Army Commander - Lieutenant General t. Cherevichenko, Deputy Commander - Lieutenant General Comrade Parusinov.

Army Headquarters -

Kolomyia. Deploy army troops: 13 sk (139, 60, 62 sd, 23 and 24 brigade, 376, 168, 305 ap RGK; 1 tank [new] b [atalio] n KV); 8 sc (72, 124, 146 sd;

5, 10, 26 brigade; 324, 375, 135 ap, 316 artillery divisions of the RGK); 17th Rifle Corps (58th and 131st Rifle Divisions, 38th Tank Brigade; 315th Artillery Division of the RGK) - in the area of Kuta, Snyatyn, Stetsova, Kolomyia - to deliver the main blow in the direction of Chernivtsi.

15 sk - 7, 141 sd, 120 ap RGK in the area of Gorodenka, Filipkovtsy, Novosyulka-Kostyukova for an offensive in the direction of Chernivtsi from Gorodenka (7 sd) and Sinkuv (141 sd). To ensure the right wing

of the front, deploy the 192nd Guards Rifle Division in the area of Ustseryka, Polyanka, Kishvoruvnya for operations in the direction of Seletin. The army commander

to concentrate the Cavalry Group (2 and 4 kk) in a waiting area - in the forests of the south [th] - in [east] of Kolomyia, meaning to introduce it into a breakthrough in the direction of Volok. By the time of entry into the gap, all tank brigades and 81 rifle divisions should be subordinated to the Commander of the Cavalry Group. Army aviation: 13, 16, 94

sbp, 138 lbp, 3 and 7 shap, 33, 91, 28, 23, 149, 12, 17, 46 iap (air defense - Stryi); 5 and 8 diae; 36 and 44 Rae; army [eyskaya] rae - 16 sbp. Include in the army: 19 and

21 pont[on]; 9th, 17th, 45th engineering] battalions, 6th camouflage company. Borders on the left - r. Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany, all for 12A

inclusive.

Fourth. 5 A. Commander - Lieutenant General t. Gerasimenko, Deputy Commander - Major General Comrade Sovetnikov.

Army Headquarters -

Dunaevtsy. Deploy army

troops: 49 sk - 80, 44, 135 sd, 36 and 49 brigade, 137, 330 and 331 ap and 34 artillery division of the RGK in the area - Bagovitsa, Studenitsa, Star[aya] Ushitsa, Krushanovka for an attack on the station. Larga.

36th Rifle Corps - 169th and 130th Rifle Divisions, leaving a reinforced joint venture on the Kalus, Mogilev-Podolsk front to demonstrate the crossing and pinning down the enemy, deploy the main forces on the Yampol, Soroka front in readiness to force the river. Dniester. Kamenetz-

Podolsky and Mogilev-Podolsky URs in their areas. Army aviation: 86 and 60 sbp,

87, 88, and 92 iap; 47 times, times 60 sbp. Include in the army: 5, 13, 22.25 pont[on] battalions. The border on the left is Savranka, st.

Popelyukhi, Kamenka, Kopachany, Pyrlitsa (30 km from [north]-to [east] Iasi), all claims. for 5A.

Fifth. 9 A. Army Commander - Lieutenant General Comrade Boldin, Deputy. Commander - Lieutenant General Comrade

Kozlov. Army Headquarters

- Grosulovo. Deploy army

troops: 140th rifle division at the front of V. Molokish, Rybnitsa, Gederim to demonstrate the crossing over the river. Dniester. 35 sc (173 and 95 sd, 522 ap RGK); 37 sc (176, 147, 30 sd; 14, 21 brigade; 110, 124, 430, 320 ap, 317 artillery div of the RGK); 7 sc (164, 51 sd; 429 ran RGK); 4 brigade; 150th Rifle Division - in the area of Dubossary, Tiraspol, Ploskoye, Shibka for delivering the main blow to Khushi south of Chisinau.

KMG - 5 kk (9 and 32 cd), 15 msd, 4, 14, 21 brigade to use for the development of a breakthrough in the

direction of Khushi. 55 sk - Odessa, 25 and 74 rd - in the area of Ovidiopol, Dalnik (South), Baraboy; 116th Rifle Division - Odessa, continuing to guard the Black Sea coast from Odessa to Ochakovo with one Rifle Division, the main forces to be ready for action with the support of the Black Sea Fleet to capture the Bugaz lighthouse and Akkerman.

Rybnitsa and Tiraspol URs in their areas.

North[ero-]West[adny] UR from June 23 passes under the command of the Commander 9A. The Dnieper military flotilla is transferred to the NW UR. Army

aviation: 5, 132, 45 sbp sbp.... sbp, 11 lbp, 21 dbp, 55, 4, 67, 146 iap. Include the

26th, 27th and 4th battalions in the army. **Sixth.** Front

reserve: 8th, 17th and

86th rifle divisions are concentrated in the area of Chertkov, Kamenets Podolsk, Dunaevtsy; 100 sd - in the area of \u200b\u200bVasilievka, Frunzovka,

Calm. 8,11,51,90 dbp, 33 and 48 sbp, 2 and 43 IAP Kyiv (air defense). 20 IAP - Proskurov, 89 IAP Lvov, 1 and 14 Tap, 34 Drae.

Seventh. The time to reach the deployment line will be given additionally.

Eighth. The headquarters of the Southern Front from 6.00 23.6 - — Proskurov "[855]". The third document delivered to the General Staff was a draft directive to the troops of the Southern Front No. A-1 /

00145ss / s: **“First.** The Romanian army, having a small grouping in the direction of Balti, concentrated its main forces on the wings of the front. In the Chernivtsi direction, up to seven infantry divisions, one GSBR and one cd are grouped; in the Chisinau region and to the south, up to six pd and two cd. Up to four to five infantry divisions and up to two mechanized brigades are concentrated in the area of Botoshan, Iasi, Roman - presumably in the reserve of the front.

Second. The troops of the Southern Front ... at ... hour ... June (hereinafter in the text instead of the name of the month its serial number is used - ... 6. - MM) to cross the state border and, delivering the main blow from Kolomyia to Chernivtsi, bypassing them from the south and further along the river. Prut and at the same time from the east to Khushi, bypassing Chisinau from the south, encircle and capture the Romanian troops deployed in Northern Bessarabia. After occupying the Yassy region and fulfilling the immediate task, the armies of the front should have in mind an offensive to the south along the river. Prut with the task of clearing South Bessarabia of enemy troops.

Third. 12 And with the main forces of at least nine rifle divisions, with tank units, with the support of strong artillery and all aviation of the army and the front, break through the enemy's position on the front of Chernoguzi, Russki-Banyliv, Zelena, Hliveshte and, advancing along the river. Prut to Yassy, bypassing Chernivtsi from the south, [towards] the end ... 6 main forces to reach the Khliboka, Molodna front. In the future, advancing on Dorohoy, with the main forces [towards] the outcome ... 6 to capture the front of Satu Mari, Vatkan, Derek, Gorzhiutsy, Pomyrla, Comeneshti. To develop success [since] morning ... 6, introduce KMG into the breakthrough as part of Kav. groups, 81 motor rifle divisions and all tank brigades of the army, tentatively on the Storozhinets, Mihalche front.

[By] the end ... 6 tank brigades, “after completing the tasks of the first day, concentrate three - in the Storozhinets region, two in the Bobeshti region and one - in Drochinets. With the

direct and constant support of the aviation of the army and the front, KMG develop an offensive along the river. Rod and to the end ... 6

go to the front Dorokhoy, Darabani. By the end ... 6 to take control of the Trusheshti, Uricheni area, having 81 motorized rifle divisions [in] the Bedusheni area. By the end ... 6 take possession of the Iasi region, establish interaction with units of 9 A, surround and prevent the enemy from

retreating to Romania. 81st Motor Rifle Division with one BT tank brigade advance on Storozhinets and further to the south, ensuring the army's advance from the side of the river. Seret [Siret] and cutting off the

enemy's escape route to the west. 192nd Rifle Division, providing the right wing of the front, advance on Seletin [Selyatin]. Upon reaching Seletin, cover the Ustse-Putilas direction with a strong barrage detachment, and continue the attack on Vikoverkhni[y] with the main forces.

To reliably secure the flank of the army from the Suceava side, the Commander of 12 A should advance one SD through Chudyn with the task of occupying and defending the Kostitsa, Seret

[Siret] line. The border between 12 and 5 A - p. Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany, all for 12 A inclusive.

The boundaries between the buildings have: Between 13 and 8 sk Kobaki, Komaresti Slobodzia, Hrinava, Mihu cheny, Vaculesti all for 13 sk inclusive.

Between 8 and 17 sk Tuchapy, Drachinets, Mikhalche, Fundoia, Dorohoy, all except Drachinets incl. for 8 speed

Between 17 and 15 sk Stetsova, Valyava, Chernivtsi, Slobodzya, Dumeni, all except Dumeniya incl. for 17 speed **Fifth**,

(so in the text. - M.M.) 5 A - 49 sk as part of three rifle divisions, 36 and 49 brigade; 330, 137 and 331 ap and 34 artillery divisions. RGK with the assistance of aviation to cross the river. Dniester in the section Tsviklevtsy, Studenica, Star. Ushitsa and, developing an offensive on st. Larga, Balasinesti, surround with joint actions with 12 A the enemy located to the west of Radautsi. [To] the end ... 6 take

possession of the border of Lipkany, Trestyany. 36 sk, leading during ... 6 a demonstration of crossings over the river. Dniester at the front Kalus, Mogilev-Podolsky, in the morning ... 6 to force the river. Dniester in the area of Yampol, Soroca and advance in the direction of Balti.

The border on the left is Savranka, st. Popelyukhi, Kamenka, Kopachany, Pyrlitsa (30 km N.V. Iasi) all for 5 A exclusively. The border

between 49 and 36 sk is Kalus, Sekuryany, Ryshkanovka [Ryshkany], all except Kalus inclusive] for 49 sk.

Sixth. 9 A, demonstrating the crossing over the river. Dniester 140 rifle division in the Rybnitsa region, with the main forces consisting of 35, 37, 7 sk, 5 kk, 4, 14, 21 brigade, with the assistance of strong artillery and all army aviation, force the river. Dniester at the front of Cellars, Tiraspol and, delivering the main blow south of Chisinau to Khushi, together with KMG 12A, encircle and destroy the enemy in Northern Bessarabia.

[By] the end ... 6 KMG consisting of 5 kk, 4, 14 and 21 brigade, 15 motor rifle divisions go to the area of Bardar, Gancheshty, Mileshty, [to] the end ... 6 force the river. Rod and master Khushi. In the future, pushing the barriers to the south and west, keep in mind to attack Iasi from the south. Rifle units [to] the outcome ... 6 to occupy Chisinau. In the future, consolidating the success of KMG, with a decisive offensive, withdraw the main group no later than ... 6 on the river. Rod and firmly occupy Khushi.

With the development of the offensive, move part of the forces to the north and north[ero]-west to compress the encirclement of the enemy's northern Bessarabian grouping and capture the ways of his retreat beyond the river. Rod. To protect against possible enemy attacks from southern Bessarabia, allocate at least two rifle divisions in a barrier to the

southwest and south. 55th Rifle Corps, guarding the Black Sea coast from Odessa to Ochakovo inclusive with one SD, with the rest of the forces, with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet, capture the Bugaz lighthouse, occupy Akkerman and continue the offensive on Sarat.

The boundaries between the buildings have: Between 35 and 37 sk Delakeu, Merena, Ploveshty, Lopusna, two first exclusively] for 35 speed.

Between 37 and 7 sk Tokmodzeya, Novo-Nikolaevka, Jaman, Rezeny, Karakui, Mingir, all except the first inclusive for 37 speed.

Between 7 and 55 sk Tiraspol, Manzyr (Countess), Tarutino (Anchokrak) all except Manzyr inclusive] for 7 sk. **Seventh.** The tasks of the Air Force: 1)

Interaction with ground troops on the battlefield when breaking through the enemy's fortified zone and developing success, directly and constantly supporting the actions of our troops by destroying enemy troops.

2) The struggle for air supremacy by destroying the enemy air force in the air and at its airfields.

3) Covering the main grouping 12 and 9 A and especially KMG with moving it out of the waiting area and entering it into the breach. 4) Continuous and close interaction with KMG 12 and 9 A. 5) Covering the crossings on the river. Cheremosh and Dniester. 6) Violation of command and control of enemy troops, destruction of its headquarters and destruction of communication lines.

7) Prevent the advancement of enemy reserves from areas: Clausenburg, Iasi, Roman, Byrlad.

Eighth. Commander of the Air Force of the front to prepare a parachute landing as part of three brigades in the areas: 1) Podu-

Iloaei, 2) Tirgu-

Frumos (25 and 40 km from [north]-west [west] of Iasi) readiness ... 6. Ninth . From ...

6 border troops are transferred to my operational subordination. Border troops to remain in their places, performing the same task. To perform special tasks to capture crossings across the river. Cheremosh and Dniester to the head of the border troops to single out selected teams from the border guards and with a sudden strike on the orders of the army commanders ... 6 seize the bridges, prevent the enemy from blowing them up, hold and clear mines.

Tenth. In order to ensure greater independence of tank formations during their operations as part of the KMG, by order of the Army Commanders, for each tank brigade, allocate an airborne detachment consisting of shooters and sappers, at the rate of 7 people for each BT tank and 4 for T-26. Landing tank detachments are to be subordinated to the commanders of tank brigades, placed on tanks and, together with tank brigades, sent into the breakthrough.

Eleventh. In connection with the need for closer interaction between the ground forces and the Black Sea Navy, from 10.00 23.6 I subordinate the Black Sea naval forces to the Military Council of the 9th A. in operational terms. I assign the following tasks to the Black

Sea Navy: when forcing the river. Dniester through the spit of the Dniester estuary and with further advance along the Black Sea coast;

b) prevent the appearance and actions of enemy ships along sections of the coast occupied by troops 9 A;

c) establish surveillance over the ports of Romania, block the Black Sea coast from the Dniester estuary to the Sulina branch of the Danube inclusive; d) to protect the Black Sea coast (the area of

the Odessa naval base and the Ochakovsky sector of coastal defense) from the actions of enemy ships"[856] . At 21.00 on June 23, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the-

General Staff sent a cipher telegram No. OU / 71 to Zhukov, in which they said that "I basically approve the plan presented by you. In the grouping of the 12th army and in the direction of the offensive, make

the following changes: 1.

Deploy a strike group consisting of the 8th, 17th and 15th Corps with the bulk of artillery on the Zaluchye, Snyatyn, Gorodnitsa front and develop an offensive against the Chernivtsi (incl.), Rzhavintsy front.

2. 13 corps to advance on the front of Voloka, Chernivtsi (excl.),
having 192 rifle divisions in the second echelon"[857] .

At 11:30 p.m. on June 23, Zhukov called Shaposhnikov and, apparently, tried to agree on some clarifications of the instructions received. The Chief of the General Staff answered him that the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense set out in telegram No. OU/71 remained "in force. There will be no objections to expanding the breakthrough front to the right to 3-4 km. There are no objections to the proposal to establish an offensive front for the main grouping of Voloka (excl.). Offensive 12 And conduct along both banks of the river. Rod. The cavalry-mechanized group, according to the people's commissar, is very likely to be introduced after the troops reach the Prut area. It is not known how the situation near Chernivtsi will develop and from which side it will have to be taken . Based on these instructions, the command of the Southern

Front at 11.15 on June 24 issued order No. 2 / M to its troops: "Action plans for the 5th Army, 9th Army and the Black Sea Fleet

Defense approved without change.

Introduce the following changes to the actions of the 12th

Army: 1. Deliver the main blow of the 12th Army with the forces of 8th Rifle Corps, 17th Rifle Corps and 15th Rifle Corps on the Russki Banylyv, Snyaty, Serafynets front in the general

direction of Chernivtsi, along the Prut River. 2. The boundary of the buildings is established between 13 sk and 8 sk - Russki Banylyv, Voloka, Dorokhoy, all inclusive for 13 sk, (

Dear. Between sk 8 and sk 17 - the Prut River to Chernivtsi, then Vatra, between sk 17 and sk 15 - Stetsova, Rakitna, Toporoutsy [Toporovtsy], Dynzhenya, all for sk 17, except Raki [t] on. 3. 15 ck [in] the initial position

23.6 on the front of Stetsova (excl.), Serafince and advances [in] the direction of Kolenkoutsy [Kolenkovtsy], Stalinesti [Stalnovtsy], forcing the Prut River in the section Mamaliga, Radeutsi [Radeutsi]. 4. 192th Rifle Division is withdrawn [to] the Pistyn area for

operations in the second echelon behind the right flank 13 speed.

5. The 139th Rifle Division, to secure the right flank of the 12th Army, advances from the second day to the Seret [Siret] River in the Kamenka, Seret [Siret] sectors.

6. 168 ran BM and 24 tank brigade are withdrawn from the 13 sk and 168 gap - 17 sk, 24 tank brigade - 8 sk are attached. 7. From the

composition of the 8th brigade, the 5th tank brigade of the 17th brigade is transferred. IN the rest is unchanged.

The commander of the 12th army, in accordance with these clarifications, to regroup, completing it by the morning of 26.6 "[859]". Thus, the troops of the Southern Front received the current directives for the upcoming operation. Accordingly, on the morning of June 26, the

command of the 12th Army approved the combat plan for the first seven days of the operation[860] and sent combat order No. 001 / ss / s to the subordinate troops:

"1. The Romanian army, according to intelligence data in the Chernivtsi direction, has up to seven PDs, one GSB and one KD, of which: in the Viznits [Vyzhnitsa], Bergomet, Khiboka [Glyboka], Voloka up to two PDs (7 and 8); south of the border Seret, Storozhinets, Chernivtsi[y], r. Rod up to 4-5 PD (7 and 8 AK). Occupied frontiers pp Dniester, Prut, Seret [Siret] continue to strengthen. The nearest operational reserves are possible in the area

of Rydauti [Rydyuti], Suceava, Botoșan[i], Dorohoi. 2. To the left of 49 sc 5 A forces the river. Dniester in the area of

Tsviklevtsy, Studenica and strikes in the direction of st. Larga, Balashinesti [Balasinesti]. The border with it - r. Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany. 3. 12 A, inflicting the main blow from

the front of Popelniki, Snyaty, Serafintsa in the general direction to Chernivtsi [y], Yashi [Yasy], breaks through the location of the enemy on the Chernoguz front,

Orosheny, Serafintse and, having ensured the introduction of a cavalry mechanized group into the breakthrough, by the end of B-3, the main forces take possession of the front of Satu Mare, Vitkan, Derek, Gorzhiutsy, Pomyrly, Kamenesti [Comenesti], Kishla Salieva. Further developing a strike on Dorohoy, Botoshan [i], Yashi [Yasi], in cooperation with 9 and 5 A, surrounds and destroys the Romanian troops deployed in Northern Bessarabia. Occupation of the starting position and

the beginning of actions - a special order. 4.13 SK

(139,60,62 SD, with 23 brigade, 376 gap RGK, 135 paps RGK, 9 engineer battalion, 20 kao), having the main grouping of forces on their left flank, force the river. Cheremosh, break through the location of the enemy in the area of Chernoguzy, Russish Banila, and, destroying the enemy, by the end of the day, capture the line of Zhadov, Komareshti Slobodzia, Kabeshti, capturing 23 tank brigade and advanced units of the Storozhinets corps. At the turn of Komareshti, Slobodzia, Kabeshti, ensure the entry of KMG units into the breakthrough, transferring 23 brigade to the subordination

of 81 MSD. To ensure the right flank of the army from the direction of Chudyn, Lukavets take the line of heights [from] 533, 459, 470 with a detachment as part of a reinforced battalion. Cover the remaining areas with outposts and enhanced reconnaissance.

To the right of the border unit 95 PO cover the state border to Tudeb.

The border on the left is a lawsuit. Kolomyia, Russis Banila, Kabeshti, Voloka, Mihoreny, lawsuit. Dear.

5. 8 SK (72,124,146 SD, 10 brigade with 10 KV tanks and 4 T-28 tanks, 26.24 brigade, 324 gan, 375 ran, 305 paps, 316 artillery divisions of the RGK, 28 and 19 pontbats, 12 kao), having the main grouping of forces on its right flank, force the river. Cheremosh, break through the location of the op [opponent] on the claim area. Russish Banila, Chartoria, with a swift blow, destroying the opponents, by the end of the day, with the main forces, take possession of the border claim. Bobeshti, Drachinets [Drachintsy], Korostova, with mobile units of at least a brigade with an infantry battalion to capture Voloka, 10 brigade with an infantry battalion with a blow from the south-west to assist 17 SC in the capture of Chernivtsi.

By the end of the day, tank brigades should be concentrated in prefabricated areas - 24th brigade of Voloka, 10th brigade of Chernivtsi[s], 26th brigade of Drachynets.

To enter the KMG breakthrough, transfer all tank brigades to the subordination of the group. The border

on the left is Gvozdiec Stary, Budyluv, r. rod up Chernivtsi[s], Ivaneshtie.

6.17SK (58.131 SD, 5 brigade with 14 tanks T-28.38 brigade, 168 ran, 315 artillery divisions of the RGK, 17 inzhbag, link 27 rae), having the main grouping of forces on its left flank, break through the location of the enemy on section of Orosheny, Stetsova, destroying the enemy, by the end of the day, capture the line of Neymamaeshti, Obersheroutsi, capturing the crossing near Glynitsa with moving parts, and take control of Chernivtsi [y] with a strike from the north.

By the end of the day, 38 brigade should be concentrated in the collection area of Drachinets, and 5 brigade on the southern outskirts of Chernivtsi, transferring them to the KMG.

The border on the left is m. Obertyn, Stetsova, Chernavka [Chernovka], claim. Rakitna, Marchenits, Leshna. 7. 15

SC (7, 141 SD, 120 ran RGK), having the main grouping of forces on its right flank, break through the location of the enemy in the Stetsov, Serafints area, destroying the enemy with a swift blow, by the end of the day to take possession abroad Kuchurmik [Small Kuchurov], Okna [Window]. 8. Horse-mechanized group (4, 2 KK, 81 MSD), in close

coordination with the advance of the infantry by the end of the day, concentrate in the area of Zhadov, Oberstaneshiti, Zelena, Kalineshti, height [ota] 352, having 81 MD on the right flank. Be ready in the morning for B-2 to enter a breakthrough at the Storozhinets-

Mikhalcha line to develop a strike along the Prut River in the general direction to Dorokhoy, Yashi [Yasi]. With the subsequent task - by establishing interaction with parts of 9 A, to surround and prevent the retreat of the enemy to Romania. 9. Army Air Force: a) Simultaneous strike of all Army aviation in ... hour ... min. (So in the text. - M.M.) to suppress the fire

system, manpower

and artillery of the enemy in the areas - ur [cleaner] Skuterevo, Bereznitsa, heights east of Vilyavche, Zamoste, ur [cleaner] Verbovets, heights north of Voloka , heights west of Kalineshti and the accumulation of troops in the areas of Bergomet, Storozhinets, Khliboka, Voloka, Chernivtsi [s], Kabeshti. Capture and destroy enemy aircraft at the airfields: Storozhinets, Chernivtsi[y], Khotyn, Seret, Dorokhoy,

Botosani[i], Radauti [Radeutsi], Salki, Suceava, Feltecheni [Falticeni]. The bulk of aviation

should be used to suppress the forward edge in close cooperation with ground forces. b) By successive strikes in the offensive zone

of the rifle corps, suppress the fire system and destroy the manpower of the enemy: in the zone 13 sk - 16 sb, 8 sk - 35 sub; 17 sc - 7 cap and 17 iap and 15 sc - 3 cap.

c) Prevent the approach of new reserves from Vikoverkhniy, Radauti, Dorohoi. d) Cover

the main grouping of the army, especially KMG during moving it out of the waiting area and entering it into the breach.

Cover crossings on the river. Cheremosh.

e) Disrupt the control of the troops of the enemy, destroying him headquarters and destroying lines of communication.

10. Border troops (95, 96, 97 border detachments) are transferred to my operational subordination. To perform special tasks to capture crossings across the river. Cheremosh and Dniester, to the heads of the border detachments, to single out selected teams from the border guards and with a sudden blow on my order to ... 6 seize the bridges, prevent the enemy from blowing them up, hold and clear mines. After crossing the border by army troops, continue guarding the state border in their areas. 11. Army reserve - 192 GSD in the area - forest west [her] Tudev

follows the right flank 13 sk.

12. In order to ensure greater independence of tank formations, both on the first day of their operation and for the period of operations as part of the KMG, corps commanders should allocate one airborne detachment to the commanders of tank brigades, consisting of one rifle battalion and a platoon of sappers. Landing forces should be placed at the rate of 7 people shooters and a sapper for each BT tank, 4 people on the T-26 and, together with tank brigades, send into the breakthrough.

13. Shtarm - Kolomyia, operational] point - height [ota] 373, which 3 km north of Kobaki. The axis of movement is Chernivtsi[y], Dorokhoi"[864] .

The corps commanders were ordered to bring this order to the attention of the commanders and commissars of divisions, brigades and regiments in the part that concerns them. Subordinate command staff until further notice

should not have been informed. The command of the 12th Army also warned the subordinate troops that a special order would follow about the time of taking the initial position[862] .

Meanwhile, the commander of the Air Force of the Southern Front, Lieutenant General F.A. Astakhov prepared combat order No. 01 / ss, which set the tasks of aviation to support their troops and gain air supremacy. At dawn on the first day of the offensive, aviation was to launch a surprise attack on enemy airfields. It was assumed that the Soviet Air Force would organize a continuous round-the-clock enemy troops. Heavy bomber regiments were preparing for on enemy airfields in the reports of his defenses - Iasi, Vaslui, Bacau, Roman, Tekuch and Focsani. Aviation was entrusted with covering their headquarters and scattering leaflets[863] . On June 25-26, the Air Force command developed a plan for landing in the Tirgu Frumos area, which was supposed to help complete the encirclement and disorganize the enemy's rear. It was supposed to land 2040 people from the 201st, 204th and 214th airborne brigades in 2 hours 35 minutes, who were supposed to interact with the Cavalry Mechanized Group (KMG). Landing from 120 TB-3 aircraft under the cover of 300 fighters was to be preceded by an air strike on airfields and [864] enemy troops in the landing area

Meanwhile, at 10.45 on June 24, the commander of the 9th Army reported to the headquarters of the Southern Front, the plan of "exercises" of the 55th rifle corps:

"1. The 25th Rifle Division crosses the Bugaz Lighthouse with the main forces, with a preliminary landing of an amphibious assault force on the cape of the right bank of the

[Tsaregrad] branch. 2. 74th Rifle Division transports only two reduced battalions across the Dniester to capture the estuary in order to capture the right bank of the estuary north of Akkerman. The battalions are transported on fishing boats, on some of them it is possible to install anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns for firing on the move. Consequently, each battalion is planned to be reinforced with 4 anti-tank guns and two regimental ones. The remaining forces of the 74th Rifle Division, as well as the main forces of the 25th Rifle Division, are crossing the pontoon bridge across the [Tsaregrad] arm, for which two pontoon battalions are concentrated.

3. The entire operation to capture the right bank of the river and the crossing over the pontoon bridge is provided by artillery, aviation and artillery of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet . To the north of ~~the~~ Dniester estuary in the lower reaches of the Dniester on the front of Yassky, Mayaks should have concentrated the combined rifle and machine-gun regiment of the Tiraspol UR and the combined artillery regiment of the Odessa Artillery School, which were supposed to force the river and advance on Korkmazy and Khan-Kishlo, distracting the enemy from Akkerman [866] . At 7 pm on June 25, the—

head of the border troops of the Western

district of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General I.A. Petrov gave the order:

"1. The military and the bourgeois-capitalist clique of Romania, preparing provocative actions against the USSR, concentrated large military forces on the border with the USSR, increased the number of border pickets to 100 people, increased the number of detachments sent to guard the border, and at an accelerated pace is building defensive structures along its border and in the near future. rear. 2. The commander of the Southern Front set the task before the border units of the Western District: a) to clear mines, capture and hold bridges on the border rivers; b) stubbornly defend the state border on the front of the 12th Army where units of the Red Army will not operate; c) provide parts of the Red Army with conductors; d) clear the rear of the 12th army from possible enemy pockets in the border zone of Romania ... "[867] .

Concentration and grouping of troops of the Southern Front

While the detailed development of the plan of the operation continued, concrete Soviet military preparations began to resolve the Bessarabian issue. Apparently, having received at 20.50–21.55 June 9 The corresponding instructions political [868] manuals, Shaposhnikov at 0.35-1.00 on June 10 sent cipher telegrams similar in content to the commanders of the KOVO and OdVO troops.

“The People's Commissar of Defense

ordered: 1. The organization of tank corps and divisions should not be carried out and the instructions given to you on this

issue should be canceled. 2. Immediately put on alert and prepare for transfer by railroad and marching ": in KOVO - the department of the 12th Army, the department of the Army Cavalry Group, the departments of the 17th, 13th, 8th, 15th and 49th th rifle corps with corps units, 2nd and 4th cavalry corps, 58th, 139th, 72nd, 192nd, 81st, 7th, 141st, 131st, 62 th, 60th, 124th, 146th, 80th, 169th, 130th, 135th, 44th and 140th rifle divisions, 5th, 3rd, 34th th, 16th, 32nd, 9th, 14th Cavalry Divisions, 23rd, 24th, 5th, 38th, 36th, 10th, 14th, 26th -th tank brigades; in OdVO - directorates of the 35th

and 7th rifle corps with corps units, 15th, 51st, 95th, 173rd, 176th, 147th, 30th and 25th rifle divisions , 4th tank brigade. “All artillery regiments of the RGK and all pontoon facilities.

3. Put all aviation of the district and air defense systems on alert. 4. All rifle and cavalry

divisions, tank brigades, corps directorates, air bases and air defense systems are put on alert in the existing states without lifting the assigned staff and transport from the national economy.

5. One day is given to prepare for the performance. The beginning of the transfer and movement from 00.05 minutes on

June 11. 6. Disbandment of the rear units to be reduced, and suspend layoff.

7. Additional instructions will be given on the points of concentration, the order of movement and the transfer. 8. All work to bring parts of the

district to combat readiness should be carried out in strict secrecy, involving a limited circle of people at the headquarters, all correspondence should be conducted only in cipher and only through me "[869] .

At 11.20–11.30 on June 10, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army sent top secret directives No. OU/583 and No. OU/584, respectively, to the commanders of the OdVO and KOVO troops, according to which it was required:

"1. In marching order, concentrate in new areas the following parts":

In the OdVO: "a) the Department of the Army Headquarters allocated by the district - Grosulovo by the morning of June 15;

b) Ex. 35 sk with hull units - Chern by the morning of June 12; 95th rifle division - Rybnitsa, Voronkovo by the morning of June 12; 176th rifle division - Dubossary, New Koshnitsa by the morning of June 13; 110 gap RGK - Voronkovo by the morning of June 13; 522 gap RGK and 39 artillery divisions b / m - Dubossary, Nov. Alexandrov by the morning of June 14; c) 51 sd - Malaesti, Tiraspol by the

morning of June 13; 15th motorized rifle division - Karmanovo, Glinnoye, Pavlovka by the morning of June 12; 4 brigade - Shibka by the morning of June 13; 320 popes of the RGK - Grigoriopol. In KOVO: "a) Directorate of the 12th Army - Kolomyia by

the morning of June 13; b) Ex. 13 sk with hull units - Kossow by the morning of June 15; 192

GSD - Ustseryki by the morning of June 17; 139 GSD - Kutuy by the morning of June 12;

c) Ex. 8 sk with hull units - Ilintsa by the morning of June 17; 172 GSD - Dzhurov, Prince by the morning of June 15; d) Ex. 17 sk with hull units -

Volchkovtse by the morning of June 12;

58 sd - Snyatyn - by the morning of June 12;

e) 7th RD - Dzvinych - by the morning of June 14; 81 msd - Zablotoy by the morning of June 13; e) Ex. 4

kk with corps - Klyuchuv by the morning of June 14;

34 cd - Klyuchuv by the morning of June 14; 16 cd - Yablunov by the morning of June 12;

g) Ex. 2 kk with corps - Kolomyia by the morning of June 16; 3 cd - Spas by the morning of June 16; 5 cd - Podgaychiki by the morning of June 16; 32 cd - Gvozdets - by the morning of June 15;

h) 23 brigade - Pyastyn by the morning of June 12; 24 brigade - Klyuchuv by the morning of June 13; 5 brigade - Zadrubovtse by the morning of June 13;

i) 168th GAP RGK - Ilintsa by the morning of June 13; 324 ran RGK - Bele-lyya by the

morning of June 14; j) Command of the caval group with its units and command of the 49th brigade with corps units -

Dunaevtsy by the morning of June 12; k) 80 sd - Yanchitsy, Bagovitsa by the morning of June 14; 169th rifle division - Kurazhino, Olkhovets by the morning of

June 16; 137 GAP RGK -

Mogilev-Podolsky district by the morning of June 14; m) 14 cd - by the end of June 16. 2.

Marches with camouflage measures, using mainly the night. 3. Material support of projected directives. 4.

Issue topographic maps according to the norms of mobile sets to units in new areas. For the period of the march, provide units with current allowance cards. 5. Take all measures to keep the

movement of troops secret,

For what:

a) prohibit all correspondence related to the movement of troops with the chiefs of the military branches and services, conducting it only through the headquarters and in cipher;

b) all military radio stations that have changed their location, work only for reception;

c) demand the strictest camouflage measures from the troops and prohibit the advance of the main forces of divisions closer than 5 km to the

border. 6. March to start on

June 10. 7. Reports on the movement of units and the areas they have reached by 10 and 22 hours daily in cipher. Pay special attention to communication with the units and the obligatory receipt from them of data on the areas reached. On the same day at 12.20 Shaposhnikov sent

directive No. OU/587/ss/ov to the commander of the OdVO troops, according to which it was required:

"1. Parts arriving by rail after unloading focus on the following areas:

a) Ex. 7 sk with body parts - Shibka; 147 RD - Grigoriopol, Tashlyk, Savvy; 120 ran RGK - Kassel; 124 ran RGK - Malaesti, Flat; 429 ran RGK - Near Khutor, Tiraspol;

b) 30 rifle division - 5 km east and southeast of Ovidiopol; 25 sd - Odessa; 430 gap RGK - Odessa.

2. Concentration should be carried out by echelon as units are unloaded, avoiding the accumulation of troops both at unloading stations and in their areas. 3. To issue topographic

maps to all units at unloading stations
cards according to the norms of mob kits.

4. The plan for the transportation of the units listed in the first paragraph will be given by the Head of the Red Army.

5. Instructions on the concentration of parts of aviation, communications, engineering, road and motor transport and logistics institutions will follow additionally.

6. Reports on the progress of transportation, indicating the arriving units present to me by 10 and 22 o'clock daily in cipher"[871] .

However, already at 18.50 on June 10, Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov sent directive No. OU / 589 / especially secret to the commander of the OdVO troops, clarifying the previous orders: "In addition to No. OU / 583 and

No. OU / 587, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered: 1. Exercise. 35 sk with hull units to concentrate

Shibka by the morning of June 13; 173 sd - Dubossary; 176th Rifle Division - the campaign of Grigoriopol by the morning of June 13; 2. Exerc. 7 sk with hull parts to

concentrate Odessa. 3. 110 ran RGK by the Karmanovka campaign by the morning of June 13th. 4. 147 sd, 120 and 124 ran RGCs will be removed from the district. 429 ran RGC will not arrive in the district"[872] . In addition, it was decided to

strengthen the troops of the Southern Front at the expense of the internal districts and troops concentrated for the Baltic operation. On June 10, the Directive of the General Staff No. OM / 706 was sent to the Military Council of the KhVO, according to which it was necessary to prepare the department of the 55th rifle corps for redeployment to the OdVO. On June 12, the General Staff ordered the transfer of the 74th and 164th Rifle Divisions of the North Caucasus Military District to the OdVO. On June 14, the Military Council of the KhVO received the directive of the General Staff No. OU / 25, which demanded that the 116th Rifle Division be transferred to the OdVO[873] . On June 15, the Black Sea Fleet was put on alert. At 23.00 on June 17, the chief of the General Staff ordered the commander of the LVO troops to "prepare for the transfer to

another district 8, 17, 86 and 100 rifle divisions "concentrated on the territory of the district as a reserve in case of fighting in the Baltic. All these formations were to be ready for loading by 18 June 18[874] . Accordingly, the commander of the KOVO was ordered:

"1. Four rifle divisions transferred from the LVO concentrate in the front reserve:

a) 8th, 17th and 86th line divisions in the area of Chortkiv, Kamenetz-Podolsk,

Dunaevtsy; b) 100 line division - in the area of Vasilyevka, Frunzovka, Calm. 2. In connection with the strengthening of the KOVO troops with

four new divisions, the transfer of the 97th rifle division

to the 12th army should be canceled "[875] . The 21st tank brigade, which took part in the Baltic operation, was withdrawn from Lithuania, by the morning of June 20 it was concentrated in Molodechno and sent by rail to the OdVO, the first echelons of the brigade began to arrive on June 26[876].

On June 20 , 214- I am the BOVO airborne brigade, transferred by June 26 to Kalinovka at the disposal of the Southern Front. On June 20, the 201st airborne brigade of the LVO, which was not used in Estonia, received an order from the General Staff to relocate to the disposal of the Southern Front and was transferred from Soltsy to Skomorohi by June 25[877]. On June 26, by its directive No. OM / 755, the General Staff ordered the Military Council of the KalVO to transfer communications units from Idritsa to Kiev at the disposal of the KOVO[878] . In addition, on the same day, the commander of the 14th Rifle Corps of the OdVO was ordered to organize the defense of the Black Sea coast from Ochakov to Cape Zhelezny. By the morning of June 28, units of the 156th Infantry Division were deployed on the western coast of Crimea from Ak-Mechet to Nikolaevka, as well as in Feodosia and Kerch[879] .

Along with the concentration of ground forces, the Air Force of the Southern Front was also strengthened. On June 17, the chief of the General Staff ordered the commander of the BOVO to return to KOVO the 17th, 20th, 149th fighter and 14th heavy bomber regiments, which had been transferred to the BOVO by June 11 to participate in the Baltic operation, and, in addition, to redeploy the 33rd th fighter, 13th, 16th, 60th high-speed bomber and 1st heavy bomber regiments and controls of the 16th and 56th air brigades. It was necessary to "pay special attention to the special secrecy

transfers"[880]. By June 19, all these regiments, which included 408 aircraft, arrived in KOVO[881]. On the same day, the commander of the BOVO was ordered to transfer the 51st long-range bomber regiment to the KOVO, and the commander of the LVO was ordered to transfer the 44th, 58th high-speed bomber regiments and the command of the 55th air brigade to the OdVO[882]. On June 21, the LVO received an order to transfer the 3rd and 7th heavy bomber regiments and the command of the 29th air brigade to the OdVO[883]. All these air regiments, consisting of 206 aircraft, arrived at the disposal of the Air Force of the Southern Front on June 22[884].—

In the meantime, having received directives from Moscow, the command of the KOVO and OdVO within 15 minutes notified the troops about putting them on alert, and at 15.04–21.45 on June 10 gave orders to concentrate. Lieutenant-General F.S. Ivanov, head of the Combat Training Department, Major General V.V. Panyukhov, Chief of Artillery KOVO Lieutenant General N.D. Yakovlev, head of the group for special assignments at the Military Council of the KOVO, Major General D.I. Averkin. The commanders and political workers of the headquarters of the districts were sent to direct the unloading of troops at the stations of Zhmerinka, Proskurov, Grechany, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Kolomyia[885]. On June 11, the People's Commissar of Defense sent a memorandum No. 16643 / ss to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and

the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which asked for 30 and 20 thousand rations, respectively, to be credited to the boiler allowance of the commanding staff of the KOVO and OdVO[886]. On June 13, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1024-395ss, issued on the same day, according to which the People's Commissariat of Defense was allowed to "enroll the commanding staff of those military units" of the KOVO and OdVO, "which have front-line tasks, with withholding for the issued food ration of its value, as performing work in the field"[887]. At 4 pm on the same day, Shaposhnikov sent a cipher telegram No. OU / 789 to the chiefs of staff of the KOVO and OdVO outlining measures to organize the rear and material support of the troops. In particular, it was required to provide the troops with 4 daily dachas of food, 1.25 ammunition ammunition, 3 refueling for combat vehicles and 2 refueling for transport vehicles. "Issue to the military personnel for

hands concentrate for one day and have them in the wagon train for two daily dachas. Give mechanized units and cavalry three daily rations of concentrates. In addition, at the supply stations it was necessary to have 2 ammunition ammuniton, from 3 to 5 daily food dachas and 2 refueling for all vehicles[888] .

On June 14, the People's Commissar of Defense sent a memorandum No. 16658/ss to the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: "The use of mobilization stocks of property stored at the bases of the NKPS is provided for the restoration of the theaters of war railways. In

order to timely prepare and organize the material supply of the technical subject railway lines, I ask you restoration

to: 1) Unbook the mobilization stocks of

property according to

the following local bases of the

NKPS: a) No. 50 Art. Filino, Yaroslavl Railway - bridge property, b)

No. 30 Art. Bologoe, Oktyabrskaya

railway, c) No. 12 st. Moscow,

Western railway, d) No. 19 st.

Vyazma, Western railway, e) No. 25 st. Vorozhba,

Moscow-Kyiv railway, f) No. 32 st.

Grebenka, South-Western Railway 2) Grant the right to use this

property to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for its intended purpose, in accordance with the operational plans of the Military Councils of the military c

3) To oblige the NKPS by

16.6.40 to: a) Deploy the head bases of restoration property in points, concentrating materials on each of them in the amount of 1-2 daily needs for these materials for the restoration of railway lines in agreement with the NPO", - Stry, Kopychintsy, Tarnopol, Zhmerinka, Slobodka and Razdelnaya and "bring to a state of full readiness for the performance of loading operations the above-mentioned, both local and head bases"[889] . On the same day, in his memorandum No. 16659 / ss, the People's Commissar of Defense requested the Defense Committee "to strengthen the railway units of the Red Army in the course of work on the restoration of railway lines" to oblige the NKPS to "raise field formations" in the amount of 7 head repair and restoration

trains (goremov), 4 trains for the restoration of water supply (vodrema), 4 columns for the restoration of communications and signaling (svyazrema), 2 military operations departments (VEO) and 4 directorates of the head restoration departments (GVOTa). Of these, for KOVO - 4 griefs, 2 vodrems and 2 liaisons, 1 VEO and 2 GVOTs and for OdVO - 3 gorems, 2 vodrems and 2 liaisons, 1 VEO and 2 GVOTs [890]

On June 15 and 16, these issues were agreed with the NKPS, but on June 17, the Chief of the General Staff sent memorandum No. 122167 / ss to the Defense Committee, which significantly reduced mobilization measures for railway units. It was proposed to unpack the mob reserves of property at bases No. 22 (station Bryansk, Moscow-Kiev railway), No. 25 (station Vorozhba), No. 32 (station Grebenka), No. 50 (station Filino) and deploy in the previously indicated points by June 21 head bases of restoration property. It was necessary to oblige the NKPS to mobilize 4 GVOTs, 3 VEOs, 8 gorems, 4 [891] vodrems and 4 svyazrems by June 21. On June 23, the Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. it was necessary within 5 days to deploy the head bases of the restoration railway property in Tarnopol, Kopychintsy, Strya, Zhmerinka, Slobodka and Razdelnaya. Each base should have a stock of materials unpacked from the NKPS bases in Bryansk, Vorozhba, Grebenka and Filino for 2 days of work. The NKPS was supposed to deploy 4 directorates of the head restoration departments, 3 military operations departments, 8 head repair and restoration trains, 4 trains to restore water supply and 4 columns to restore communications and signaling[892]. Meanwhile, on June 15, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army sent memorandum No. 144837/ss to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with a number of draft resolutions of the Economic Council

under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In particular, it was proposed to unbook the mobilization stocks of fuels and lubricants in the warehouses of the People's Commissariat of Defense in the KOVO, OdVO, KhVO and mobilization funds for food forage, anti-tetanus and anti-gangrenous serum in the KOVO and OdVO, to supply the troops of these two districts with shag, smoking paper and matches, and also to form

sanitary institutions in KOVO, OdVO and KhVO. "I ask for your instructions on the urgent implementation of the planned measures"[893]. On June 19, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1052-406ss, 1053-407ss and 1056-4 Yuss, issued on the same day, which allowed 13,650 tons of flour, 4,100 tons of cereals, 3,400 tons of meat and canned meat, 1,500 tons of fish and canned fish, 1,000 tons of fat, 1,700 tons of pasta, 700 tons of sugar, 850 tons of salt, 30 tons of tea, 135 tons of dry vegetables, 13,000 boxes of makhorka, 4,550 thousand smoking paper books, 1950 thousand boxes of matches, 150 tons of soap, 22,500 tons of oats, 30 thousand tons of hay and 54,327 tons of fuel and lubricants (see table 5). In addition, the People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry was supposed to ship to NGOs in June 2,200 tons of aviation gasoline, 25,100 tons of gasoline, 7,650 tons of naphtha, 5,720 tons of diesel fuel, 1,400 tons of kerosene, 500 tons of aviation oils, 1,210 tons of autol, 590 tons of grease and 350 tons of diesel lubricants. The KOVO and OdVO troops in the field were to be given 600 grams of tobacco per person per month, 3 boxes of matches and 7 books of smoking paper, 50 sheets each[894]. Accordingly, at 23.40 on June 20, the Chief of the General Staff, by his directives No. 434 and No. 446, demanded that the Military Councils of the KOVO and the OdVO take decisive measures to accumulate the above stocks in the troops and at supply stations[895]. Table 5. **Unpacked amount of fuel and lubricants (in tons).**

	БОВО	КОВО	ОдВО	ХВО	Итого
Авиабензин	2500	21 035	2417	8397	34 349
Бензин	—	13 155	—	3227	16 382
Авиамасло	—	578	213	343	1134
Автол	—	1533	10	327	1870
Солидол	—	501	2	89	592
Итого	2500	36 802	2642	12 383	54 327

Also on June 19, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1054-408ss and 1055-409ss, issued on the same day, according to which anti-tetanus anti-gangrenous serum was unbooked from the mobilization funds of the KOVO and OdVO, the People's Commissariat of Defense should have deployed 11

evacuation hospitals, 14 auto-surgical-epidemiological hospitals, 2 sanitary-epidemiological detachments, 5 sanitary-epidemiological detachments, 39 field mobile hospitals, 2 hospital base departments, 6 auto-sanitary companies, 2 sanitary depots, 4 head sanitary depots, 3 field departments of evacuation centers with laundries and disinfection teams, 10 head evacuation centers, 6 evacuation centers, 20 military sanitary trains, and the People's Commissariat of Health - 36 evacuation hospitals and 2 river sanitary ships[896]. According to the report of the command of the Southern Front, 16 field hospitals, 6 departments of field evacuation points, 4 infectious diseases hospitals, 2 auto-sanitots, 5 auto-surgical detachments, 12 ambulance trains were formed according to the wartime states, hospitals in Lvov, Tarnopol, Proskurov were prepared to receive the wounded, Odessa and Ochakov. To support the combat operations of the troops, 34 various warehouses, 5 bakeries, 7 field mobile hospitals, 3 evacuation and 8 field veterinary infirmaries, 9 working companies were deployed. To replenish the loss of personnel, there were 17 marching battalions assigned by the General Staff, 10 marching battalions formed in the KOVO and OdVO, 5 spare sapper companies and 225 tank crews[897]. June 20 People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov sent a memorandum No. 2654ss to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: "In connection with the retraining and training camps of mobilized ships and coastal units in the Black Sea Fleet, there is a need to expand — existing hospitals and call for a training camp of one ambulance transport.

Given the dire need to expand medical institutions, please allow:

1. Deploy Odessa and Ochakov naval hospitals up to 200 beds each, staffing their staff with conscripts. 2. To call for a training camp from 20.6.40, for a period of 3

months, the vessel of the NKMF "Chekhov" to use it as an ambulance transport"[898]. Accordingly, on June 22, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union —

Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued on June 23

270ss "On the expansion of the Odessa, Ochakovsky naval hospitals of the Black Sea Fleet and on the call of the Chekhov ship for ambulance transport", according to which the NKVMF should have carried out these activities by June 25 and allowed to call up 287 conscripts from the reserve[899] .

In the meantime, on June 11, the troops of the KOVO and OdVO, under the guise of a training campaign, began to concentrate, which was supposed to end on June 24. However, this process encountered a number of difficulties. A serious problem for the troops was bringing them to combat readiness without calling up assigned staff, which required the redistribution of military personnel to form the necessary rear and auxiliary units. To do this, nearly 35,000 Red Army soldiers were recruited from the combat units, poorly prepared to fulfill the new duties assigned to them. The lack of commanding staff of the rear specialties and medical personnel was made up for by their conscription from the reserve. Almost 60% of the troops were transferred by rail, the rest - on foot. During the concentration, the poor organization of the traffic control service was revealed, which led to the crossing of columns, traffic jams and the wandering of individual units and units. The weak discipline of the march had an effect - the columns stretched out, the military personnel left the line and moved in a crowd, the units were located in the bivouacs in disarray. In the first days, a significant number of abrasions were revealed in people and horse composition. The troops moved practically without observing elementary camouflage measures, with music and songs; at night, vehicles clearly unmasked the movement with undarkened headlights. The lack of transport led to the fact that the troops that set out on the campaign were not able to immediately take the necessary weapons and equipment, which led to a delay in concentration, because it required several flights of available

cars.

Certain difficulties also arose in the rail transportation of troops, since there was no transportation plan. The order of the General Staff on transportation was received only at 18.30 on June 12, although the transportation was supposed to begin at 18.00 that day. In reality, they began on June 13, however, the echelons were delivered 1–5 hours late, the cars were often dirty. Mess in

organization of transportation was so noticeable that on June 16 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. stations, and disperse it over a wider front along a number of nearby stations "on the territory of the KOVO and OdVO, as well as form full military echelons and prevent their redirection. The inconsistent work of the Department of Military Communications and the NKPS led to the fact that instead of the required 709 echelons, the troops received about a third less[900] .

All these difficulties led to the fact that the troops did not have time to concentrate by June 24th. Therefore, on June 23, the commander of the Southern Front sent report No. A-1 / 00146 / ss / s to the Commissar of Defense: "Fulfilling your directive, the troops of the KOVO and OdVO began to concentrate from 10.6.1940. **By now:** 12th Army:

a) **Rifle troops:** Of the twelve rifle divisions, six have concentrated, the rest are concentrating. At the same time, by the end of 24.6, only two will be concentrated. The rest during: 25.6 - one, 26.6 - two, 27.6 - one.

b) **Cavalry:** The cavalry group is fully concentrated. c) **Tank troops:** Of the six tank brigades, four were concentrated. Two will finish concentration by the end of 24.6. d) **Artillery:** Of the seven artillery regiments and two divisions of the RGC, four artillery regiments were concentrated. The remaining artillery regiments are only being loaded. The speed of their concentration will depend on the timely supply of rolling stock and on the provision of tractors.

Artillery battalions unloaded completely and by 24.6 will focus. Until

now, KAPs 17 sk (269 and 274), 13 sk (468), 8 sk (236), 253 gap 141 sd have not been concentrated due to the failure to supply trains and due to a lack of tractors. Thus, by the end of

June 24, the 12th Army will have in its composition:

Eight sd out of 12.

Four RGK artillery regiments
out of 7. Two RGK
artillery divisions. Kavgroup in
full force. Full readiness of the 12th army - by the end
of

27.6.40. 5th army: a) **Rifle**

troops: Of the five rifle divisions, four have concentrated, the last must
complete the concentration by 24.6. b) **Tank**

troops: Of the two tank
brigades, one has concentrated, the second will complete the concentration
on 23.6. c) **Artillery:**

Of the three artillery
regiments and one artillery division of the RGK, one artillery regiment was
concentrated. One artillery regiment and artillery battalion will concentrate on
25.6. The third artillery regiment is awaiting loading.

Thus, by the end of June 24, all rifle divisions, tank brigades, one artillery
regiment will be fully concentrated. By the end of June 24, separate divisions
and batteries can concentrate from the second artillery regiment and the artillery
division. Full readiness

of the 5th army - outcome 26.6.40. 9th army: a)

Rifle

troops: Commands 37th
and 55th brigades did not arrive. Of the
thirteen rifle divisions, eight were concentrated; finished shipping three;
started transportation alone (150[s]); there is no information about 116 [th].

b) **Cavalry:** Management 5 kk concentrated. On June 21, 15 echelons of
9 cd and 19–32 cd were unloaded. 5 kk will finish concentration 24.6. c) **Tank**

troops: Of the three

tank brigades, the 4 [th] brigade concentrated, the 14 [th] brigade began
to arrive on 21.6, 6 echelons unloaded. 0 21 tbr no information. d) **Artillery:** Of
the six artillery

regiments of the RGK, four were concentrated. 429 ap began to arrive on
21.6. The 317th artillery division, due to the lack of tractors, cannot move to the
area of concentration. We must assume that by the end of

24.6 out of thirteen rifle divisions
Eleven will be there.

The cavalry will concentrate. Two tank brigades will be in place, 21 brigade may not come up. Of the six artillery regiments, four will be at full strength, two may not be fully concentrated. The concentration of 317 artillery divisions depends on the provision of tractors. Measures taken. Full readiness of the 9th army will be no earlier than 27.6. **Troop condition.** security

rifle and artillery

weapons

incomplete:

1. Part of the artillery regiments do not have fully 152-mm howitzers (375 rgk gaps out of 48 have 30, gaps: 62 sd have 9, 146 sd - 10, 135 sd - 5; 169 sd - 6). 2. There are no mines for 50 and 120 mm

mortars in the Okrug's mob reserve, no hand grenades; no shots for 122 mm guns. There is a shortage in the tractor park for artillery on the

mechtyag. Of the 250 tractors released by the center, only 110 arrived. Due to the additional lifting of 330 gaps of the RGK BM, even if the full 250 tractors for artillery were received, 106 tractors would not be enough. The delay in the arrival of tractors already released puts artillery in a difficult situation. The shortage of tractors falls on corps artillery and RGK artillery, the need for which will be especially noticeable in the first 2-3 days. Of the six tank brigades of the 12th Army, four are equipped with combat vehicles by 80% (23.24, 5.10), the remaining two are poorly equipped: 26 brigade came out with 38 tanks, at present the number of tanks has been increased to 130, 38 brigade has 87 tanks.

Of the two tank brigades of the 5th army, 36 brigade has 100, 49 brigade - 81 tank.

The technical condition of the machines is satisfactory. Only 39% are provided with tanks and a barrel-packing brigade. Therefore, tank brigades can take only one to two refills of fuel with them. There is no possibility of obtaining barrels.

Mobile and repair means tank units secured by 35–50%.

The percentage of provision with tractors is low - by an average of 58%. There are no tractors in the armies ... **Front Air Force.**

On June 22, 1940, the Air Force of the front concentrated: 21 fighter regiments, 12 SB regiments, 5 DB air regiments, 2 assault air regiments, 2 light bomber regiments, 4 heavy air regiments. Fighters - 1155, bombers - 869, light bombers - 110, attack aircraft - 93, reconnaissance aircraft - 61.

In total, there are 2298 crews, 2242 aircraft (as in the text, correctly - 2288. - MM).

12 air bases are deployed at operational airfields, 11 air bases are not deployed. By the end of June 24, 1940, 18 air bases will be deployed. 7 air bases following by railroads from other districts will arrive on 25–26.6.40.” The general conclusion of General Zhukov was that “the full readiness of the Southern Front for the offensive will be ensured by the end of 26 - the morning of 27.6. The delay in the concentration of troops, the organization of the rear and the general readiness for a decisive offensive is a consequence of the failure of the railways to fulfill the transportation plan. The troops of the front can go on to a decisive offensive with the aim of crushing the Romanian army before dawn on 27.7.40 . At 00.55 on June 25, a report was received from Grosulov to Moscow by the Deputy People's Commissar for Defense, Colonel-General A.D. Loktionov, who "acquainted himself in detail on the spot with the section of the main direction of the offensive of the 9th Army" and "came to the conclusion that the—

army would be ready for the offensive only by the end of 26.6"[902] . On June 25, at 13.40, the Chief of the General Staff ordered the command of the Southern Front, the Degtyarev submachine guns deployed on airplanes at his disposal, “to issue to the troops as soon as possible at the rate of at least two submachine guns for each rifle platoon per squad in as well as to provide and one submachine gun reconnaissance units”, “all forward units with mine-catchers, so that the troops would be armed with these means in advance”[903]. A little later, at 15.05 of the same day, an order was received from Moscow from the People's Commissar of Defense "to bring ammunition into the troops and supply stations in the most energetic way and create the necessary supplies, both in the troops and at supply stations. For the import of ammunition, mobilize all vehicles, including military vehicles, in order to maximize the import"[904] . The non-deployment of the rear and the irregularity of the approach of echelons with ammunition led to the fact that shells with

disguises were stored near the railroad tracks, from where they were gradually taken out by the available vehicles. As a result, by June 28, it was possible to bring the mobile stocks of troops up to 1.5 ammunition, 2 refueling and 8 daily food distributions. True, due to the lack of the necessary vehicles and the large shortage of tractors and trailers in the artillery units, the troops could actually take 73 less ammunition with them, the rest were piled on the ground in the deployment areas. At the supply stations in the 12th Army, 0.6 ammunition, 0.6 refueling and 9 daily allowances were accumulated, in the 5th Army - 1.75 ammunition, 2 refueling and 16 daily allowances, and in the 9th Army - 1.5 ammunition, 1 refueling and 3 daily —

delivery[905] . Despite all these difficulties, by the evening of June 27, almost all the troops of the Southern Front (commander - General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, member of the Military Council - Army Commissar of the 2nd rank V.N. Borisov, chief of staff - Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin) were pulled up and deployed in accordance with the plan. The troops of the 12th Army (commander at the time of the operation - Lieutenant General Ya.T. Cherevichenko), who were in Ciscarpathia, were deployed to the southeast. The army headquarters was relocated from Stanislav to Kolomyia, where the 8th, 13th, 15th, 17th rifle corps and the Army cavalry group as part of the 2nd and 4th cavalry corps were subordinate to it. Part of the troops of the 5th Army, deployed in Volhynia, was reassigned to the 6th and 12th armies. The headquarters of the 5th Army (commander for the duration of the operation - Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko) was transferred from Lutsk to Dunaevtsy on June 15-16, where the 36th and 49th rifle corps were subordinated to it. From the troops of the OdVO, replenished at the expense of the KOVO, KhVO and North Caucasian Military District, the 9th Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin) was deployed as part of the 7th, 35th, 37th, 55th rifle and 5th Cavalry Corps, whose headquarters is located in Grosulovo (no

The troops of the Southern Front included 32 rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 6 cavalry divisions, 11 tank and 3 airborne brigades, 14 corps artillery regiments, 16 RGK artillery regiments and 4 high-capacity artillery divisions. The total number of front troops, according to incomplete data, was at least 638,559 people, 9,415 guns and mortars, 2,461 tanks, 359 armored vehicles, 28,056 vehicles (see table 7) [906] .

Table 6.

Grouping of troops of the Southern Front on June 28, 1940 [\[907\]](#)

Армии	Корпуса		Дивизии и бригады
			8-я, 17-я, 86-я, 100-я СД, 201-я, 204-я, 214-я адбр
12-я	13-й СК		60-я, 62-я, 139-я СД, 23-я тбр
	8-й СК		72-я, 124-я, 146-я СД, 10-я, 24-я, 26-я тбр
	КМГ	2-й КК	3-я, 5-я КД
		4-й КК	16-я, 34-я КД
			81-я МСД
	17-й СК		58-я, 131-я СД, 5-я, 38-я тбр
	15-й СК		7-я, 141-я СД
			192-я ГСД
5-я	49-й СК		44-я, 80-я, 135-я СД, 36-я, 49-я тбр
	36-й СК		130-я, 169-я СД
9-я			140-я, 150-я СД
	35-й СК		95-я, 173-я СД
	37-й СК		30-я, 147-я, 176-я СД, 14-я тбр
	5-й КК		9-я, 32-я КД, 15-я МСД, 4-я, 21-я тбр
	7-й СК		51-я, 164-я СД
	55-й СК		25-я, 74-я, 116-я СД

Table 7.

Number and armament of the troops of the Southern Front

Войска	Личный состав	Орудия и минометы	Танки	Броне-машины	Авто машины
12-я армия*	233 673	3392	1546	190	11 062
5-я армия*	78 477	1269	322	59	3340
9-я армия	267 391	4238	589	99	12 104
Итого**	638 559	9415	2461	359	28 056

* The information is

incomplete. ** The overall result is derived taking into account the available data on the front-line troops, as well as the rear units and ground services of the Air Force, whose subordination to the 12th and 5th armies could not be established.

The Front Air Force grouping united 21 fighter, 12 high-speed bomber, 5 long-range bomber, 2 light bomber, 2 assault, 4 heavy bomber regiments and by June 24 had 2160 aircraft[908] . The build-up of the aviation group continued (see Table 8). In addition, the 40th high-speed bomber, 8th, 9th, 32nd fighter regiments, 1 heavy bomber squadron of the 2nd 4th reconnaissance squadron and 2 squadrons, in which there were 380 aircraft, were involved in the operation from the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. [909] . Table 8 _
long-range bomber regiment,

Фронт, армии	Авиа бригады	Авиаполки	Эскадрильи	Самолеты
Южный фронт	7-я	8-й, 11-й, 51-й, 90-й дбап	—	160
	29-я	1-й, 3-й, 7-й, 14-й тбап	—	122
	22-я	2-й, 43-й иап	—	130
		46-й, 89-й, 20-й иап, 48-й сбап	24-я драэ	146
Всего	3	14	1	558
12-я А	16-я	13-й, 16-й сбап	—	83
	35-я	7-й шап, 94-й сбап, 138-й лбап	—	129
	56-я	3-й шап, 33-й, 149-й иап	—	135
	69-я	23-й, 28-й, 91-й иап	—	130
		12-й, 17-й иап	5-я, 8-я драэ, 36-я, 44-я раз, 20-й, 12-й као, 3-я аз	152
Всего	4	13	7	629
5-я А	10-я	33-й, 60-й, 86-й сбап	—	168
	38-я	87-й, 88-й, 92-й иап	—	159
			47-я раз, 7-й као	17
Всего	2	6	2	344
9-я А	1-я	4-й, 131-й иап, 132-й сбап	—	187
	13-я	21-й дбап, 44-й, 45-й сбап	—	144
	43-я	5-й сбап, 55-й, 67-й, 69-й иап	—	229
	55-я	11-й лбап, 58-й сбап, 146-й иап	—	149
			42-я, 48-я раз	22
Всего	4	13	2	731
Итого	13	46	8 раз, 3 као, 1 аз	2 262

On June 21, 1940, the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissar 1st rank L.3. Mehlis sent the Military Councils and the heads of the Political Directorates of the KOVO and the OdVO directive No. 5285/ss on political work during the Bessarabian campaign, which explained the actions of the USSR as follows: we have Bessarabia. Our brothers live in Bessarabia in appalling poverty and drag out a miserable

existence", which was confirmed by excerpts from the Romanian press. "The

government of the royal dictatorship supplements the economic oppression of the popular masses of Bessarabia with political and national ones. Ethnographically, Bessarabia has nothing to do with Romania. No more than 9.1% of Romanians live there. The rest of the population is Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans. Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans, under pain of a court, are forbidden to speak their native language. Their cultural institutions and schools were destroyed.

The Rumanian capitalists and landowners subject the Russian and Ukrainian population in Bessarabia to especially cruel abuse. They beat and destroy everyone who sympathizes with the Soviet Union to some extent. The desire

of the Bessarabian population to free themselves from the Romanian oppression is reflected in mass revolutionary uprisings and uprisings, which were brutally suppressed throughout the 22 years of the occupation of Bessarabia. Thus, the Khotyn (1919) and Tatarbunar (1924) armed uprisings were drowned in the blood of the working people. Bessarabian prisons are overflowing with political prisoners and peasants.

The Soviet Union never recognized the capture of Bessarabia by boyar Romania. On March 5, 1918, according to the Iasi peace treaty with Soviet Russia, Romania promised to clear Bessarabia of its troops and return it to our Motherland within 2 months. Romania, with the support of England and France, did not fulfill

this treaty. The time has come to wrest our land from the thieves' hands of boyar Romania, to rescue our brothers and citizens from Romanian captivity. Stolen Bessarabia must be and will be returned to the bosom of its motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In order to prepare the troops for the upcoming military operations, the Political Directorate of the Red Army "obliged the political agencies" to explain to all personnel the foreign policy of the USSR, to expose Romania, which had seized our Soviet land by thieves. We are going to liberate our half-brothers Ukrainians, Russians and Moldavians from the yoke of boyar Romania and save them from the threat of ruin and extinction. Rescuing Soviet Bessarabia from the yoke of the Rumanian capitalists and landowners, we defend and strengthen

our southern and southwestern borders. (Do this on the evening before the speech) ... "It

was required" by all party-political work to create a military upsurge in parts, an offensive impulse that ensures the rapid defeat of the enemy (capturing his main forces and clearing Bessarabia) ... The task of the Red Army, as indicated above, is to return Bessarabia to our Motherland and rescue our half-brothers and citizens from boyar captivity. On its banners the Red Army brings freedom to the working people from exploitation and national oppression. The workers will be liberated from capitalist slavery, the unemployed will get jobs, farm laborers, landless and landless peasants will receive the lands of the Rumanian landlords, taxes will be lightened and temporarily completely removed. An end will be put to the wild system of "Romanization" of Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans. The population of Bessarabia will have the opportunity to build their own culture, national in form and socialist in content.

Bessarabia will become a Soviet outpost on our southern and southwestern borders... Preparations for the offensive must be carried out in the strictest secrecy. Resolutely deal with talkativeness. Everyone should know only what he is supposed to know and within the prescribed time ... The texts of the leaflets to the soldiers and the population will be given by the Political Directorate of the Red Army. They will have to be scattered all over Bessarabia by planes on the first day of the offensive ... "In order to prevent possible

looting and" junk work ", it was necessary to" instruct the personnel on the attitude towards the civilian population "and prohibit" all military personnel from making any personal purchases in stores regardless of faces. Measures were envisaged for work among the enemy troops, the main goal of which "is to quickly disintegrate his army, demoralize the rear and thus help the command of the Red Army achieve complete victory in the shortest possible time and with the least sacrifice." It was necessary "to show on concrete facts the plight of the working masses, especially farm laborers and small landowners, in Bessarabia, terror and violence in the rear by the police and gendarmerie apparatus ... To explain to the Romanian soldiers the injustice and hopelessness of the war against the USSR and the tasks of the Red Army. Expose the arbitrariness of officers at the front,

capitalists, landowners, officials and policemen in the rear... To promote the transition of soldiers to our side and anti-war sentiments in the enemy army. Broadly propagate every fact of the defeat of the Romanian troops. Show the happy and joyful life of workers and peasants in the USSR. Explain how the workers and peasants of the USSR govern the state without capitalists and landlords. Contrast this with the disenfranchised position of the workers and peasants in Rumania. To show the fundamental difference between tsarist Russia, a prison of peoples, and the Soviet Union, a fraternal union of liberated peoples... Political workers are taking a serious test. They must justify the enormous confidence placed in them by the party, the government, Comrade STALIN .

The concentration of troops to the border and political work in accordance with this directive, received among the troops on June 25, gave rise to rather militant moods. As the military technician of the 1st rank of the 5th Cavalry Corps Lavrentyev stated, "I look forward to the day when it will be possible to show the power of Soviet weapons in the hands of the working people, and most importantly, to fulfill the responsible task of the party and Great Stalin." According to the detached commander of the 86th cavalry regiment of the 32nd cavalry division Chernyaev, "they would rather have given permission to go closer to the border and engage in battle with the enemies of the Soviet Union." The detached commander of the 14th tank brigade, Rychkov, said: "If only they would give a combat order, we would show the whole world the strength and glory of our tanks"[912] . The announced recruitment of volunteers for reconnaissance and assault detachments caused a great fighting enthusiasm among the military personnel and a desire to be among those who would be the first to strike the enemy. So, the Red Army soldier of the 358th Infantry Regiment of the 60th Infantry Division Gekalo asked: "Record me as a volunteer, I want to be the first to beat the enemy, and if necessary, then with the consciousness of the greatest pride for the Great Motherland, the leader of the peoples, Comrade Stalin, I will give my life." "We are ready to set out at any moment and fulfill the combat mission of the command, our combat vehicles are always in full combat readiness," said junior commanders of the 5th tank brigade Kostyuk and Zhigaev[913] . By the beginning of the operation, "the political and moral state of the troops was at a high level. Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers understood the historical

Bessarabian people and were full of determination to fulfill the task of the Party and the Government of the USSR -

with honor" [914] . However, the political agencies recorded not only the "correct" understanding of the events by the personnel, but also negative moods. So, for example, the Red Army soldier of the 36th tank brigade Sokolovsky said: "Again the war, again we are extending a fraternal helping hand. And we ourselves say that we do not have an imperialist predatory policy. According to the Red Army soldier of the 335th howitzer artillery regiment of the RGK Fedotov, "we only talk against the war, but they themselves are fighting, as a result of which up to 200 thousand people have already died, and we are still preparing a war to kill people, this is criminal." The Red Army soldier of the 358th Infantry Regiment Dronov during the political information said: "If we fight with Romania, then we are pursuing an aggressive policy and, in general, why should people be killed"[915] . Naturally, the political agencies were especially active in combating such sentiments. During the period of concentration of troops, there were facts of desertion of the Red Army. So, only in the troops of the 12th Army from June 11 to June 28, 138 deserters were detained, 71 of whom were convicted (including 5 to be shot). By June 26, the political agencies developed an action plan for the first days of the operation[916] . To influence the enemy troops, 6 million leaflets were printed, which on June 27 were loaded onto aircraft and

On the eve of the operation, the Soviet command stepped up enemy reconnaissance. So, on June 13, the commander of the 17th Rifle Corps of the 12th Army ordered round-the-clock command surveillance of the Romanian territory. The location of the observation posts had to be coordinated with the border units and carefully disguised. The task was to identify the presence of defensive structures and their occupation by Romanian troops, obstacles, long-term firing points (DOT), machine-gun nests and positions of anti-tank artillery, as well as to establish the places of Romanian observation posts[918]. On June 14, the corps troops were ordered to organize artillery reconnaissance of the defensive strip enemy and chart targets[919] . However, as a result of the inept actions of artillery reconnaissance officers, "on June 15, there was a violation of the state border by parts of the army: artillery reconnaissance sent by the chief of artillery of the 17th sk without coordination with the border units and without

appropriate briefing, found herself on Romanian territory. The army commander ordered: in order to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings with the Romanian authorities, to categorically prohibit any actions of units near the state border without permission and agreement with the command of our border units. Commander of the 17th SC to investigate the above case and to recover from those responsible for violating the border"[920] . On June 16, the troops of the 12th Army were ordered to conduct a reconnaissance of the border river over the next day. Cheremosh. Reconnaissance should be carried out in the form of border guards, the task was to identify approaches to the river, crossings, fords, as well as the presence of local and places of

concentration of army crossing facilities[921] . According to the intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters, from June 1 to June 10, 1940, "Romania intensified the transfer of troops to the Bukovina region and the northern part of Bessarabia"[922] . Soviet intelligence estimated the size of the Romanian army by the end of June 1940 at 1.6-1.8 million people. It consisted of 12–13 army corps, 40–42 infantry divisions, 1 mountain infantry corps, 5 mountain infantry brigades, 1 fortress brigade, 3 cavalry divisions, 1 horse-motorized division, 2 tank brigades. The Air Force had 1550-1600 aircraft, of which 30% were obsolete and non-combat[923] . By the 20th of June 1940, the intelligence of the Southern Front established the presence of the next grouping of Romanian troops. In the Chernivtsi region and in the north of Bessarabia there were 8–9 infantry divisions, 2 mountain infantry brigades and 1 cavalry brigade. In the Prut grouping (apparently, the 3rd Army), there were 7-8 infantry, 2 cavalry, 1 horse-motorized divisions and 1-2 motorized regiments. The Seret grouping (4th Army) included 9 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions. Thus, the Romanian Eastern Front included 25 infantry, 3 cavalry, 1 horse-powered divisions, 2

mountain infantry and 1 motorized brigades[924] . In fact, 20 infantry, 3 cavalry divisions and 2 mountain infantry brigades were deployed on the Soviet-Romanian border. In the strip from Valya-Visheuliai to Sekiryan, the troops of the 3rd Army (headquarters - Roman) were located as part of the mountain infantry corps (1st, 4th mountain infantry brigades), the 8th and 10th army corps (5th, 6 1st, 7th, 8th, 29th

Dniester from Sekiryan to the Black Sea, troops of the 4th Army (headquarters - Tekuch) were deployed as part of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 11th army corps (2nd, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 21st, 25th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 37th Infantry, 3rd, 4th Cavalry Divisions). Both armies, which were part of the 1st Army Group, united 60% of the ground forces of Romania and numbered

about 450 thousand people[925] . The defensive lines of the Romanian troops in Northern Bukovina passed along the borders of the Cheremosh, Prut and Siret rivers. The engineering equipment of these lines consisted of trenches and communication passages, machine-gun platforms and nests, observation and command posts, mortar and artillery positions, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, and a small number of pillboxes. In the north of Bessarabia, no defense system was created, there were only separate trenches and trenches. In the south of Bessarabia, near Bender, in the spring of 1940, the construction of 207 reinforced concrete pillboxes began, of which 133 were already concreted. However, they did not yet have equipment and weapons. In addition, 6 firing points were prepared near Petreshta. "In general, the defense system of the Romanian army in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia was not complete and, with the exception of the natural water barriers of the river. Dniester, r. Cheremosh and r. Prut, did not —

represent a serious obstacle for the advancing army"[926] . For its part, the Romanian command, with the help of air reconnaissance, tried to clarify information about the concentration of Soviet troops, the grouping of which was estimated at 42 rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 11 cavalry divisions, 10 tank and 4 aviation brigades. On June 21–27, Romanian aircraft invaded Soviet airspace 11 times, including 9 times on [June 26–27\[927\]](#) . So, for example, at 20.55 on June 21, a Romanian plane violated the border in the area of Sniatiy. Having flown at an altitude of 2000-2500 m along the border to the town of Stetsov, it was fired upon by 22 rifle shots from units of the Red Army and by machine-gun fire from the border outpost. Having dived over the northern outskirts of Stetsovo, the plane fired a machine-gun burst, turned around and left for Romania. On June 26, a 2-engine Romanian aircraft flew over the border somewhere in the Carpathians and at 8.45 was seen in the Kolomyia region, where it descended to 50-100 meters and flew o

The Soviet fighter aircraft raised for pursuit was not found. At 9 o'clock in the morning, another 2-engine Romanian aircraft flew 5 km deep into Soviet territory in the lower reaches of the Dniester, flying over the location of the 25th Infantry Division. In addition, on the same day, on the front from Kamenets-Podolsk to Rybnitsa, Romanian aircraft flew four more times into Soviet territory to a depth of [928] 100 to 800 m. Naturally, the Romanian command did not have accurate data on the concentrating grouping of the Red Army, but they perfectly understood the seriousness of the situation.

Germany - Romania - USSR

The military preparations for resolving the Bessarabian issue were accompanied by appropriate diplomatic activity by Moscow. Italy's entry into the war on June 10, 1940 increased its interest in demonstrating cooperation with the USSR, which was also interested in determining the position of Germany and Italy in relation to the Balkans and the possibility of resolving the Bessarabian issue. On June 20, the Italian ambassador in Moscow, A. Rosso, told Molotov about the desire of the Italian government to develop relations with the USSR in the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression and Neutrality of 1933 and to help resolve disputes in the Balkans by peaceful means. In response, Molotov declared that the USSR was in favor of settling the Bessarabian issue "by peaceful means, unless, of course, it drags on endlessly"[929]. This conversation was the first hint for the German embassy in Moscow about the possible actions of the USSR in relation to Romania[930]. On June 21, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Bucharest, in a conversation with The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in response to the latter's remark about ways to improve Soviet-Romanian relations, noted that, first of all, unresolved political issues, in particular the question of Bessarabia, should be settled. However, the Romanian side did not develop this [topic](#)[931]. —

In a conversation with Molotov on June 23, Schulenburg confirmed that, according to Germany, the "consultation agreement" under the non-aggression pact "applies to the Balkans." Having found out that Germany was confirming the last year's agreement on Bessarabia, Molotov informed Schulenburg of the decision of the Soviet government on the Bessarabia issue. "The Soviet Union would like to resolve the issue peacefully, but Romania did not respond" to the Soviet statement of March 29, 1940. Now the Soviet government "wants to raise this issue again before Romania in the near future. Bukovina, as an area inhabited by Ukrainians, is also included in the resolution of the Bessarabian issue. Romania will act wisely if it gives up Bessarabia and Bukovina peacefully. She used it for 21 years, knowing that they did not belong to her, even her allies did not ratify the treaty, according to which Bessarabia was recognized by Romania. In view of

the fact that Japan has not ratified this document, it is not valid. If Rumania does not agree to a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian question, the Soviet Union will solve it by armed force. The Soviet Union waited long and patiently for the resolution of this issue, but now it is impossible to wait any longer. Schulenburg pointed out the importance for Germany of economic supplies from Romania and asked the Soviet government not to take any decisive steps until the German position was indicated. Molotov once again emphasized the urgency of the issue and stated that the Soviet government expected support from Germany. For its part, the USSR will ensure the protection of Germany's economic interests in Romania[934].

On the evening of the same day, Molotov informed Schulenburg that "the Soviet government will expect a response from the German government until June 25, inclusive." [934] On June 24, Ribbentrop drew up a memorandum for Hitler, in which he indicated that in the secret protocol of August 23, 1939, Germany declared its political disinterest in "these territories" of South Eastern Europe, but emphasized its economic interest in the region[935]. Thus, the German leadership had no formal reason to reject or limit Soviet claims. At a time when the fighting in France had just ended and the end of the war with England was expected soon, Germany simply could not afford to take any other position on the Bessarabian issue. True, a little later, when evaluating the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, J. Goebbels wrote in his diary: "This is very unpleasant for us. The Russians are taking advantage of the situation." [936]. On June 24, Ribbentrop was given the views of the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry E. von Weizsäcker, who proposed that efforts be made to peacefully resolve the issue in the sense of satisfying the claims of the USSR, but in return Moscow had to satisfy the following wishes: "1. Do not cross the section of the river in Bessarabia. the Prut and the lower reaches of the Danube, so as not to jeopardize our interests in the oil-producing regions; 2. Promise to respect the rights and interests of the citizens of the Reich; 3. Promise to protect the interests of the Volksdeutsche in a manner to be determined at a later date; 4. In the event of a military clash, do

oil production". Romania, on the other hand, must indicate that Germany will support the Soviet demands[937] .

On June 25, the Soviet side undertook a more specific diplomatic sounding in relation to Italy. In response to a previous request from the Italian ambassador, Molotov told him that the USSR "has no claims against Hungary" and "considers Hungary's claims against Romania to be justified. The USSR has good, good neighborly relations with Bulgaria. They have reason to become closer. Bulgaria's claims to Romania, as well as to Greece, are justified. The main claims of the USSR to Romania are known. The USSR would like to get from Rumania what is rightfully its own, without the use of force, but the latter will become inevitable if Rumania proves intractable. As for other regions of Romania, the USSR takes into account the interests of Italy and [938] June 26 of Germany and is ready to agree with them on this issue "in a conversation with the plenipotentiary in Rome, Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano, Soviet referring to information about the intentions of the USSR" to allow the question of Bessarabia by military means", informed Moscow that Italy "fully recognizes the rights of the USSR to Bessarabia", but is interested in a peaceful solution of this issue. At the same time, the Italian side expressed its readiness, together with Germany, to "advise Romania to accept the Soviet proposals"[939] . On June 27, Moscow agreed to this Italian proposal[940] .

In the meantime, at 9:00 pm on June 25, Schulenburg informed Molotov of the following response from Berlin: "1. The German government fully recognizes the rights of the Soviet Union to Bessarabia and the timeliness of raising this question before Rumania. 2. Germany, having great economic interests in Rumania, is extremely interested in resolving the Bessarabian question by peaceful means and is ready to support the Soviet government along this path, exerting influence on Rumania for its part. 3. The question of Bukovina is new, and Germany believes that without raising this question, a peaceful settlement of the question of Bessarabia would be greatly facilitated. 4. The German government, being interested in the numerous Germans living in Bessarabia and Bukovina, hopes that the question of their resettlement will be resolved by the Soviet government in the spirit of the agreement on the resettlement of Germans from Volhynia.

Germany expressed interest in preventing "the transformation of Romania into a theater of military operations"[941] . Molotov expressed his gratitude to the German government for its understanding and support of the Soviet demands and stated that the USSR also wanted a peaceful solution to the issue "of Bessarabia and Bukovina, but immediately", since "the Soviet government believes that this issue cannot be dragged out any longer." The wishes of Germany regarding the Germans living there will be taken into account, as well as the economic interests of the Reich. On the issue of Bukovina, Molotov stated that it "is the last missing part of a united Ukraine and that for this reason the Soviet government attaches importance to solving this issue simultaneously with the Bessarabian one," but, as Schulenburg noted in a telegram to Berlin, some change in Soviet requirements is quite possible.

On June 26, Molotov spoke again with Schulenburg and stated that Soviet demands were "limited to the northern part of Bukovina with the city of Chernivtsi", and added that the Soviet government expected German support for these demands. When Schulenburg noted that the issue would be resolved more easily if the USSR returned to Romania the gold reserves of the Romanian National Bank, taken to Moscow in 1915, Molotov replied that this was out of the question, since Romania had been exploiting Bessarabia for quite a long time. Regarding further actions, Molotov said that he would convey the demands of the USSR to the Romanian envoy in Moscow in the coming days and expected Germany's support in satisfying these demands if Romania did not want war[943] . These Soviet-German contacts led to the fact that "the opinion prevailed in Berlin that the Bessarabian issue could be resolved without a military — clash"[944] . Romania did not yet know that the fate of Bessarabia had already been practically decided. On June 25, the Romanian Prime Minister asked the German envoy in Bucharest if there was any answer to the Romanian statement of June 20. When asked by an interlocutor whether Romania had begun negotiations with the USSR on Bessarabia, Tatarescu said that "the Romanian government and the king are determined to fight rather than just give in" if Moscow demands this territory. American diplomats listened to similarly bellicose statements on June 24–26 from their Romanian colleagues[945] . True, in

fears that repeated alarming appeals to Berlin stumbled upon a wall of silence. June 26 at 22.00 Molotov

handed over to the Romanian envoy G. Davidescu a note from the Soviet government. It stated that "in 1918, Romania, taking advantage of the military weakness of Russia, forcibly seized from the Soviet Union (Russia) part of its territory - Bessarabia ... The Soviet Union never put up with the fact of the forcible secession of Bessarabia, which the government of the USSR repeatedly and openly stated in front of the whole world. Now that the military weakness of the USSR has receded into the past, and the current international situation requires the speediest resolution of unresolved issues inherited from the past in order to finally lay the foundations for a lasting peace between countries, "the Soviet government suggested to Romania:" 1. Return Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. 2. Transfer to the Soviet Union the northern part of Bukovina within the boundaries, according to the attached map. At the same time, Moscow expressed the hope that Romania "accepts the real proposals of the USSR and thus will make it possible to peacefully resolve the protracted conflict." The response of the Romanian government was expected within [June 27\[946\]](#) . Romanian attempt

envoy to challenge the argument given in the note with references to the Romanian version of the history of Bessarabia and the events of 1918, of course, did not find a response from Molotov, who noted that they "do not correspond to either historical development or the real situation." An attempt to extend the deadline for a response from Bucharest also failed, since the Soviet government had already "waited 22 years" and therefore "hopes that the answer will be given without delay, and if it is positive, then the issue will be resolved peacefully." Davidescu refused to take a map with the line of the new border in Bukovina, referring to the impossibility of transferring it to Bucharest, but wrote down the names of the — .

most important points of this [line\[947\]](#) Molotov informed Schulenburg late in the evening of June 26 about the actions taken against Romania[948] , who on the morning of 27 June tried to clarify "how to understand the demand of the Soviet government that the Romanian response should come today." To this he was explained that "the Soviet troops will cross the Romanian border tomorrow morning if the Ro

a positive response to Soviet demands"[949] . Having received the Soviet note, the Romanian government turned to Italy, Germany and the allies in the Balkan Entente for support. In addition, Rome and Berlin were required to exert a restraining influence on Hungary and Bulgaria[950] . On June 27 at 10:30 a.m., Ribbentrop sent an instruction to his envoy in Bucharest, in which he proposed to declare to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania: "The Soviet government informed us that it demands from the Romanian government the transfer of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the USSR. In order to avoid a war between Romania and the Soviet Union, we can only advise the Romanian government to give in to the demands of the Soviet government . Similar responses were received from Italy

and the countries of the Balkan Entente. During the meeting of the Crown Council, which opened at 12.30, it turned out that from a military point of view the situation was unpromising. The Romanian command believed that the army would be able to resist, retreating to the river. Siret, on the condition that later she will rely "on the support of a large army of some ally." However, precisely this condition could not be met, since, as Romania was informed, for Germany "military action in the East is currently impossible, since the German army must end the war against England." Bucharest was clearly in no hurry to repeat Finland's recent experience. The vote that took place showed that 11 members of the council were against the adoption of the Soviet ultimatum, 10 were in favor of accepting it, 4 supported the idea of entering into negotiations with Moscow, and the prime minister abstained. True, the conversation that took place after dinner with Carol II showed that Tatarescu was in favor of accepting Soviet demands. Discussing options for action in this situation, Bucharest decided to try to drag out time by entering into negotiations with the USSR. Therefore, as noted in the published communique, "based on the desire to maintain peaceful relations with the USSR, the Council approved the decision of the Romanian government to demand from the Soviet government to fix the date and place where the meeting of delegates of both governments could take place in order to discuss the Soviet note. The answer of the government of the USSR to the proposal of the Romanian go

signed a decree on the mobilization of the Romanian armed forces from 24.00 June 28[952] .

At 11:00 p.m. on June 27, a response was received in Moscow from Bucharest, in which the Romanian government stated "that it is ready to begin immediately, in the broadest sense, a friendly discussion, with common consent, of all proposals coming from the Soviet government." Romania asked to "indicate the place and date" of future negotiations, the delegates for which from the Romanian side will be appointed after a response from Moscow. The note expressed the hope that "negotiations ... will result in the creation of strong relations of good accord and friendship between the USSR and Romania." After listening to such a streamlined answer, Molotov said that "he does not see in the statement made agreement to the Soviet proposals and that he believes that tomorrow the Soviet troops should enter the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina." Davidescu assured him that the Romanian government agreed with the Soviet proposals, but should agree on "the procedure and legal forms for the implementation of these measures." However, all attempts by the Romanian diplomat to agree on future negotiations were unsuccessful, since, as Molotov stated, "now we are talking about political issues, not technical ones." The Soviet side offered to immediately sign an agreement that on June 28 "Soviet troops should occupy certain points" and occupy the rest of the territory in 3-4 days. Accordingly, Romania must guarantee the safety of enterprises, railways, airfields, telegraph and telephone, state and private property, and later "the Soviet-Romanian commission will be able to agree on the details

implementation of the planned activities"[953]-

Davidescu refused to sign the agreement, citing his lack of necessary authority. Then at 1.25 am on June 28, a new Soviet note was handed over to him, which noted the uncertainty of the Romanian government's response, "because it does not say directly that it accepts the proposals of the Soviet government for the immediate transfer of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the Soviet Union." However, taking into account the explanations of the Romanian envoy in Moscow, the Soviet government proposed: "1. Within 4 days, starting at 2 o'clock

day Moscow time on June 28, to clear the territory of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the Romanian troops. 2. Soviet troops for the same period to occupy the territory of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina. 3. During June 28, Soviet troops will occupy the points: Chernivtsi, Chisinau, Akkerman. 4. The Royal Government of Romania assume responsibility for the safety and prevention of damage to railways, locomotive and wagon fleet, bridges, warehouses, airfields, industrial enterprises, power plants, telegraph. 5. Appoint a commission of representatives" of the parties "to resolve disputes regarding the evacuation of Romanian troops and institutions." Romania's response was to arrive in Moscow no later than 12:00 on [June 28\[954\]](#) .

Meanwhile, in Bucharest, the discussion of the current situation continued, not excluding the possibility of military resistance from the USSR. However, during the second meeting of the Crown Council, held at 21.00-24.00 on June 27, having realistically assessed the military capabilities of Romania and fearing social upheavals in the event of a war with the USSR, those present by 19 votes against 6 (with 1 abstention) decided to agree to the cession of the territories demanded by the USSR. According to the diary of Carol II, he "closed the meeting of the Council with a short speech in which he said that this was the hardest day of my life, I could not even be glad that my son had passed the bachelor's exam. I think that, yielding almost a quarter (actually 17.1% - M.M.) of the country's territory without resistance, we are making a major mistake. Without shaking hands with anyone, I left in deep grief and convinced that the consequences of these decisions would be very deplorable for the country, even if, as Argetoyanu claims, we may achieve what we have lost in the near future." As Tatarescu later declared in parliament, "we decided to retreat from Bessarabia and Upper Bukovina in order to save the Romanian state today and save the future of the Romanian nation from danger"[955] .

The motives behind the decision of the Romanian leadership were no secret to Moscow. Already on July 2, Soviet intelligence reported that, "according to the information of the resident in Romania, the Romanian king agreed to the ultimatum of the Soviet Union allegedly only after he received assurances from the German and Italian ambassadors that the return of the USSR to Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina

is a temporary solution, since Germany and Italy, engaged [at the moment in the conduct of hostilities] in the West, cannot provide armed assistance to Romania. Subsequently, Romania, as compensation for the correct understanding of the moment, will be able to receive not only Bessarabia, but also the Moldavian Republic. The rank and file and junior officers of the Romanian army are satisfied with the peaceful resolution of the conflict, and the generals regard this as a gross —

mistake of the government . Meanwhile, having received a new Soviet note at 2.30 on June 28, the Romanian government turned to Germany with a request to influence the USSR in order to maintain Chernivtsi as part of Romania and extend the evacuation period. Although Berlin promised support, Schulenburg received no instructions[957] . At 1100, Bucharest told Moscow that, in an effort to "avoid serious consequences that would entail the use of force and the opening of hostilities in this part of Europe, he sees himself obliged to accept the conditions of evacuation provided for in the Soviet response." At the same time, Romania asked for an extension of the evacuation period, "taking into account that the evacuation of the territory would be extremely difficult to carry out within four days due to rains and floods that spoiled the communications." A mixed Soviet-Romanian commission could deal with this issue[958] . At the same time, as M.D. Ereshchenko, Romania formally agreed not to the return of the territory to the Soviet Union, but only to the "evacuation of Romanian troops" from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which was later used by Bucharest to justify its claims to these territories[959] . Having accepted the text of the Romanian response, Molotov declared that "the Government of the USSR cannot give a delay. If, for technical reasons, it becomes necessary to postpone the implementation of one or another part of the planned measures for several hours, then the question of this may be considered by the mixed Soviet-Romanian commission. Soviet troops will be given instructions to start crossing the border today after 2 pm. The Romanian troops must take measures to ensure that the organization of the advance of the Soviet troops is not disturbed in any

Bessarabian campaign

While all these diplomatic negotiations were going on, the troops of the Southern Front were completing the last preparations for the operation. Not knowing what the answer from Bucharest would be, Shaposhnikov called Zhukov at 4:00 pm on June 27 and gave him the following instruction: "From the morning of 6/28/40, be ready for action. Actions can be with or without a shot. An order about actions and their nature is additional.

Zhukov: I give the order to occupy the starting position. What about an explanation to the Red Army? Shaposhnikov:

Wait for an explanation. A decision will obviously follow up to 24 hours. Zhukov: Allow me to

put air defense systems on alert. Shaposhnikov: It is possible to put air defense systems on combat alert"[961] . Accordingly, the command

of the Southern Front issued directive No. A00148 to its troops, which demanded "from the evening of 27.6 to take their original position and be ready for action from 3.00 on 28.6.40. There will be a special order about

the nature of the actions. Two options for action

are set: 1. According to the plan and

order, which has already been handed to you; 2.

The second option is without

a fight. The order for the second option is sent additionally.

Explanatory work should be carried out only on special instructions"[962] .

At 17.30 information "about a possible start from the morning of 28.6.40 with or without a shot" was transmitted from the General Staff by telephone to Admiral Galler. At 21.10-21.20 on June 27, Shaposhnikov went into Stalin's office, but since the Romanian answer had not yet been received, he was ordered to wait for further instructions. Accordingly, at 10 p.m., the Chief of the General Staff called Proskurov again and again warned Zhukov that "without a special order, there would not have been a single shot. Wait for special instructions." At 22.30, the Main Naval Headquarters was informed that "you can be calm today, and Haller said that if anything happens, he must be warned in advance, since he needs time." At 23.00, when Molotov was talking with Davidescu, Colonel General D.A. called the General Staff from Grosulovo. Loktionov and

said that "everything is ready and we are all waiting. Will there be instructions? To this Shaposhnikov answered rather dryly: "I don't know anything. Wait for the order and warn everyone not to take a single [step without an order.](#)"[963] At 6.30 on June 28, Moscow— .

received a report from the headquarters of the 9th Army, according to which "during the night of June 27–28, the troops of 9A took their starting position. Preparations are underway for crossings and the equipment of O[angry] P[positions] and Command] P[points].

a) 71 OUB 4th brigade, passing into submission to 37th brigade, took its original position in the Tashlyk

area. b) in 176th Rifle Division, the landing groups of 404th and 389th Rifle Regiments advanced to

the bend of the Dniester River. c) the rifle-machine-gun regiment of the— 55th brigade is concentrated in Jassy"[964] . At 0905, the General Staff

received a report from the headquarters of the Southern Front: "1. The troops of the Southern Front have turned around, taken their starting position in accordance with Front Directive No. 00145, and are in

readiness to carry out the order of the People's Commissar. 2. Frontal reserves - 8.86 and 100 sd are completing their concentration, 17 sd continues to concentrate - in the areas

according to report No. 34. 3. Heavy rains that took place on June 27 in the areas of the 12 spoiled dirt roads, which are difficult to pass in places.

4. At dawn on June 28, two platoons of the 497th Rifle Regiment, 135th Rifle Division, in the Kanilovka area, 3 km southwest of Staraya Ushitsa, crossed to the southern bank of the Dniester River. After a firefight from both sides, the platoons returned to the northern bank of the Dniester River, having 2 wounded Red Army soldiers. An urgent investigation is underway. Details in a special report"[965] . As a result, it turned—

out that "in the sector of the 5th Army, the commander of the battalion of the 497th joint venture, captain Balashev, at 3.50 under the cover of up to 11 heavy machine guns from the area of vil. Kanilovka threw troops into Romanian territory on 3 boats, consisting of 57 people. The landing party crossed to the Romanian territory and captured the height near vil. Molodov, up to 1 km deepening into Romanian territory. The Romanians fled, leaving 2 rifles, a Mauser and up to 1000 cartridges. The commander of the regiment, Colonel Shukov, as soon as he found out about this, sent the company commander and returned the landing force back. At 6 o'clock the last

the boat returned to our territory. As a result of the skirmish on our side, there are two lightly wounded. The investigation showed that the battalion commander, Captain Balashov, knew that without an order he could not fire a single shot. At the same time, he knew that the deadline for completion was set at 3 hours. Just by this time, he lost contact with the regiment and, fearing to be late, on his own initiative began crossing the Dniester. Since Romania's response was expected by 12:00 on June 28, the troops of the Southern Front continued to be in the concentration areas,

awaiting orders. The border guards were the first to learn about the change in the political situation. At 10.00, Deputy Head of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General V.A. Khomenko reported to Moscow that "the Romanians received an order to immediately withdraw from Bukovina and Bessarabia in an organized manner without firing a shot." Since the Romanian guards began to withdraw, Khomenko suggested urgently guarding the bridges and other structures on the Dniester[967]. However, it was decided not to rush things. Only after receiving a response from the Romanian government at 11 o'clock did the Soviet troops receive a new task - to occupy Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina without a fight. Accordingly, the command of the Southern Front gave the troops directive No. A00149:

- "1. The Romanian government agreed to voluntarily leave Bukovina and Bessarabia and withdraw the Romanian troops beyond the river. Rod.
2. The task of the troops of the Southern Front is to quickly advance to the river. Prut to secure the territory of Bukovina and Bessarabia for the USSR.
3. To the commander of the 12th army, to throw out moving units in the first echelon with the task of: a) 4 kk with 24 brigade of BT to occupy the Seret [Siret], Hertsa, Chernovitsy area and gain a foothold on the Seret, Hertsa line. Following 4 kk 60 and 131 divisions, go out: 131 sd - to Chernivtsi and 60 sd to the line of Seret, Hertsa and change parts of 4 kk, replacing the main forces, shtadiv 60 in the area of Teresheni [Tarashany]. 4 kk to change his 60th rifle division to concentrate in the Storozhinets area.

The border on the left is Prut (incl.), Hertz. b) 2 kk with 5 battalion brigade to occupy the area of Hertsa (claim.), Lipkany, Zalizchiki and gain a foothold at the turn of the river. Prut from Hertz (claim.) to Lipkana, immediately occupy Khotyn in one cd, send 58 sd in 2 kk, which go to the area - Dinautsy [Dinovtsy] and change parts of 2 kk, having a tripod and

the main forces of the division are Dinauci. 2 kk per shift, fully concentrate in the Khotyn area. Shtakor 2 kk - Khotyn.

The border on the left is Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany (all inclusive for 2 kk).

c) 192 GRD, remaining in the Ustseryki area, [forward units] advance to the Rizhina and Seletin [Selyatin] areas with the task of firmly holding the mountain passes in the Camerale, Frasin, Strazha areas. The border between 192

GSD and 4 KK - Rostock, Guard. 4. Commander of the 5th

Army to transport the 49th and 36th tank brigades across the river. Dniester. Tank brigades go to the river. Prut and hold the line of Lipkany (claim.), Zagaikany by simultaneously advancing 80th rifle division from the Studenitsa region and 169th rifle division from the Yampol region to change parts of the 49th and 36th tank brigades, having the main forces of 80th rifle division in the Korjeutsi region and 169 rifle division in the Danul Veche region; after changing the 36th and 49th tank brigades, the last to concentrate: the 49th tank brigade in the Larga area, the 36th tank brigade - Bleshteni. From the 130th Rifle Division, advance one joint venture - Soroki, subsequently, the actions of the 80th, 169th and 140th Rifle Divisions of the 9th Army will be united by the command of the 36th Rifle Corps, whose headquarters will be advanced to Balt

The border on the left is Soroca, Balti, Kalineshti (all for 5 A). 5. To the commander of the 9th army, to throw out moving units in the first echelon with the task of: a) 140 rifle divisions with one regiment in vehicles to reach the river. Prut and gain a foothold at the line of Kalineshti, Skuleni [Skulyany], with the rest of the division's forces to go to the Boksha area. With the release of the division in the Boksha area, transfer it to the commander of the 36th brigade of the 5th army. b) 35 sk with a mobile

echelon consisting of 15 msd, 21 brigade and one cn 95 sd on vehicles to reach the river. Prut with the task: to firmly hold the line: 15th rifle division in the Ungheni, Kastuleni sector, joint venture 95th rifle division Nemtseny, Radyukani and 21st brigade Leovo, Gypsy, with the rest of the forces to occupy 35th brigade - 173rd rifle division with 4th brigade of Chisinau; the main forces of the 95th Rifle Division - the Karpineni area. Tripod 95 - Carpineni.

Shtakor 35 - Chisinau. The border on the left is Tiraspol,

Selemet, Gypsy. c) mountains. To occupy Bendery with a regiment of the 51st Rifle Division and the city of Orgey [Orgeev] - a reinforced

rifle and machine-gun battalion of the UR. d) 5 kk go to the area of Izmail, Cahul, Bolgrad and, having 9 kd - Izmail, firmly hold the line of the river. Prut and r. Danube in the areas: Cahul, Izmail.

The border on the left is the upper reaches of the Dniester estuary, Kyurdo,

Kislitsa. e) 55 sk - 25 rd take Akkerman and Sarata. Stadiv Sarata. 74th Rifle Division go to the area of Reni, Izmail, Bolgrad and change parts of the cavalry. QC to shift to concentrate

in the Cahul area. 6. The rest of the Southern Front to remain in the occupied them areas, except for the 141st rifle division, which will be moved to the Zalishchyky area.

7. The rate of movement of troops introduced into Bessarabia and Bukovina will be indicated

additionally. 8. When troops move on the territory of Bukovina and Bessarabia, take measures to clear mine areas, for which purpose reinforce the first echelons of troops with sappers and agree with the command of the Romanian army: a) on guides, b) on maps and diagrams and c) on mined

areas. 9. In order to organize the rapid advance of troops, do not take bulky rear areas with you, leave all excess property of the units in place. The material part of the artillery, over 122-mm calibers, do not take. Limit military reserves - $\frac{1}{2}$ bq, two refuelings of fuel and a three-day dacha. The fighters have a lightweight display approved by the order of the NPO. 10. On the move, observe strict order, establish exemplary

combatant cohesion and clarity - do not get out of order on a campaign when passing through settlements, do not make halts near settlements, commanders of all degrees during the entire movement to be in their places.

11. Each regiment to have an orchestra and settlements with them pass with music and songs.

12. Pay special attention to the appearance of the fighters and their smartness - everyone should be shaved, cleaned, in neat clean summer clothes and helmets, left poorly dressed in the rear of the division and not taken out to Bukovina and Bessarabia, all personnel and units should be pre-examined by the corps commanders and military councils of the armies.

13. In

view of the application of the second option of action and the movement of troops on the basis of an agreement, my order No. 00126 on the chiefs of garrisons and their functions should be canceled. Heads of garrisons of settlements I appoint senior commanders of units and

formations that operate in a given area, their functions are in accordance with the regulation on the heads of garrisons.

For guidance and to facilitate the issuance of orders for the garrison, issue a supply of copies of the draft order for the garrison for each division. 14. Take all necessary measures immediately

and be ready to fulfill this order by 12.00 28.6.40. The order to put into practice by special order "[968] , which was transmitted by telephone to the headquarters of the armies of the Southern Front at 12.10–12.18 on [June 28\[969\]](#) . Accordingly, at 13.00, the border guards received an order from the commander of the Southern Front "immediately take all border — bridges on the Cheremosh, Prut, Dniester rivers under guard by border units.

Identify the laying of mines and clear the bridges. Having taken the guard, put up reinforced detachments on both banks"[970] . Based on the ~~directive~~

of the commander of the Southern Front, the army commanders issued their own orders to the troops. So, the commander of the 12th Army issued directive No. 58 / ss: "1. The Romanian government agreed to voluntarily leave

Bukovina and Bessarabia and withdraw the Romanian troops beyond the river. Rod.

2. The task of troops 12 A is to quickly advance to the line of Seletin [Selyatin], Seret [Siret], Hertsa and further along the river. Prut to Lipkana to secure the territory of Bukovina and northern Bessarabia for the USSR and prevent the destruction of objects of state and military importance by the outgoing Romanian troops. The border on the left is Zbruch, Khotyn, Lipkany. 3. 4th KK, having 60th Rifle Division on the tanks of

the tank regiments, with a 24th Tank Brigade with a 60th Rifle Division landing battalion, by the end of the first day, take the Seret, Hertsa, Chernivtsi [s], Storozhinets area and gain a foothold on the Vikoverkhni [y] line], Seret, Hertz before the approach of parts of 60 sd. With the arrival of units of the 60th Rifle Division, change and concentrate the corps in the area of Storozhinets, Chudyn, Petrouts [Petrovtsy], pushing to the

river. Su chava up to 2 cavalry regiments. The border on the left is Prut, Hertz (incl.). 4. 60 RD following the 4th forced march to reach the lines: by the end of the first day - Storozhinets, Chernivtsi, by the end of the

second day

- Seret, Hertsa and change units of the 4th kk, having the main forces and a staff in the Teresheny [Tarashany] area. 5.

2nd KK, having airborne detachments from 58th Rifle Division on tanks of tank regiments, with 5th Tank Brigade with an airborne battalion from 58th Rifle Division, occupy the Novoselitsa area with one day's march, claim. Lipkany, Khotyn, Kotsman and gain a foothold at the turn of the river. Prut from Novoselitsa to Lipkany, before the approach of units of 58th rifle division. With the arrival of units of the 58th Rifle Division, change and concentrate the corps in the area of Dolinyany, Pashkovtsy, Dankoutsy

[Dankovtsy], Kaplyvka. Shtakor - Dankows. 6. 58 rd with a forced march to consistently reach the line: [by] the end of the first day - Neizuchka, Chernavka [Chernovka], Rzhavintsy; [by] the end of the second day - Novoselitsa, Forostka [Forosna], Dankoutsy; [k] 15.00 on the third day, the border of the river. Prut, change units of the 2nd KK, having a staff and the main forces

of the Dinautsy [Dinovtsy] division. 7. 192 Guards Rifle Division to occupy the Seletin area and leave the main forces of the division and the staff in place. The

border on the left is Rostock, Guard. 8.

When moving units to the newly occupied territory, organize a thorough reconnaissance of the routes. As part of reconnaissance, have a sapper with mine catchers. 9. In order to move the

troops as quickly as possible into the areas indicated by them, all excess property of the units should be left in place. The material part of artillery over 122 mm calibers should not be taken with you. Limit military supplies - $\frac{1}{2}$ bq, to seven daily dachas, three of which are concentrates.

10. Immediately with the advancement of mobile units to the territory of Bukovina and Bessarabia, by order of the division commanders, allocate garrisons as part of a rifle company to the following points: Bergomet, Chernivtsi [y]. 11. With the advance of troops to the

territory of Bessarabia and Bukovina
in addition to protecting the state border, the duties of the command are:

1) accounting and protection of all objects of state military importance, 2) the seizure of the telegraph, post office, radio station, water supply, railway stations and the organization of their normal operation and safety. Submit a list of all registered and protected objects to the shtarm using the attached form.

12. All other military formations and units included in composition of the 12th army, remain in place in full combat readiness.

13. The time of the entry into force of this directive will be announced later"[971] .
At 13.15, the commander

of the 9th Army also issued combat order No. 2, clarifying the tasks of the troops:

"1. The Romanian government voluntarily agreed to leave Bukovina and Bessarabia, to withdraw its troops beyond the river. Rod. 2. On the right, the 5th army occupies the northern part of Bessarabia. border with her - Magpies, Tsypleshty, Balti, Kalineshti.

3. The task of the 9th army is to quickly advance to the river. Rod at the front Iasi, Galati assign the middle and southern part of Bessarabia to the USSR.

4. 140 SD with advanced moving units within a day through Stefanesti and [Ki]shkareny to reach the river. Prut and gain a foothold at the Kalineshti-Skuleni line, with the rest of the units to reach the Skumpia area in three crossings. With access to the indicated area, the division becomes subordinate to the commander of the 36th brigade, whose headquarters is Balti. 5. 35 sk, 173 sd and 95 sd, 15 msd

and 4 tbr to the end of 29.6 mobile parts reach the boundary of the river. Rod:

a) 15th Motor Rifle Division on the Vulpeshti, Koshtuleni section, shtadiv - Ketireni. Overnight [from] 28 to 29.6 - Chisinau;

b) The mobile detachment of the 95th sd - RB, TB, motorized artillery, infantry and sappers in vehicles go to the crossing near Leuseni. Overnight from 28 to 29.6 - Chisinau;

c) 4 tbr by the evening

of 28.6 completely concentrate Chisinau; d) 173rd Rifle Division to cross the Dniester near Grigoriopol and by the end of 28.6 concentrate in the area of Korzhevo, Balabanesti, on 29.6 cross Chisinau; e) The 95th Rifle Division is crossed by the main forces on

June 28 [at] Tashlyk and by the end of the day is concentrated in the area of the farm [or] Nakharov, Nov[aya] Romanovka, Spey. In the future, moving along the route of Chimisheny, Bachoy, Loveni, Gancheshty, Karpiyany, go to the river. Prut by the morning of 1.7 in the Nemtsava, Leuseni, Tomai section, having the main forces in the Karpiyany region, holding the Karpiyany. 6. 51st Rifle Division to transport an infantry regiment with one artillery battalion and an armored

train by the end of 28.6 to occupy the Bendery area, where

garrison, the rest of the 51st divisions remain in Tiraspol, Parkany. 7. 14th brigade by the end of 28.6 cross the Bendery

bridge and focus on lodging for the night in the area of Tanatara, Ursoy. By the morning of June 30, moving along the route of Novo-Kaushani, Troitskoe, Cimislia, Kochalia, go out with forward units [on] the river. Prut on the front of the Leovo metro station - Gypsy, the main forces - Tigech, Kochalia. Stabrig - Kochalia.

8.5 kk by the evening of 28.6, start moving forward units along the crossings of the 7th brigade and the Bendersky bridge, concentrate in the area: 9 cd - Cahul, Reni, main forces - Cahul, 32 cd - Izmail. Shtakor - Bolgrad. Traffic lane - on the right: Bendery, Koshkalia, Romanovo, Kongaz, Cahul, on the left: Merinesti, Manzyr, Berezina, Kubey, Izmail. Advance units to reach the indicated areas by the end of 30.6, the main forces - by the morning of

2.7. Upon reaching the area of Reni, Izmail, parts of the 74th corps should concentrate on Cahul. 7 sk immediately establish all crossings for the passage of units 5 kk, remaining with your units on

place.

9. 55 sk to the outcome of 28.6 25 sd take Akkerman and Kol[oniya] Star[aya] Sarat. Stadiv - Kol[ony] Old[aya] Sarat.

74th sd is transported in 25th sd and, following the route - Akkerman, Kol[oniya] Star[aya] Sarata, Kubey, by the end of 4.7 go [to] the area of Reni, Izmail, Bolgrad, changing units of 5 kk. Stadiv - Bolgrad.

10. Other parts of the 9th army not listed in this orders to remain in place.

11. When advancing troops through the territory of Bukovina and Bessarabia, take measures to clear mine areas, for which purpose to strengthen the first echelons of troops with sappers and agree with the command of the Romanian army: a) about guides, b) about maps and diagrams and c) about mined areas. 12. In order to organize and speed up the

advancement of troops, do not take bulky rear areas with you, leave all excess property of the units in place. Do not take the material part of artillery of 122-mm calibers. Limit military reserves - $\frac{1}{2}$ bq, two refuelings of fuel and a three-day dacha. The fighters have a light load, approved by order of the NPO. 13. On the move, observe strict order, establish exemplary combat cohesion and clarity. Out of order on a hike

do not go out when passing settlements, do not make halts near settlements. Commanders of all ranks must remain in their places during the entire movement.

14. Each regiment to have an orchestra and settlements with them pass with music and songs.

15. Pay special attention to the appearance of the fighters and their smartness. Everyone should be shaved, brushed, in neat clean summer clothes and helmets. Poorly dressed people should be left in the rear of the division and not taken to Bessarabia. All personnel and units should be preliminarily inspected by the commanders of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments .

On June 28, the troops received an order from the Political Directorate of the Red Army, which demanded that all personnel be explained that "thanks to the wise Stalinist foreign policy of the Party and the Government, we saved the working people of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from a bloody war and resolved the issue of the return of Bessarabia to the mighty family of the Soviet Union peacefully. way." The troops were ordered to remain vigilant and conduct active political work among the local population, for which special groups of political workers were created[973] . First of all, a member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, army commissar 2nd rank Borisov, sent an order to the command of the 12th, 5th and 9th armies, in which he indicated that in response to the Soviet ultimatum "by the deadline, the Romanian government agreed to return the USSR stolen from us Bessarabia. Due to the changed situation, I order that the note of the Soviet Union and the answer of Rumania be explained to the entire composition of the units, making the note the basis of all political work . Then the Military Council and the — Political Directorate of the Southern Front sent directive No. K0064 / ss / s to the subordinate troops: "In connection with the peaceful resolution of the issue of Bessarabia, I propose:

1. The main points of the introductory part of the directive of the Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army No. 5285 / ss should be used in explanatory

work. 2. Paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the same Directive shall be fully implemented.

3. In all settlements occupied by our units, hold wide rallies among the population explaining the policy

Soviet government.

4. Special Nos. Nos. of newspapers, leaflets and a political order to the troops of the front, designed for military operations, to be burned according to the act and not to give a single copy to anyone. Submit the acts to the Political Directorate of the Front.

5. Make sure that at the points occupied by our units the order of the Head of the garrison was posted in 2 languages.

6. In the cities of Chisinau, Khotyn, Soroca, Balti, Izmail, Orhei, Akkerman, Bendery, Cahul, publish newspapers in Romanian, in Chernivtsi - in Ukrainian. In Chisinau, also publish a newspaper in Russian"[975] . "With the greatest joy and approval, the—

fighters, commanders and political workers met the message of our Government on the peaceful settlement of the Soviet-Romanian conflict." Rallies and talks were held in all units and divisions on this occasion. The Red Army soldier of the 187th Infantry Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division Paklanov believed that "only the powerful forces of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, approaching the very border, forced the Romanian authorities to come to their senses and accept our legitimate demands." As the Red Army soldier of the 269th corps artillery regiment Sinelnikov stated, "the Romanian government decided to give up Bessarabia not because it is so fair, but because it was convinced of the power of the Red Army." According to Kushnerev, a Red Army soldier of the 150th howitzer artillery regiment, "the agreement reached once again confirmed the wise foreign policy of the world, which is steadily being implemented under the leadership of Comrade Stalin by our Government." As the Red Army soldier of the 264th corps heavy artillery regiment Shirshov stated, "for the wise policy of Stalin, for the party that ensured a peaceful life for our people and the liberation of our brothers from the oppression of the bourgeoisie, all as one are ready to fight any enemy until it is completely destroyed." Lieutenant of the 26th separate reconnaissance battalion Ryvkin believed that "the liberation of Bessarabia from the oppression of the Romanian boyars once again showed our power and the wise Stalinist foreign policy." According to the Red Army soldier of the 409th artillery regiment of the 131st rifle division, Korchuk, "the Romanian bourgeoisie will have enough to exploit the Bessarabian people. If Bessarabia had not been given to us voluntarily, we would have taken it by force, because it is ours."

"It turns out two big differences," said Ivanov, a Red Army soldier of the 50th separate sapper battalion, "a capitalist country is waging a war with states - a war of conquest, which leads to people's bloodshed for the interests of capitalism. The Soviet Union, pursuing a policy of peace, is waging a war of liberation in which the working people greet our Red Army with joy and flowers. Similar opinions were also noted in units of the 95th Infantry Division. According to Reshetnikov, a Red Army soldier of the 161st Infantry Regiment, "it's good that this issue was peacefully resolved, this is in the interests of the workers of the USSR and the workers of Romania, because the capitalists would not have fought, and only the workers of Romania would have borne the victims." Karaev, a Red Army soldier of the 90th Infantry Regiment, said: "I knew that the issue of Bessarabia would be resolved peacefully, because our government always pursues a policy of peace, and the Romanians could not resist our army, they felt it." A Red Army soldier of the 13th separate reconnaissance battalion, Bondarenko, believed that "indeed, Stalin's peace policy is very wise. Now the question of Bessarabia has been resolved peacefully, without any casualties. Comrade Stalin took care of the liberation of the working people of Bessarabia from the oppression of the Romanian boyars. According to the Red Army soldier of the 404th Infantry Regiment of the 176th Infantry Division Kuzmenko, "Now everyone began to reckon with the strength of the Soviet Union. Our people have achieved this because we are led by the Bolshevik Party, headed by Comrade Stalin." At the same time, voices were heard: "But it's still a pity,—

they were preparing, preparing, but they didn't have to fight"[976] . At 2 pm on June 28, Soviet troops began an operation to occupy the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. Already at 14.30, the headquarters of the Southern Front reported to Moscow that the 5th tank brigade and the 58th rifle division in the Snyaty area, the 24th tank brigade in the Knyazhe area, the 141st rifle division moved to the Zalishchikov region, and from the 5th army to Bessarabia - the 80th rifle division in the Ustye, Sokol, Bolshaya Muksha region and the 169th rifle division - in the Yampol, Porogi region. Information

about the actions of the 9th Army has not yet been received[977] .

At 16.30, the commander of the 9th Army, Boldin, reported to Zhukov by direct wire:

"First. Bendery is occupied by our troops with one rifle battalion at 15.40. Second. The

population of Bender met our units with red banners and with exclamations of "Long live Soviet Bessarabia."

Third. The crossing of the Dniester River in the Grigoriopol region and to the south continues.

Fourth. On the bridges in the Grigoriopol region, the crossing has not yet started.

Fifth. He ordered to immediately occupy Ackerman. All. I'm waiting for instructions. [Zhukov] - Everything is clear. You have been given instructions. There is nothing more to add. Remember, I just spoke with Comrade Stalin. He was terribly interested in whether Ackerman was busy. I reported [that] the units near Ackermann would soon be busy. Try to occupy Ackerman in half an hour and report back. Move and move faster. [All"\[978\]](#) . At 17.30,

by direct wire from Grosulov, Senior Adjutant General of the People's Commissar of Defense, Lieutenant General V.M. Zlobin transmitted Timoshenko's order to the headquarters of the Southern Front: "1. Ferry 9 A is late. The crossing is poorly organized and threatens to collapse. 2. The commander was ordered to send reconnaissance fighters to the airfields of Chisinau and Akkerman, and then land fighter units there. 3. The People's Commissar ordered to immediately reconnoiter, for his part, the Chisinau airfield and to land an airborne brigade there today. The head of the Operational Department of the Front Headquarters, Lieutenant-General G.K., who received the message, Malandin reported this to Zhukov, who himself approached the apparatus and handed over to the people's commissar of defense for a report: "1. Advanced units of Cherevichenko on the way to Chernivtsi. The delay was due to very bad and washed out roads. 2. Hotin is busy. 3. Balti will be occupied by Gerasimenko's units and aviation at 20.00.4. Today it is impossible to land an airborne assault in Chisinau, because it takes 4 hours to fly from the airfield of the airborne brigade. It is impossible to plant at night in Chisinau. I ask Kondratenko to inform how Boldin is correcting the matter.

Zlobin: Boldin has not yet done anything to speed up the crossing. Now he is thinking. Make a decision and let me know. [All"\[979\]](#) .

In accordance with the orders received, the troops of the 12th Army advanced deep into Northern Bukovina in the afternoon of June 28. At 17.30, an armored train of the NKVD railway regiment with a battalion of the 58th rifle division arrived in Chernivtsi, where the 5th tank brigade entered a little later, which, having passed the city, together with a separate reconnaissance battalion of the 58th rifle division, moved on and towards evening, having passed Magala, reached the area Toporovtsy, Redkovtsy. The main forces of the 58th Infantry Division crossed the border north of Snyaty and, moving southeast, reached the Kitsman and Viteuvka areas. By 21:00, 23 I-16 aircraft of the 12th Fighter Aviation Regiment had relocated to the airfield near Chernivtsi, and at 19:30, an advanced team of the 255th Air Base was sent there. The 101st tank battalion of the 24th tank brigade crossed the border at 15.10 in the area of Snyaty and entered Chernivtsi at 16.20. The remaining units of the brigade were unable to force the river. Cheremosh and instead of it, on the orders of the commander of the 12th army, the 23rd tank brigade with an airborne battalion was sent from Kuta, which, together with the forward units of the 4th cavalry corps, occupied Storozhinets. The main forces of the 34th Cavalry Division were on the way to Storozhinets, and the 16th Cavalry Division was south of Vashkovtsev. The armored train arrived at Novoselitsa at 24:00. The 141st Rifle Division occupied the bridge at Zalizchikov and advanced southeast to Kadobeste. The 2nd cavalry corps moved to the border in a forced march and by the end of the day the advance detachment of the 3rd cavalry division entered Berkhomitka, the main forces of the division were in the Snyaty area, and the 5th cavalry division approached from Gorodenka to Yasenev-Polny.

The 60th Infantry Division was at the crossings across the river. Cheremosh in Vyzhnitsa and Ispas. At the front of the 5th Army, border guards crossed to Khotyn at 15.45, and at 17.30 units of the Kamenetz-Podolsk UR began to arrive. At the crossing near Khotyn, a pontoon boat with 30 fighters and ammunition was carried by the current onto the ferry cable and capsized. As a result, 16 servicemen of the 39th machine-gun battalion of the Kamenetz-Podolsk UR drowned, 5 light machine guns, 16 rifles and 2000 rifle cartridges were lost. The 80th Rifle Division crossed the Dniester in the Ustye, Sokol, Bolshaya Muksha regions and, having passed Lenkovtsy and Kelmentsy, reached the Novoselitsa, Volchenets region.

Luka-vats. The remaining parts of the division near the mouth until 21 o'clock made a pontoon crossing for the 49th tank brigade. To the east, near Maryanovka, at 4 p.m., the 305th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division crossed the Dniester, and by 01:00 on June 29, it had completed building a pontoon bridge for the 36th Tank Brigade. The delay in guiding the crossings was due to both the poor preparation of the pontooners and the strong current of the river swollen after the rains. The 169th Infantry Division at 1700 began crossing the Dniester in the region of Kosovtsi, Soroka, and in the evening reached Flexer, Skinyany, where they camped for the night. During the crossing of the 556th Infantry Regiment of the division, 3 Red Army soldiers drowned. The 434th rifle regiment of the division was transferred from Mogilev-Podolsky to the Yaruga, where it crossed the river. The 371st Rifle Regiment of the 130th Rifle Division occupied Soroki and

proceeded to build a pontoon bridge across the Dniester. Meanwhile, the advanced units of the 147th, 176th and 30th rifle divisions of the 37th rifle corps of the 9th army crossed the Dniester near Tashlyk at 14-15 hours and ensured the guidance of the crossings, which was delayed due to the poor training of the pontooners. As a result, the crossing of troops on pontoon bridges began only after 17 hours. The 435th and 798th rifle regiments of the 140th rifle division crossed the river at Solonchen and Rezina by 22:00, respectively, and by 4:00 in the morning on June 29 they advanced to the area of Soldaneshty, Syrkova. At Grigoriopol at 18.20–20.00, the 95th Infantry Division crossed, which went to the area of Budeshty, Kolonitsa, Sagaydak. While crossing the Dniester of the 13th separate reconnaissance battalion of the division, in the middle of the river, the engine of a floating tank stalled, which sank. Another floating tank sank 10-15 meters from the Bessarabian coast. The crews were rescued, the second tank was pulled ashore and put into operation. At Grigoriopol, by 20.30, the main forces of the 173rd Infantry Division completed the crossing. The 15th motorized rifle division and the 4th tank brigade began crossing south of Tashlyk at 20:00, and their advanced units entered Chisinau at 22:00. On the approach to the city, 1 Red Army soldier was killed in an overturned armored vehicle of the reconnaissance battalion of the division. During the night, the main forces of the 15th motorized division, the 4th tank brigade, the forward detachment of the 95th and the mobile detach

The 287th Infantry Regiment of the 51st Infantry Division occupied Bendery at 17.40, where 16 Romanian soldiers appeared at the headquarters of the regiment, who surrendered their weapons and declared their unwillingness to leave for Romania. The procedure for transferring the city to the Soviet units took place with a large crowd of people who, seeing the Romanian general approaching, began to shout: "Shoot him!" Under these conditions, the Romanian representative considered it best to leave the square without waiting for the ceremony to be completed. The 18th and 30th tank regiments of divisions of the 5th cavalry corps, which had concentrated in Farladen, and the 14th tank brigade, which reached the Ursoy area, were crossing the railway bridge in Bendery from 20:00. At 21.47, a battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment of the 74th Infantry Division crossed over to Akkerman. From 17.20, the construction of a pontoon bridge across the Tsaregradsky arm of the Dniester estuary began. The assembled parts of the bridge were alternately pulled up to the girl, but during a strong storm the cables broke several times, and the construction of the bridge was completed only by 4 o'clock in the morning of June 29.

In the meantime, following the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, at 18.35, 9 I-16 aircraft landed at the Chisinau airfield, and by 20.15 another 18 aircraft from the 146th Fighter Aviation Regiment were relocated there. Having received information about the flight of aircraft to Chisinau, the advance detachment of the 130th air base crossed the Dniester and moved towards the city. At 19.10–19.40, 27 I-16 aircraft of the 67th Fighter Aviation Regiment moved to the airfield near Akkerman.

On June 28, Galler reported to Shaposhnikov that in connection with the peaceful resolution of the Bessarabian issue, the Black Sea Fleet had been transferred from readiness No. 1 to readiness No. 2 from 15.00. The ships intended to assist the flank of the Red Army and block the coast of Romania are concentrated in Odessa and on the Tenderovsky raid. 2 submarines were deployed in positions near Constanta and 2 - on the approach to the Bosphorus. According to fleet reconnaissance, 2 destroyers, a submarine and a gunboat of the Romanian Navy were seen in the area between Sulina and Snake Island, 1 gunboat - in Constanta. The Turkish fleet is located in the Bosphorus and did not go to sea[980]. At 23.00 on June 28, the command of the —

Southern Front issued directive No. 00150 to its troops, which stated:

"1. Romanian troops continue to retreat beyond the river.

Rod. 2. The armies of the Southern Front, having crossed the state border at 14.00 28.6, occupied Chernivtsi, Khotyn, Soroca, Chisinau, Akkerman and the Storozhinets and Balti

regions by the end of the day. 3. The armies of the front, acting in the composition established by my directive No. 00149, from the morning of 29.6 continue to move and occupy northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and reach the new state

border by the end of 30.6. 4. 12 armies on 29.6 reach the line of Seletin [Selyatin], Terebleshti [Porubnoe], st. Kamenka, st. Construction sites, st. Lipcans and firmly hold it. With access to this line, have the main groupings: 4 RD with 23 brigade in the Storozhinets area, 60 RD - Teresheni [Tarashany], 131 RD - Chernivtsi, 58 RD with 5 TB Brigade - Dinautsy [Dinovtsy] and 2 RD - Khotin. Withdraw the headquarters of the 17th brigade on 29.6 - Chernivtsi and subordinate to the command of the

17th brigade - 131, 60 and 58 rifle divisions. The border on the left is Zbruch, Khotyn, r. Prut (all for the 12th army). 5. 5 armies - 36 sk, consisting of 80,169,140 rifle divisions with 49 and 36 brigade, reach the 29.6 line of art. Lipcany (claim.), Art. Reucela. The main forces and headquarters should be: 80 sd - Korjeutsy,

169 sd - Glodeni and Balti and 140 sd - Kishkareny. 49 and 36 tank brigades with the exit o concentrate in the districts - 49 brigade - Larga, 36 brigade - Bleshteni. The border on the left is Botushany, Skuleni. 6.

9th army - go on 29.6 to the line of Pyrlitsa, Gancheshty, Dezginzhe. The main forces of the active troops should have: 15 motor rifle divisions in the Pyrlitsa area, 95 rifle divisions - Gancheshty, 21 brigade - Dezginzhe and 173 rifle divisions - Chisinau. Combine all these compounds in

35 sc. 5 kk - 29.6 reach the line Kongaz, Bolgrad, Furmanka.

55th Rifle Division, occupying 25th Rifle Division Ackerman and Sarata, withdraw

74th Rifle Division to the Akmangit area. 7. By order of the chief of the Air Force, by 10.00 29.6, drop the paratroopers of the 201 adbr in the Bolgrad region with the task of

occupying the Bolgrad region. 8. Parts during the occupation of Bukovina and Bessarabia, the movement to lead on

the tails of the departing Romanian troops. 9. Establish exemplary order in all garrisons of occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina, establish guard duty and take under guard

all property left by the Romanian troops, state institutions and landlords.

10. Immediately take measures to repair roads and bridges in areas occupied by troops. By order of the chief of the VOSO, immediately begin rebuilding the railway sections to broad gauge: a) Tiraspol - Chisinau; b) Zalishchyky - Chernivtsi, Lipkany - Balti; c) Mogilev-Podolsk - Balti; d) Balti - Chisinau; e) Balti - Rybnitsa; f) Bendery - Bolgrad; g) Akkerman - Romanesti [Romanovo], Felchiu [Falchiu]. 11. The Air Force, according to the scheme approved by me, from June 29, proceed to

construction of field airfields at the rate of 15 IAP and 5 ShAP. 12. From 29.6 remove the threat from the air. 13. Organize from 29.6 the clearing of roads and areas, remove obstacles and blockages and restore the destroyed

connection.

14. By the end of 29.6, the army headquarters will go: 12 - Chernivtsi, 5 - Kamenetz-Podolsk, 9 - Tiraspol "[981]". —

Having received a new directive from the command of the Southern Front, the commander of the 12th Army issued directive No.

A0060: "1. Troops 12 A 29.6 continue with a rapid advance to the line of Seletin [Selyatin], Seret [Siret], Hertsa and further along the river. Prut to Lipkany to secure the territory of Bukovina and Northern Bessarabia for the USSR. The

border on the left is the old

one. 2. 4 kk with 23 brigade by rapid advance to occupy the area of Seret, Hertsa, Chernivtsi [s] and gain a foothold on the line of Seret, Hertsa, pushing Shcheredova] 0 [detachment] by force [to] the cavalry regiment to the Vikoverkhny line.

With the arrival of units of the 60th Rifle Division at the Seret line, Hertsa will change and concentrate in the Storozhinets area, leaving the PO at the Vikoverkhny

line. Shtakor - Watchman.

The border on the left is Prut, Hertz (incl.).

3. 60th Rifle Division, following the 4th KK forced march, reach the line of Seret, Hertsa, change units of the 4th KK, having the main forces and a staff in the Tereshen [Tarashany] area.

4. 2 kk with 5 brigade forced march to go out and occupy the Hertz area, (claim.) Lipkany, Zalishchik [and] and gain a foothold at the turn of the river. Rod from

(suit.) Hertz to Lipkany, one cd immediately occupy Khotyn.

Upon arrival of units of the 58th Rifle Division, change positions and fully concentrate in the Khotyn area. Shtakor 2 kk - Khotyn.

The border on the left is the

old one. 5. 17th SC - following the 2nd KK, send the 58th Rifle Division, which will go to the Dinautsy [Dinovtsy] area and change units of the 2nd KK at the turn of Novoselitsa, Tarasoutsy [Tarasovtsy], Lipkany, having a staff and the main forces of the Dinautsy division. 131 sd go out and settle down [in] Chernivtsi.

Corps control without corps artillery regiments - locate [in] Chernivtsi. 6. 192nd Guards Rifle

Division, with the main forces to go out and settle down [in] Ustserkyi, pushing the PO to the area of Ryzhina and Seletin by force [in] the Guards Rifle Regiment with the task of firmly holding the mountain passes in the area of Cameral, Frasin, Strazha. The

border on the left is Rostock, Guard. 7.

The rest of the 12th A to remain in the occupied areas, except for the 141st Rifle Division, which the commander of the 17th Rifle Corps should move to the Zalizhchik [i] area by 15.00 on 29.6.40.

8. When troops move across the territory of Bukovina and Bessarabia, take measures to clear mine areas, for which purpose reinforce the first echelons of troops with sappers and agree with the command of the Romanian army: a) about guides, b) about maps and diagrams and c) about mined areas. 9. In order to organize

and quickly advance the troops of bulky rear areas, do not take with you all the excess property of the units

leave in place.

10. In motion, observe strict order; to establish exemplary combat cohesion and clarity. Do not get out of order on a hike when passing settlements, do not make halts near settlements.

Commanders of all degrees at all times of the movement to be on their own places.

11. Each regiment to have an orchestra and settlements with them pass with music and songs.

12. Pay special attention to the appearance of the fighters and their smartness, everyone should be shaved, cleaned, in a neat clean

summer clothes and helmets. Leave poorly dressed in the rear of the division and do not withdraw to Bukovina and Bessarabia. 13.

The order on the allocation of garrison commanders is to be canceled. I appoint senior commanders of units and formations that operate in a given area as heads of garrisons of settlements. Their functions are in accordance with the regulations on the chiefs of garrisons.

For guidance and to facilitate the issuance of orders for the garrison, issue a supply of copies of the draft order for each division.

[982] the — .

garrison" At 5.10 on June 29, the headquarters of the 9th Army issued combat order No. 3, clarifying the instructions of the front

headquarters: "1. Romanian troops continue a hasty retreat beyond the river.

Rod. 2. On the right, it continues advancing to the river. Prut 5th army, the border with it is the same.

3. The 9th Army on 29.6 moves to the line of Pyrlitsa, Gancheshty, Dezginzhe with mobile units. 4. 35 brigade

consisting of 15 motor rifle divisions, 95 and 173 rifle divisions, 4 brigade by the end of 29.6 concentrate:

a) 15 motor rifle divisions in the Pyrlitsa area, throwing forward units to the river. Rod on the Petresti, Danutseni section; b) 95

sd - Gancheshty; c) 173rd

rifle division and 4th brigade -

Chisinau. 5. 5 kk mobile tank units by the end of 29.6 reach the Kagul-Bolgrad line; the main forces of the 9th cd - Leipzig, 32 cd - Tarutino, Berezina. 6. 55 sk: a) with the forces of 74 sd, take the Akkerman

area, Col [oniya] Old [aya] Sarata; b) 25 RD by the end of 29.6 withdraw to the

Akmangit area. 7. By order of the chief of the Air Force of the

front, by 10.00 29.6 paratroopers of the 201 adbr will be dropped in the Bolgrad region with the task of occupying the Bolgrad region. 8. During the occupation of Bessarabia, the troops of

the army should move on the tails of the departing Romanian troops. 9. Establish exemplary order in all the garrisons of occupied

Bessarabia, organize guard duty and take under guard all the property left by the Romanian troops, state institutions and landowners.

10. Take immediate action to fix roads and bridges [c] areas occupied by troops.

11. From 29.6, clear the roads of the districts, eliminate barriers and blockages and to restore the destroyed communication"[983] .

Fulfilling the directive, the troops of the Southern Front resumed their advance on the morning of June 29. On the front of the 12th Army, the 5th Tank Brigade at 7 o'clock in the morning set out in the direction of Novoselitsa and, moving further along the river. Prut, by 10 o'clock entered Lipkany. By the end of the day, the brigade concentrated in the area of Mamalyga, Lipkany, Stalnovtsy. The 23rd tank brigade set out from Storozhinets in the direction of the Siret at 7 o'clock in the morning and entered Kamenka at 10 o'clock. On the way, the brigade ran into the tail of a column of Romanian units and detained 500 soldiers and officers. At 3.30 am, 10 tanks of the 101st tank battalion of the 24th tank brigade, under the command of the battalion commissar Rudnik, set out from Chernivtsi to occupy Hertz, where they entered at 5.10 am. However, on the eastern outskirts of Hertz at 6.30 the tanks were fired upon by the Romanians. In the skirmish that ensued, 3 Romanian soldiers were killed and 2 wounded. The Romanian 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions, which were retreating in front of the front of the 12th Army, faced the problem of maintaining military discipline. In one of the columns of the 7th Infantry Division, up to 3 thousand soldiers fled, taking with them the horse train, and no more than 200 people went to Romania. Soviet troops picked up up to 200 rifles, 3 machine guns, about 50 thousand rifle cartridges and several hundred hand grenades. Two Romanian platoons voluntarily surrendered their weapons and refused to leave for Romania. In the area of the village of Sergieny, the Romanian captain tried to provoke an armed clash by giving the command to take up defense. The Soviet commander ordered to move machine guns into position, seeing which the Romanians fled. The local population turned to the Soviet command with complaints about the looting of the departing Romanian units, which in the Tarashan region shot 3 residents who resisted the seizure of horses. The cavalry squadron and the rifle company of the 192nd mountain rifle division reached Selyatyn at 1 pm and began to push outposts to the Cameral-Frasin am Falkeu-Guard line. The main forces of the division concentrated in Ustseryki.

The 60th Rifle Division completed the crossing over the river. Cheremosh and moved in two columns from Kuta to Storozhinets and from Vashkovtsy to

Chernivtsi. The 58th Infantry Division advanced towards Chernivtsi. At 23.45 on June 28, on the northwestern outskirts of the village of Rogozna, on the way to Sadgora, the 138th anti-tank division of the division met a Romanian cavalry patrol, to detain which a group of soldiers of the 3rd battery was sent under the command of the head of the ammunition supply division, military equipment 2nd rank Sukharev. Approaching the Romanian military, Sukharev commanded "hands up" and fired two shots into the air, to which the guard responded with fire. The ensuing firefight lasted about 10 minutes, after which the patrol surrendered. As a result, 2 Romanian soldiers and 3 horses were killed, and 1 soldier was slightly wounded. 19 privates and 1 lieutenant were taken into custody and disarmed. The trophies of the Soviet unit were 1 light machine gun, 13 carbines, 6 sabers and 19 horses. On the morning of June 29, the soldiers were sent home, and the officer was transferred to the local commandant's office. By the end of the day, the division reached the Mamornitsa area. The main forces of the 34th cavalry division of the 4th cavalry corps concentrated at Storozhinets at 0900, mobile detachments were sent to the Krasnoilsk-Porubnoye-Gertsia line by 1400 (along the cavalry regiment with a tank company). After a night march, the 16th Cavalry Division approached Chernivtsi at about 09:00 in the morning, and by 14:00 it concentrated in the Voloka area. The advanced units of the 2nd Cavalry Corps at 16 o'clock went to the river. The road at the Tarasovites. The 3rd cavalry division, having made a night march, was in the Magala area by 9.30, and by the end of the day concentrated in Novoselitsa, pushing forward detachments to the Tarasovtsy-Kostycheny-Shandryany line. The 5th Cavalry Division reached the Yurkovtsev area by 10 o'clock in the morning, and by evening entered Khotyn. The headquarters of the 2nd Cavalry Corps is located in Chernovka. The 131st Rifle Division continued to concentrate in Chernivtsi. The administration of the 17th Rifle Corps was also relocated there, and at 16.30 the

operational group of the headquarters of the 12th Army arrived. On the same day, the Chief of Staff of the 12th Army, Major General M.V.

Zakharov issued, in addition to the order of the commander No. A0060, order No. A0062: "1. During the

occupation of Bukovina and Bessarabia, the movement should be carried out on the tails of the departing Romanian troops. 2. Establish exemplary order in

all property left by the Romanian troops, state institutions and landlords.

3. On June 29, the troops begin clearing roads and areas in their lanes, remove obstacles and blockages and restore destroyed communications. 4.

Immediately begin to

fix roads and bridges busy

territories in the bands:

192 GSD - the border on the left of Rostock,

Guard; 13 sc - Kobaki, Neyzhadova and further

r. Seret; 8 sk - border on the right of the delimitation from 13 sk;

left r. Rod; 17 sk - border on the left Stetsova, Chernavka, Kostachany; first turn to restore the road Removed, Berkhomitka, Chernivtsi[y];

15 sc - p. Dniester.

To involve only sapper units in the work "[984] . On

the front of the 5th Army, by 6 o'clock in the morning the 49th tank brigade reached the Largi area, and at 13 o'clock the main forces of the brigade concentrated in Korzheutsy. By the end of the day, forward detachments were deployed on the Prut from Shirovtsy to New Bedrazh. The 36th tank brigade reached Brichany by 6.05, concentrated in Oneshty at 9.15, and the forward detachments with the 25th rifle regiment of the 44th rifle division attached as a landing force deployed along the river by 14.00. Prut from Old Bedrazh to Costesti. On this day, 2 Red Army soldiers died in an overturned tank, as well as the pilot of the U-2 communications aircraft that had crashed. The 80th Rifle Division reached the Balasinesti, Korzheutsy area. The advance of the consolidated detachment of armored vehicles of the 169th Infantry Division, sent to occupy the city of Balti, was delayed by the column of the 4th Romanian Cavalry Division slowly retreating to Falesti, overtaking which the advance detachment entered the city at 4.30. As it turned out, back at 17:00 on June 28, the only bridge connecting northern and southern Bessarabia across the Reut River, and the city with the railway station, was blown up. As the commission for the survey of the blown up bridge found out, preparations for the explosion, which destroyed 3 spans (46 m), began on June 18. By the end of the day, the main forces of the 680th and 556th regiments of the 169th rifle division were concentrated in the Ryshkan area. On the same day, the command of the 36th Rifle Corps arrived in Balti, and 4 I-15 aircraft of the 3rd Attack Aviation Regiment were relocated to the Stryba airfield northwest of the city.

On the front of the 9th Army, the 140th Infantry Division continued to move towards Kishkaren. At the crossing near Rybnitsa, the rise of water in the Dniester led to a rupture of the pontoon bridge, which had to be rebuilt. The 15th motorized rifle division set out from Chisinau at 6 o'clock in the morning and by 19 o'clock the advanced tank and 321st motorized regiments reached the Korneshty, Pyrlitsa area. Near Kornesht, parts of the division were fired upon by a Romanian detachment. The Soviet units returned machine-gun fire. In the shootout, 2 Red Army soldiers were killed, 12 were killed and 16 Romanian soldiers were wounded. The conflict was resolved on the spot by representatives of the parties. The division's communications plane was fired upon by a Romanian armored train at the station. The railing between Korneshty and Pyrlitsa. The directorate of the 35th Rifle Corps, the 173rd Rifle Division and the 4th Tank Brigade were completely concentrated in Chisinau. The 46th tank battalion was sent from the tank brigade through Gancheshty to the crossing at Falchiu, which by the end of the day concentrated in Cania, where it controlled the withdrawal of the

Romanian troops. By the end of the day, the 95th Infantry Division reached the Milesty, Costesty area. The troops of the 5th Cavalry Corps completed the crossing of the Dniester in the morning. The 9th cavalry division was crossing from 2.30 north of Bender, and the 32nd cavalry division - from 5.30 near Krasnogorka. By the end of the day, the corps with its main forces reached the Petrovka, Sturdzyany area. In the Manzyr region, units of the 32nd Cavalry Division detained a group of Romanian servicemen on 40 wagons, from whom 14,200 lei, 86 rifles, 4 pistols, 117 bayonets, 5,000 cartridges and various products were seized, as well as a safe with secret documents. The tank regiments of the 9th and 32nd cavalry divisions reached Cimislia and Romanov. In connection with the landing of the 204th airborne brigade in the Bolgrad region, the corps was ordered not to advance further than the Cimislia-Comrat-Romanovo line, and the 14th tank brigade returned to

the eastern bank of the Dniester and concentrated in Parkany. To the south, on the front of the 55th Rifle Corps, the 74th Rifle Division completed the crossing of the Dniester Estuary and occupied the area of Palenka, Karlovka, Akkerman. To the north of the estuary, at 0300, units of the 360th Infantry Regiment of the division crossed the Dniester and occupied the Khan-Kishlo region. On their right flank, by 6.00, units of the combined rif

Tiraspol UR and the combined artillery regiment of the Odessa Artillery School, who occupied the Korkmazy area. After 4 o'clock in the morning, the crossing of units of the 25th Infantry Division began along the pontoon bridge across the Tsaregradskoye arm, which by the end of the day had reached the area of Benkendorf, Postal, and Cherkessy with the main forces. During the day, the

headquarters of the 9th Army relocated to Tiraspol. Meanwhile, the commander of the Air Force of the Southern Front, Lieutenant General F.A. At 8 pm on June 28, Astakhov gave a preliminary order to the commander of the 29th air brigade to land troops in the Bolgrad area. True, instead of the 201st, it was ordered to use the 204th airborne brigade. As the commander of the 204th brigade, Colonel I.I. Gubarevich, from 4 a.m. on June 29, the personnel of the brigade were withdrawn to the aircraft and stayed there until departure, having one ammunition load of cartridges and two daily rations of canned meat and vegetables, concentrates and crackers. 1436 paratroopers were placed in 99 TB-3 aircraft of the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 14th heavy bomber regiments, and at 0800-0930 the aircraft took off in several echelons towards southern Bessarabia. 97 aircraft reached the target, as 2 were forced to land in Vinnitsa and Chisinau. The landing was carried out from 12.30 to 14.30 on June 29, 10 km north of Bolgrad. In total, 1372 paratroopers were landed, armed with 1065 rifles, 72 light machine guns, 246 pistols, 187 Degtyarev submachine guns, 18 radio stations, 28 telephones, 213 thousand rifle cartridges and 110,700 pistol cartridges. During the drop, 1 fighter opened his parachute early and, hitting the stabilizer of the aircraft, died. 5 paratroopers received leg fractures, 15 dislocations and sprains, and 1 concussion. After the landing, 95 aircraft returned to the airfield, and 2 made an emergency landing in Chisinau and Vinnitsa. By 16.30 the brigade had concentrated at Bolgariysk, but even before that the 3rd battalion was sent to Bolgrad, and the 1st battalion to the Troyanov

Val station, which were occupied at 18.30. The landing was enthusiastically received by the population and became a clear demonstration of the strength of the Red Army. In Bolgrad, which joyfully met the Soviet paratroopers, voluntarily disarmed and dispersed

houses the local Romanian security battalion. Following this, the cavalry squadron of the 3rd Romanian Cavalry Division, which approached the city, was dismounted and the horses were returned to the population. At 18.35, the 204th brigade received an order from the Southern Front to occupy the cities of Reni and Cahul, located 40–50 km from the landing site. At 20 o'clock the 2nd battalion moved to Reni in marching order. At 21:00, the Romanian command protested the landing in their rear[985] .

Meanwhile, on June 29, the headquarters of the Southern Front received a description of the state border of the Soviet Union with Romania sent by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Smorodinov: along a conditional line to the east, leaving the village of Sarata Yuzhnaya on the side of the USSR and not reaching 5.5 kilometers to the village of Izvor, it goes along an unnamed stream to the village of Shipotele Suchevey [Whisper], then along the Suceava River to the village. Ruska [Russian], leaving on the side of the USSR the points of Shipotele Suchevey, Seletin [Selyatin], pst. Ruska. From here, the border goes to the north-east along a

conditional straight line to the southern slopes of the top of Mount Petroushka, leaving the top of Mount Petroushka on the side of the USSR. Further, the border goes east in a straight line at st. Vakhrineshtie [Bagrinovka] and to the northwestern outskirts of the village of Dereka, leaving on the side of Romania the points of Guard, Upper [upper] Vikov [Vikovul de Sus], Neifratauts [Frateutsi-Nouy], Braintse, Seret [Siret], Dereka, and on the side of the USSR, the station Vakhrineshti, Volchinets, Terebleshti [Porubnoe]. From here, the border goes northeast to the western outskirts of the village of Hilisheu Kurt, the eastern outskirts of Probotesti and further to the southern bend of the Prut River near the eastern outskirts of the village of Lunka, leaving the points of Turyatka, Probotesti, Hertsa and Lunka on the USSR side, and Hilisheu Kurt on the Romanian side,

Died, Comeneshti. Further, the border goes along the Prut River to its confluence with the Danube River. From the city of Renia to Chatal, the border runs along the bed of the Danube River and further along the Chinese branch

From Pardino, the border goes along the middle channel of the Chilia branch to Chilia Noue. From Chilia Noue, the border runs along the middle channel of the Chilia branch until it flows into the Black Sea at an unnamed island, 13 km north of Sulina .

At 0.15 on June 30, Shaposhnikov signed directive No. 02737, which was sent at 1.00 to Timoshenko and Zhukov, who were in Tiraspol: "Instruction was received from the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Dekanozov, that the term for the evacuation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Romanians was extended until two in the afternoon on July 3 1940 "[987] . Accordingly, the command of the Southern Front issued order No. 00151, which demanded:

"1. The armies of the front, continuing to move towards the new border, by the end of June 29 occupied northern Bukovina and are completing the occupation of Bessarabia.

I order: 1) 12 A to advance by the end of 30.6 60 sd to the area of Teresheni [Tarashany] and advance units of 60 and 58 sd to gain a foothold along the state border in the Fontana Alba section, st. Tereblishti [Porubnoe], Hertsa, Lipkany. With the release of advanced rifle units to the state border, tank brigades should concentrate: 23 brigade - Storozhinets, 5 brigade - Stavchany. Battalion 24 brigade to join their brigade. Cavalry corps remain in the areas they occupy. The border on the left is the old one. 2) 5 A to continue

the implementation of the previously assigned task (order 00150) and advancing to the river. The rod of advanced rifle units, to firmly gain a foothold along the state border in the area (claim.) Lipkany, Skuleni [Skulyany]. The border on the left is Botushani,

Skuleni. 3) 9 A forward units 35 sk to the outcome of 30.6 to occupy and gain a foothold along the river. Prut in the area (suit.) Skuleni, Gypsy, with the main forces of 15 rd md in Pyrlitsa, 95 rd in Ganceshty, 5 kk 30.6 concentrate in the area of Cimishlia, Comrat, Romanovo. 204 adbr, having the main forces in

Bolgrad, to occupy and hold Cahul and Reni, with strong detachments of up to 300 people. every. 55 sk, occupying 25 sd area Kol[oniya] Star[aya] Sarata, Akkerman, one sd 74 sd by cars should be thrown to the Izmail area by the end of 30.6, providing the state border along the line of the river. Danube, with the rest of the division's forces, with a forced march, go to the area indicated in order 00150. Shtakor 55 sk 30.6 go to Kol[oniya]

Star[aya] Sarata.

- 4) Headquarters 12 A, leaving the task force in Chernivtsi, go to Kolomyia.
5) To

explain to all personnel that our Government allowed the Romanian army to carry out the evacuation until 14.00 on 3.7.40, therefore, all issues should be resolved only peacefully, allowing where necessary the possibility of a normal withdrawal. During the withdrawal of the Romanian units, to prevent the production of robberies by the Romanian soldiers, the removal of livestock, rolling stock and supplies taken from the local population of Bessarabia and Bukovina, for which purpose allocate for crossings across the river. Prut: from the 5th Army near Braneshta, a tank battalion with an infantry landing from 36 brigade; from the 9th Army in Leuseni a tank battalion with a landing force; in Cahul one tank regiment from cd, in Reni a tank battalion with an infantry landing; to cross the river Danube to Izmail - one tank regiment from cd.

The tank regiments and battalions should set out for the indicated crossings at 5.00 on 30.6.40, the tasks are to control the withdrawal of the Romanian troops across the border and in no way allow the export of property, the removal of livestock, carts taken from the local population and rolling stock "[988] .

On June 30, on the front of the 12th Army, the troops of the 4th and 2nd Cavalry Corps, the 23rd and 5th Tank Brigades were in their former areas and were preparing to move to Storozhinets and Stavchany after their replacement by rifle units. The 101st tank battalion of the 24th tank brigade set out at 17:00 to the location of its brigade. At 4 p.m., the 60th Rifle Division reached Storozhinets with the main forces, and the forward detachments of the 358th and 194th Rifle Regiments went to the Porubnoe-Hertz line to change cavalry. One unit of the Red Army accidentally entered the Siret station, but on the same day retreated beyond the established line of the state border. The 58th Rifle Division occupied the area of Dinovtsy, Kotelevo and was preparing to change units of the 5th Tank Brigade. The 131st Rifle Division was completely concentrated in Chernivtsi. On the front of the 5th Army, the 49th Tank Brigade was relieved by the approaching regiments of

the 80th Infantry Division, which deployed along the Shirovtsy-Korzheutsky-Kukonesti line and concentrated in Korzheutsky. One tank battalion of the brigade was advanced to the crossing near Branesht, where it was until the approach of units of the 169th Infantry Division. The 169th Rifle Division replaced the 36th Panzer

brigade, which retreated to the Onesht region, and occupied the Proskuryan, Braneshy, Bolotino, Kamenka, Balti, Ryshkany regions. Parts of the 8th and 11th cavalry regiments of the 4th Romanian cavalry division departed through Braneshy, who robbed the population. The commander of the 1st battalion of the 556th rifle regiment of the 169th rifle division offered to hand over the horses and wagons stolen from the population. The Romanians refused, firing several rifle and machine gun shots at the battalion's disposition. The battalion turned around and, in turn, fired several shots towards the Romanians, who fled, leaving their horses, part of their weapons and wagons. The Bessarabian cavalry remained on the eastern bank of the Prut. Horses and wagons stolen from local residents were seized from the remnants of the cavalry. The artillery battalion of the 4th Romanian Cavalry Division, which was retreating in the division's zone, disarmed itself and refused to leave for Romania. The 140th Rifle Division reached the area of Falesti, Skumpia, and the advance detachment advanced to the Prut between Toksoben and Skulyan. During the day, the 3rd assault and 92nd fighter air regiments

moved to the Balti area. On the front of the 9th Army, the main forces of the 15th Motorized Rifle Division had been in the Pyrlitsa area since 15:00. The battalion of the 321st motorized regiment and the tank battalion of the 14th tank regiment controlled the crossing in Ungheni from 20:00. The advanced tank company at 20.00 occupied the crossing at Petresht. At 2 pm the 47th Rifle Regiment came into contact with a Romanian detachment of up to 1,800 men with 20 guns and 200 carts loaded with artillery shells. They were asked to reload the shells on military carts, and to return the carts of local residents. The tank battalion and the 9th rifle company of the 15th motorized rifle division entered Skulyany. During negotiations with the Romanian general, which took place on the street with a large crowd of local residents, it was not known who threw a hand grenade towards the Soviet tanks, after the explosion of which a machine-gun burst was fired at the tank by the Romanian units. One of the tanks responded with a machine-gun burst and a fragmentation projectile. There were no casualties on either side. On the night of July 1, as a result of indiscriminate firing from the Romanian bank of the Prut, a Red Army soldier of the 9th rifle company of the 15th motorized rifle division was wounded. In response to the Soviet protest, the Romania

they clean their weapons and inadvertently fire shots. Soviet fighters witnessed how a Bessarabian soldier was stabbed with bayonets on the western bank of the Prut, where the Romanian troops were preparing defensive positions.

At 12.50, a Romanian general arrived at the location of the 95th Infantry Division with two officers and an interpreter and protested the rapid advance of the Soviet troops, which was bringing disorder to the Romanian army. The general threatened that he had given his units the order to open fire if the Soviet units began to advance behind them to the Balchan-Karlikan line. However, this did not prevent the 95th Infantry Division from entering Gancheshty with the main forces by the end of the day, and the advance detachment in vehicles reached the banks of the Prut and occupied Leovo at 1700 and Leuseni at 2000. The main forces of the 5th Cavalry Corps occupied the Romanovo-Cimishlia region by 1500. In front of the front of the corps, the 12th Romanian infantry division, staffed by Bessarabians, who refused to leave for Romania, retreated. "Soldiers of the 22nd and 3rd artillery regiments in the Petrovka area abandoned their materiel, personal weapons and went home." About 3,000 Bessarabian servicemen of the 10th and 20th infantry regiments of the division voluntarily laid down their arms and were sent home, while 80 officers and 200 non-commissioned officers were detained.

To the south, the 74th Rifle Division occupied Akkerman with its 78th Rifle Regiment, and at 0300 the rest of its forces entered Staraya Sarata. 22 Romanian soldiers and 1 officer came to the division headquarters and voluntarily surrendered their weapons. The 25th Infantry Division reached the area of Tatarbunary, Akmangit. When approaching Akmangit, an explosion of a mine laid by the Romanians killed 1 and wounded 3 servicemen of the 263rd Infantry Regiment. At 13:00, the 80th separate reconnaissance battalion and the forward detachment of the division, consisting of 2 rifle companies, set out in vehicles in the direction of Reni and Izmail. During the day, the 4th Fighter Wing moved to Chisinau, and 2 squadrons of the 67th Fighter Wing moved to Akkerman.

Landing operations continued in the south of Bessarabia. On the night of June 30, the 4th company of the 204th airborne brigade occupied Reni in vehicles, where it was met by "random fire from the Romanians fleeing in the dark." After return fire, "the firefight stopped, there were no casualties on our side." On the morning of June 30, the 5th company of the 2nd battalion

brigade on the way to Reni was fired upon by a Romanian aircraft, as a result of which 1 fighter was wounded. In the meantime, at 02:00 on June 30, the 1st battalion of the 204th airborne brigade set out on a campaign to occupy Cahul. The 3rd battalion of the brigade was left in the area of Bolgrad, Bolgariysk and the Troyanov Val station, which was also engaged in the collection of parachutes. During the day, in the Bolgrad area, units of the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 12th Infantry Division, the 4th Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 6th Gendarmerie Regiment, which retreated to Romania, disarmed by 50–70% and went

home. In the meantime, at 4.55 am on June 30, an order was given by the commander of the Air Force of the Southern Front to transfer the 201st airborne brigade to Izmail, and at 9.35–12.15 44 TB-3 aircraft with 809 paratroopers on board headed for the target. At 14.31, the last 5 aircraft took off from the airfield in Skomorokha. Initially, it was assumed that the aircraft would land at the Izmail airfield, but it turned out that the airfield was too small for such large aircraft. Landing began at about 12.20, and out of the first 9 aircraft that landed, 3 suffered breakdowns, including one of them collided with an I-16 aircraft that was on the ground, which burned down. After landing another 4 TB-3s, it was decided to stop landing and drop paratroopers 1 km north of the city. Since there was no connection between the ground and the planes, 6 cars flew away and landed in Bolgrad. In total, 240 were landed and 509 people were parachuted, and out of three aircraft, landing was not carried out, since one contained radio equipment that was not prepared for landing, the other had a brigade orchestra, which consisted of fighters unprepared for jumping who refused to jump, and the third plane fell behind on the way. As a result, all three aircraft returned to Boryspil. During the landing, 10 paratroopers were injured and 1 broke his leg.

By 18 o'clock Izmail was busy, and by 21 o'clock the paratroopers organized border guards along the Danube from Satu-Nou to Staraya Nekrasovka. The Romanian troops and their property were no longer in the city. By 10 pm, the advance detachment of the 25th Infantry Division and the squadron of the 18th Tank Regiment of the 32nd Cavalry Division of the 5th Cavalry Corps approached the city, which were used to strengthen the protection of the city and the border. "The presence of these tanks in the airfield area, obvious

interpretations about the transfer of tanks on airplanes, "the commander of the 201st brigade, Major General I.S., explained in his memorandum. Angleless. Late in the evening, representatives of the Odessa Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks arrived in the city and set about organizing local city government. In the meantime, it turned out that in Izmail, during the withdrawal of the Romanian troops, 6 citizens were killed, who were trying to resist the sacking of the city. Their funeral resulted in a crowded demonstration[989] .

According to the command of the Southern Front, the landings "completely justified themselves and forced the Romanian units to reckon with the agreement"[990] . Despite such a high assessment of the actions of the paratroopers, the commanders of the airborne brigades were quite critical of the operation. In their opinion, the Air Force Command did not actually prepare the operation: no reconnaissance of the drop site was carried out, there was no organization of communications, and the preparation of air regiments for landing turned out to be low, which led to the dispersion of the landing force of the 204th brigade over a large area (8 km along the combat course and up to 3–4 km to the sides). In addition, there was no unified command and control of the landing force, and "in a real combat situation, this would lead to large unnecessary losses"[991] .

Head of the Combat —

Training Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Kurdyumov, reporting on July 24, 1940 to the People's Commissar of Defense on the progress of the airborne operation in Bessarabia, noted that it was "performed exceptionally poorly", since "there was no preparation for the operation ... The release of the 204th brigade on June 29 was carried out with a delay of 1 hour 30 minutes due to untimely issuance of the departure order. The departure of the 201st brigade instead of 9.00 was made at 14.00 on June 30 for the same reason, and also because of the lack of fuel tankers at the Skomorokha airfield. The airborne assault was carried out in a peaceful manner - without the cover of combat aviation and preliminary reconnaissance of the area of the drop (landing). The formations and flight altitude were not respected. The release was carried out in a disorganized manner, at various heights and very extended. As a result, the brigades were dispersed over an area of 10 x 10 km, and after landing they were assembled within two hours, which is unacceptable for a combat situation. Flight

The landing took place during the day, in the conditions of the greatest turbulence in the air, from here only in one 204th brigade 50 people were returned to the departure airfields, who were unable to jump (sickness). The air brigades were thrown out and landed without any tasks and instructions on the nature of the actions. The drop points for the command of the airborne brigades became known only from the commanders of the flying units. There was no leadership of the brigades from the side of the front, and only 5 hours after the drop, a representative of the front arrived in the 204th brigade with a very general order to occupy new points, but again without mentioning the nature of the

actions of the brigades. When using brigades, the degree of their condition and preparedness was not taken into account. Thus, the 204th brigade, which had 42.2% of the "composition of people who arrived at the brigade in June and hastily made 1-3 jumps, was dropped by parachute in difficult conditions with a wind of 8-9 m / s. At the same time, the 214th brigade, best prepared for parachute drop, was not used at all. The time to prepare for the operation from the moment the order was received to the departure was estimated at 4 hours, and then due to the deprivation of the necessary rest of the brigade personnel. Replenishment of the abandoned brigades with firearms and food by air, as well as the evacuation of the wounded and sick, was not provided. After many requests, only on July 5 (five days later) an ambulance aircraft arrived at the location of the 204th brigade. The listed shortcomings in a combat situation would inevitably lead to the failure of the airborne operation and to the

needless loss of people and aircraft . Meanwhile, on July 1, on the front of the 12th Army, the 192nd Mountain Rifle Division concentrated its main forces in the area of Stebne, Ust-Putila. By 6 o'clock in the morning, the passes north of Frasin and Straga were occupied by outposts. The 56th Romanian infantry regiment and two squadrons of cavalry retreated in front of the division's front, with which 15 guns were thrown in the Dikhtinets area. The 60th Rifle Division relieved cavalry during the day in the Porubnoye-Gertsya sector. On the Novoselitsa-Lipkany sector, the 58th Rifle Division replaced the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 5th Tank Brigade, which withdrew to Stavchany. The 34th Cavalry Division and the 23rd Tank Brigade concentrated in Storozhinets, and the 2

On the front of the 5th Army, the Soviet troops occupied their former position. Only the 3rd battalion of the 680th rifle regiment of the 169th rifle division occupied Kukhneshty, and the 140th rifle division continued to advance towards the Prut. The advanced battalion of the 798th rifle regiment of the division entered Skulyany, where the battalion commander, Major Chernov, not knowing about the permission to postpone the withdrawal of the Romanian troops until July 3, negotiated with the Romanian command to clear the coast from the Romanian soldiers. Chernov gave 1 hour to fulfill his requirements - until 24.00. The representative of the Romanian side, division general Pavniceanu, refused, threatening to use force in case of a provocation. Meanwhile, Chernov was informed about the extension of the evacuation period, and he withdrew his demands. The 49th tank brigade concentrated in Larga, and the 36th tank brigade in Oneshty, sending one battalion to Braneshthy.

On the front of the 9th Army, the 15th Motorized Rifle Division occupied the area of Petreshty, Ungheni, Pyrlitsa. On the night of July 1, a group of Red Army soldiers in vehicles was fired at in the Strashen area. At the same time, on the southwestern outskirts of Pyrlitsa, a team of telephone operators of the 53rd separate communications battalion, consisting of 1 junior commander and 4 Red Army soldiers, was attacked by unknown people. 1 Red Army soldier was killed, and the rest fought for 3 hours. With the approach of Soviet tanks, the attackers disappeared into the darkness. The 95th Rifle Division approached the Karpineny in the evening. By the end of the day, the main forces of the 25th Infantry Division entered Kamenskoye, and its advanced units entered Reni and Izmail as early as

8 o'clock in the morning. Meanwhile, at 8 pm on June 30, the headquarters of the 204th airborne brigade received a report from the commander of the 1st battalion, which was located 20 km southeast of Cahul, that, according to information received from the local population, the Romanian units had organized defenses 2 km east of cities. The brigade commander Gubarevich with the 8th company of the 3rd battalion in 3 vehicles at 1.00 on July 1 left for Cahul. Arriving at the location of the 1st battalion, the brigade commander learned that the battalion commander was negotiating with the Romanian officer, who was the most senior in the area, who was dragging out the negotiations, waiting for the approach of the cavalry regiment. "For the provocative organization of the defense," Gubarevich later reported, "I gave the retreat of the defending units a period of 20 minutes, which was overfulfilled by them, wi

Entering the city, I called the head of the garrison with the rank of major and suggested that he talk with his command about the cleansing of Cahul in connection with the provocative organization of defense on the outskirts of Cahul. Upon my return from the border dam across the Prut River, there were no Romanians in the city, and the major reported that the requirement had been met." The appearance of the paratroopers stopped the robbery of the population by the Romanian soldiers. By 0200, the 30th Tank Regiment of the 9th Cavalry Division entered the city.

In Reni, the departing Romanian units were inspected by the fighters of the 2nd battalion of the 204th airborne brigade and local residents flocking from everywhere. The property of the Bessarabian population and livestock were immediately confiscated and returned to their owners. The rail transport was checked in the same way. It is clear that these measures of the Soviet troops caused dissatisfaction with the Romanian units, which, having crossed to the western bank of the Prut, often opened indiscriminate fire in the direction of the location of the paratroopers. During the day, in spontaneous skirmishes, 1 Red Army soldier was wounded and 1 Romanian soldier was killed. On the night of July 2, near Giurgiulesht, from the Romanian coast, the positions of the 2nd battalion of the 204th brigade were shelled for 30 minutes, which did not return fire. The Soviet parliamentarians offered the Romanian command [a ceasefire\[993\]](#) . In the meantime, the Udarny and —

Rostovtsev river monitors left Ochakov for Odessa, which were supposed to move further to Izmail through the Ochakov arm of the Danube. To prepare the fairway, 2 hydrographic vessels, boats and the Khenkin minesweeper were sent to the mouth. In the bay of Zhebriany, the gunboat "Red Georgia" and the minesweeper "Explosion" anchored. As naval intelligence reported, during the day, on the approach to Sulina, the Romanian fleet set up a minefield, and the destroyer "Meresti" with 1 gunboat is on patrol between Sulina and about. Serpentine[994] . On July 2, on the front of the 12th and 5th armies, the troops remained in the areas reached the day before. In the ~~area~~

of Kamenka across the river. Siret, up to 400 soldiers from the 7th and 8th Romanian infantry divisions, who had already retreated beyond the border line, crossed into Soviet territory. The 140th Rifle Division, which concentrated its main forces in the area of Falesti, Scumpia, deployed outposts along the Prut from Kalinesht to

Skulyan, where up to 100 remaining Romanian soldiers and 6 Cardin-Lloyd tankettes were found in the

barracks. On the front of the 9th Army, the 15th Motorized Rifle Division continued to remain in the area of Pyrlitsa, Korneshty. The forward detachment of the division controlled the crossing in Ungheni, where the Romanian units mined the bridge. Having received an order to prevent the explosion of the bridge, the division commander presented an ultimatum to the Romanian command: "In the event of a bridge explosion, we will take decisive action with the use of aviation against Iasi." As a result, the Romanian side agreed with the Soviet demands, and the bridge was not blown up. In addition to the evacuated Romanian troops, up to 6 thousand refugees accumulated at the crossing to Romania. The main forces of the 95th Rifle Division were concentrated in the Karpinen area by 5 o'clock, and the forward detachment controlled the Prut bank from Leusenii to Leovo. The 136th Cavalry Regiment of the 9th Cavalry Division at 0900 set out from Cimislia to the crossing at Falchii. On the night of July 2, in the area of picket No. 4 near the Dniester Estuary, unknown persons fired at a column of the 360th Infantry Regiment of the 74th Infantry Division. After return fire, the shooting, as a result of which 2 horses were wounded, stopped. The main forces of the 25th Infantry Division reached the area of Banovka, No.

On July 1 and 2, separate Romanian planes bombarded the square and the railway station in Reni, but there were no casualties. 1.5 km east of Giurgiulesht, the Romanian company took up defensive positions and opened indiscriminate machine-gun fire on the soldiers of the 204th airborne brigade. At the suggestion of the brigade commander, the Romanian units were withdrawn beyond the Prut. At 18.30-19.00 on July 2, 5-6 Romanian river monitors, cruising between Galati and Giurgiulesti, fired indirect fire from their 37-mm guns, and the last Romanian units retreated along the bridges to the western bank of the river. Rod. Soviet troops, who were 250 meters from the bridges, did not open fire. After the departure of the last Romanian units at 19.45, in a conversation with the Soviet representatives on the bridge, the Romanian parliamentarian Colonel Stepanov warned them to immediately leave the bridge. 2-3 minutes after their departure, two trusses of the western part of the railway bridge and two spans of the automobile bridge were blown up. In response to the protest of the Soviet side

Romanian representatives stated that the bridges had been blown up because Soviet tanks attacked them.

Meanwhile, in the arms of the Danube, Soviet ships were measuring depths. The river monitors of the Danube military flotilla "Rostovtsev", "Shock", "Martynov", "Zheleznyakov" and "Pearls" were in Odessa, waiting for the weather to improve for the transition to Izmail. The Romanian command declared the mined zones near Sulina and Constanta dangerous for navigation. True, in reality, mining was not carried out near Constanta[995] .

On July 2, by its order No. 017 / ss, the headquarters of the Southern Front demanded that the headquarters of the 12th, 5th and 9th armies organize the defense of the border and "develop a plan for the use of troops in case Romania switches to active operations. In this plan, to provide for the use of parts not only already advanced to the border, but also those that remained behind the Dniester and Cheremosh pp. Submit this plan for approval by 20.00 4.7.40. Open by observation, without crossing the river. Prut, the position of the Romanian army (intentions, whether it crossed the western bank of the Prut river to the defense, whether it retreats further, its main groupings, whether the strengthening of the western bank of the Prut river continues). To establish which groups of the Romanian army are still hanging out in the rear of the army, their behavior and measures for their withdrawal from—

the river. Prut"[996] . On July 3, at 15:00, on the front of the 12th Army, the 77th Romanian Infantry Regiment advanced in battle order in the direction of Volchinets, violating the state border in the Vashkouty area with forward units. The population in a panic, with cattle, fled to Volchinets. The outpost of the 148th cavalry regiment, consisting of a junior lieutenant and 6 fighters, was forced to withdraw. With the arrival of a tank company of the 23rd tank brigade, the Romanian unit withdrew beyond the border line in the direction of Siret. Although the sides of the fire were not opened, the tank company was left in Vascou just in case. In addition, the head of the reconnaissance group of the 97th border detachment, Captain Khrustalev, reported to the headquarters of the 12th Army that on July 3, the Romanian units crossed the border line and occupied the villages of Kulicheni, Turyatsi, Poeni, Obersinoutsy and Sherbouts. Separate groups of Romanian troops appear in the Hertz region, where they take things from the population. As a result, the chief of staff of the 12th Army, by his order No. op / 025, demanded that the commander of the 17th rifle corps restore order in the protection of the border line.

On the front of the 9th Army, the advance detachment of the 15th Motorized Rifle Division was withdrawn from Skulyan, since the main forces of the 798th Rifle Regiment of the 140th Rifle Division approached there. The 25th Infantry Division entered the Kubey region (now Chervonoarmeiskoye) and continued to move towards Bolgrad. The 32nd Cavalry Division occupied Abaklia, and the 18th Tank Regiment of the division was deployed squadron by squadron in Bolgrad, Reni and Izmail. By 4 p.m., the 136th cavalry regiment with a field artillery battery of the 108th cavalry regiment of the 9th cavalry division arrived in Kania, where the 46th tank battalion of the 4th tank brigade, which was stationed there, was reassigned to it. After the withdrawal of the last Romanian units behind the Prut, the Romanians made the railway bridge impassable and mined the bridge for wheeled vehicles near Falciu. By the end of the day, squadrons of the 136th Cavalry Regiment were deployed along the Prut from Leovo to Kania, south of Gatesht to Cahul, squadrons of the 86th Cavalry Regiment of the 32nd Cavalry

Division deployed ~~when the conditions provided the~~ completion of priority hydrographic work in the Danube channels allowed 5 river monitors of the Danube military flotilla, accompanied by the destroyer Bodry, to begin the transition from Odessa to Izmail[997] . From 2 pm on—

July 3, 1940, the Soviet-Romanian border was closed. Thus, "the troops of the Southern Front fulfilled the task assigned to them and provided our Government with the opportunity to peacefully liberate BESSARABIA and BUKOVINA and, by their actions, quickly secured them for the USSR ... The border was securely secured. The main forces began normal combat training in the areas they occupied . Following the troops of the Red Army, 3 operational-Chekist groups of the NKVD were introduced into the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which arrested former employees of the Romanian punitive organs, agents of the Romanian special services and seized weapons from the population. By July 3, 490 people were arrested, and in the adjacent regions of the Ukrainian SSR - 270 agents of the Romanian intelligence[999] . On the same day, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

sent a letter to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs with a proposal "on the urgent advancement of the border troops of the NKVD to the line of the new state border of the USSR with Romania and on the change of field units of the Red Army"[1000] . Table 9—

[1001] Grouping of troops of the Southern Front on July 3, 1940

Армии	Корпуса	Дивизии, бригады
		8-я, 17-я, 86-я СД, 214-я адбр
12-я	13-й СК	62-я, 139-я СД
	8-й СК	72-я, 124-я, 146-я СД, 10-я, 24-я, 26-я тбр
	15-й СК	7-я, 141-я** СД, 81-я МСД, 38-я тбр
	2-й* КК	3-я*, 5-я* КД
	17-й* СК	58-я*, 60-я*, 131-я* СД, 5-я* тбр
	4-й* КК	16-я*, 34-я* КД, 23-я* тбр
		192-я* ГСД
5-я	49-й СК	44-я, 135-я** СД
	36-й* СК	80-я*, 169-я*, 140-я* СД, 36-я*, 49-я* тбр
		130-я** СД
9-я	37-й СК	30-я, 147-я, 176-я СД, 21-я тбр
	7-й СК	51-я**, 150-я, 164-я СД, 14-я тбр
	35-й* СК	15-я* МСД, 95-я*, 173-я* СД, 4-я* тбр
	5-й* КК	9-я*, 32-я* КД
	55-й* СК	25-я*, 74-я* СД
		201-я*, 204-я* адбр, 100-я, 116-я СД

*

Troops introduced into the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.

Troops from which separate units were introduced into the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. At 22.30

on July 3, the chief of staff of the Southern Front issued order No. 024 / ss:

"In connection with the end of the evacuation period for the Romanian army, the commander of the front ordered:

1. Firmly gain a foothold on the new state border, immediately close her and prevent crossing the state

border. 2. Remaining small units and groups of Romanian troops disarm and collect in camps under guard until further notice.

The gathering place is determined by the commanders of formations and

separate units. 3. To immediately allocate units and units of each army, with a total strength of at least an infantry division with vehicles, to collect abandoned Romanian weapons, military equipment and other property, to comb the area and capture more

hiding small groups of Romanian soldiers and, possibly, bandit groups. In the garrisons and in the regions of

the garrisons, entrust this task to heads of garrisons, and at the state border to the troops occupying it.

Involve the local population in this work. The collected weapons and property should be immediately taken into account and handed over under reliable guard at the points established by the formation commanders.

4. Within five days, register the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Romanian army remaining on the territory of Bessarabia and Bukovina, indicating the last name, first name and patronymic, rank and position, place of residence, which unit and in which garrison he served, nationality, what locality he was born in, year of birth, place of residence and occupation of the family. 5. Establish careful monitoring of all crossings across the river. Prut and prevent

them from exploding, making strict demands on the Romanian command in this regard. Consider that the Romanian troops have already blown up the railway and dirt bridges across the river. Rod at Reni; the bridges near Ungeni-

Tyrg were prepared for the explosion, but as a result of the tough ultimatum presented by us, the bridges near Ungeni-Tyrg were not blown up. 6. Execution and on the measures taken, indicating which parts are allocated for the collection of weapons, which bridges are taken under supervision and other

measures, to be reported by 18.00 4.7.40. 7. On the new state border, establish careful monitoring of the opposite bank, the behavior and actions of the Romanian troops "[1002] . At 02.10 on July 4, Shaposhnikov informed the command of the Southern

front order of the people's commissar of defense:

"1. Border with Romania in northern Bukovina and Bessarabia before the mouth of the Danube, inclusive, is firmly closed and no one is allowed to pass.

2. All remaining units and divisions of the Romanian army urgently and disarm immediately.

3. Report by special telegram how many Romanian soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers have been disarmed since the beginning of the operation until 03.07 inclusive "[1003] . As was reported to Moscow, on Soviet territory

7446 servicemen of the Romanian army remained and were disarmed (106 officers, 243 non-commissioned officers and 7097 soldiers)

[1004] . At about 2 a.m. on July 4, at the 5th Army sector in the Valya Rusului area, the commander of the 6th company of the 445th rifle regiment of the 140th rifle division sent the squad leader Vekshin with 3 fighters behind the company. Approaching the river, Vekshin mistook his company for the Romanians and opened fire. As a result, 3 Red Army soldiers were wounded, 1 of whom died from wounds. On the front of the 9th Army at 2 pm on the same day, the main forces of the 25th Infantry Division entered Bolgrad, Reni and Izmail and from July 6 replaced tank and airborne units on the border guard. At 4 pm on July 4, the river monitors of the Danube military flotilla entered the Ochakovskaya arm of the Danube and moved up the river following the boats trawling the fairway. 3 border boats arrived in Vilkovo, 3 more boats went up the river to Kiliya [1005] On the same day, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the proposal of the People's Commissar of Defense to change to a broad gauge by the end of July about 1300 km of railways in Bessarabia .

and Northern Bukovina and restoration of bridges across the Dniester [1006] At 5.45 on July 5, in the 14th rifle regiment of the 72nd rifle division of the 12th army, the sentry guarding the makeshift warehouse under a canopy took a fuse from an unsealed box and began to turn it in his hands. The fuse ignited, and the sentry, frightened, threw it back into the box where the rest of the fuses lay, which led to an explosion, as a result of which 8 people were injured. On the same night, near Branesh, unknown persons attacked the communications post of the 556th Infantry Regiment of the 169th Infantry Division. In the skirmish, 1 Red Army soldier was killed, and the attackers fled in the dark. On this day, 5 monitors of the Danube military flotilla arrived in Kiliya at 14.20, and in Izmail at 20.30. Trawling of the fairway showed that the approaches to the port of Izmail were blocked by flooded booms. To control the Danube at 20 o'clock on July 5, the 265th corps artillery regiment of the 7th rifle corps arrived in Izmail, and the 441st corps artillery regiment [1007] Rifle Corps In — .

connection with the end of the Bessarabian campaign on July 5, the troops of the Southern Front, and on July 6 the Black Sea Fleet were brought to a state of normal peacetime readiness [1008] . In small skirmishes with Romanian troops and from accidents, units

From June 11 to July 6, 1940, the Red Army and border troops lost, according to incomplete data, 148 people (killed - 6, died - 26, suicides - 10, drowned - 23, wounded - 79, self-mutilation - 4)[1009] . According to some reports, the losses of the Romanian troops amounted to 89 people (killed - 42, wounded - 47) [1010] . On the morning of July 5, border detachments crossed the Dniester and moved in motor vehicles to the Prut. From 21.00 on July 8, the border was transferred to the protection of the border troops of the NKVD. On the new border and along the Prut and Danube rivers, the 97th (Chernovitsky), 23rd (Lipkansky), 24th (Balta), 2nd (Calarashsky), 25th (Cahulsky) and The 79th (Izmail) border detachments of the Ukrainian and Moldavian districts of the border troops of the NKVD [1011].

In the meantime, at 14.30 on June 30, the chief of the General Staff sent memorandum No. 104541/ss to the People's Commissar of Defense with a project for the deployment of Red Army troops in the western border districts. In particular, it was proposed to include the northern part of Bukovina, which belongs to the USSR, into the KOVO, and

Bessarabia into the OdVO and have: "5. On the territory of the Kyiv Special Military

District: a) 21 rifle divisions, b) 2 mechanized corps consisting of 4 tank and two motorized divisions,

c) 3 tank brigades, d)

4 cavalry divisions. 6. On the

territory of the Odessa Military District: a) 9

rifle divisions, b) a

mechanized corps consisting of two tank and one

motorized division, c) one

cavalry division, d) one tank

brigade. In addition, it was

proposed to redeploy the 116th Infantry Division from the KhVO, the 9th Cavalry Division and the 49th Tank Brigade from the KOVO to reinforce the OdVO. "When approving the deployment project proposed to you, I ask for instructions for a report to the Government of the — . USSR" [1012] On July 3, by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No.

dated June 13 and No. 1055-409ss dated June 19 in the ORVO, HVO, KOVO and OdVO[1043] .

Having discussed the deployment of troops in the western border districts, on July 4, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff sent a memorandum No. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina include: the northern part of Bukovina as part of the Kiev Special Military District, and the territory of Bessarabia as part of the Odessa Military District. In addition, it was proposed to strengthen the KOVO and OdVO and "to approve the following distribution of ground forces: [...] d) In the Kiev Special Military District, have: eighteen divisions of twelve thousand, two divisions of six thousand, two mountain divisions of nine thousand, two tank corps, three tank brigades, four

cavalry [cavalry] divisions, fourteen corps artillery]

regiments, ten artillery] regiments of the RGK. Thus, the number of rifle divisions remains unchanged. One cavalry division and one tank brigade are transferred to the OdVO. In total, the Kyiv Special Military District, including three divisions to be formed with a strength of three thousand, will have 31 divisions, of which: 25 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized

divisions.

e) In the Odessa Military District, to have:

eight divisions of twelve thousand, two divisions of six thousand, one tank corps, one cavalry [cavalry] division, one tank brigade, two corps artillery] regiments, two artillery] regiments of the RGK. Thus, an increase against the earlier decision by one rifle division, one cavalry division and one tank

brigade and a decrease by four artillery] regiments of the RGK. In total, there will be 13 divisions in the Odessa military district, of which: 10 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions. In addition, it was proposed to have 25 air regiments as part of the KOVO Air

Force, of which 1 heavy bomber, 2 long-range bomber, 5 high-speed

bomber, 2 light assault, 1 light bomber and 14 fighter. The OdVO Air Force should have 13 air regiments, of which 3 long-range bombers, 3 high-speed bombers, 1 light bomber and 6 fighter regiments. The military asked to approve these proposals[1014] . On July 6, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks approved the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1193-464ss, according to which the territory of Northern Bukovina was included in the KOVO, and Bessarabia - in the OdVO and provided for a number of organizational measures in the Red Army[1015] . On the same day, the People's Commissar of Defense sent directives No. 0/1/104584 - 0/1/104585 / ss to the Military Councils of the KOVO and OdVO, respectively, on the composition and deployment of district troops. It was required to disband the units and institutions created for the Bessarabian campaign, and immediately begin the transfer of units to the points of permanent deployment. In the KOVO, it was necessary "first of all to withdraw the troops being transferred to another district (8, 17, 86 rifle divisions, 120 ran b / m and 21 tank brigade), units intended for deployment in the border zone of their district (192, 72, 62 and 81 sd), tank units (5, 14, 23.10 and 24 tank brigades), artillery and management of the 5th army; in the second place - the rest of the parts. From the rifle divisions 141, 7, 124, 139, 192 - withdraw in marching order, providing them with rolling stock only for the material part.

In the OdVO, it was necessary "first of all to transfer the units located along the eastern bank of the river. Dniester and airborne brigades. Airborne brigades, 30th, 164th and 100th regiments of the division, 14th and 21st tank [s] brigades, 124th, 110th, 429th, 430th, 522nd ap RGK, 317th BM ad to transfer by rail; 116, 150, 147, 130 lines of the division - in marching order, using in exceptional cases the rolling stock only for the transfer of materiel. In the second turn, withdraw the units located on the territory of Bessarabia, while withdrawing the 140th, 169th and 80th regiments of the division upon reaching their areas of the 95th and 176th divisions. In addition, it was required to start new formations approved by the government and resume the dismissal

Northern Bukovina and in the north of Bessarabia the 192nd mountain rifle division, 58th, 60th and 169th rifle divisions, and "the rest of the formations, units and institutions to send to points of permanent deployment" of permanent deployment in Bessarabia remained the 176th rifle division in [1017]. For Soroca, Floreshty, Balti, 15th motorized rifle division in the Bendery region, Tiraspol, 9th cavalry division in the Leovo region, Comrat, 25th rifle division in the Cahul region, Bolgrad, 51st rifle division in the Kiliya region, Staraya Sarata, Akkerman and the offices of the 14th and 35th rifle corps, respectively, in Belgrade and Chisinau [1018]. From July 8–9, the troops of the Southern Front set out on a campaign to their places of permanent deployment.

At the same time, the dispersal of aviation units began. On July 8, the Chief of the General Staff ordered the Commander of the KOVO to redeploy the 33rd Fighter and 3rd Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiments to the BOVO, the 16th Aviation Brigade, the 13th High-Speed Bomber and 51st Long-Range Bomber Aviation Regiments to the OrVO, the 60th High-speed Bomber Aviation Regiment to the KhVO, in the KalVO the 16th high-speed bomber air regiment, in the LVO the control of the 29th air brigade and the 7th heavy bomber and in the North Caucasus Military District the 1st long-range bomber air regiment and to return to the places of permanent deployment in the OdVO the control of the 7th air brigade, the 8th and 11th heavy bomber air regiments. At the same time, the commander of the OdVO control of the 55th air brigade, the 44th and 58th high-speed bomber regiments, as well as the permanent 21st to transfer the deployment of long-range bomber, 146th and 131st fighter air regiments[1019]. Already on July 9, 13 air regiments were deployed to the places of permanent deployment (the 33rd IAP and the 3rd bap in the BOVO, the 13th bap and the 51st bap in the ORVO, the 60th bap in the KhVO, the 21st bap, the 8th th and 11th bap in OdVO, 7th bap, 44th and 58th bap in LBO, 16th bap in KalVO, 1st bap in SKVO) consisting of 540 aircraft[1020]. On July 9, the and on July 10, the administration of the 9th Army[1021].

Soviet-Romanian commissions

In accordance with the Soviet-Romanian agreement of June 28, 1940, Lieutenant General D.T. . Kozlov, who was ordered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army at 23.17 to organize a meeting on June 29 of representatives of Romania sailing from Constanta on the steamer Transylvania, led by divisional general A. Aldea [1022] .

At 17.30 on June 29, Davidescu arrived at Molotov and handed over to him the plan for the evacuation of certain zones of the transferred territories, developed by the Romanian General Staff, as well as the request of the Romanian government that the rate of occupation of the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by Soviet troops should not exceed the rate of evacuation of the Romanian troops. Molotov replied that "the rate of evacuation should be set by the Mixed Commission, which can now begin work. However, it is not known for what reasons the Romanian delegates have not yet arrived in Odessa. As for the opinion of the government of the USSR on the evacuation period, it agrees to extend the period until 2 p.m. (Moscow time) on July 3, so that the Romanian government has 5 days at its disposal. Accordingly, the rate of advance of the Soviet troops will also be calculated. Davidescu replied that "he does not know for what reasons the Romanian delegates have not yet arrived in Odessa. They left Constanta yesterday on the ship Transylvania, and it is possible that the ship was delayed due

to a storm in the Black Sea. At the same time, the Romanian side tried to achieve a revision of the border line in Northern Bukovina. Davidescu told Molotov that since the new dividing line in the Hertsa region was not exactly fixed, he "did not clearly communicate it to his government. When he looked at the map shown to him by Comrade Molotov, then it was not clear to him whether this line went north of Hertz or in another direction. At present, the Soviet units have reached Hertz and have advanced 11 km south of this city.

The Romanian government asks to leave this region behind Romania, since it is an old Romanian territory that belonged to Romania even before the war of 1914. Therefore, the Romanian side proposed to draw a border along the line of the former border between Austria-Hungary and Romania. Molotov reminded "the envoy that during a conversation on June 26 he suggested that he take a map showing the proposed border, but the envoy refused the map and limited himself to recording the most important border points. The map was published today in the newspapers. The envoy can receive this card even now." With regard to Bucharest's request to change the border line, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR said that "he foresees difficulties in resolving this issue in a desirable way for the Romanian government

direction"[1023] .

Tem Not less, Soviet the leadership decided to consult with the military, and on June 30, the General Staff asked Vatutin, chief of staff of the Southern Front, to report before 14.00 "an assessment of the significance of the Hertz region both militarily and economically"[1024] . In response, Vatutin said that "in economic terms, Hertz is of no particular importance. In military terms, the Hertz region, with its location on the southern bank of the river. Prut occupies a commanding position above the Novoselitsa area (railway station), is a road junction and a fortified point. Therefore, it is necessary to have the Hertz region in our hands." On July 1, the chief of the General Staff handed over this answer to the NKID[1025] . On the same day, Davidescu handed over a note to Molotov, in which he indicated that in his note the USSR demanded the northern part of Bukovina, "however, the line drawn in red pencil cuts off a corner of the territory in the Hertz region, which never formed part of either Bukovina or Bessarabia, but was part of the old kingdom - Dorohoi County.

The old border between Romania and Austria-Hungary was at Mamornica. There was not and is not a single Ukrainian in this area. Consequently, occupying the line indicated on the map, the Government of the USSR would put forward practically a new demand, since we are talking about the territory that has always belonged to Romania and has never been part of either Bessarabia or Bukovina. This note contains Molotov's resolution: "T. Sobolev. It must be answered that this has no basis, since the Romanian government has adopted

proposals of the USSR, to which a map was attached, according to which the region of Hertsa is included in the USSR " [1026] At 21:00 on July 4, the Romanian side was told that "the demand of the Romanian authorities regarding the border in the area of the city of Hertsa, being in complete contradiction with the border, marked [in accordance with the map attached to the proposals of the Soviet government of June 26 of this year] was not accepted by the competent

Soviet authorities"[1027] . In the meantime, at 21.10 on June 29, Zhukov reported by telephone to VCh Shaposhnikov that, according to Timoshenko, the Romanian troops were robbing the population and stealing livestock. According to the people's commissar of defense, "it is necessary to raise a question with the government of Romania - to immediately return the cattle, carts and the male population - natives of Bessarabia, which today serves in the entire Romanian army"[1028] . At 22.10 on June 29, a Romanian delegation arrived in Odessa, and at 24.00 the first meeting of the Mixed Commission opened. At it, the Romanian representatives proposed to introduce planning into the withdrawal of the Romanian and the advance of the Soviet troops and to ensure that there was a gap of one day's march between the two armies. In addition, they asked that Soviet units be withdrawn from Hertza and that Romanian citizens wishing to evacuate be allowed to leave for the Prut. The Soviet representatives pointed out that the delay in the arrival of the Romanian delegates led to the fact that it would not be possible to immediately introduce planning into the

advance of the troops, and demanded an end to the outrages perpetrated by the retreating Romanian troops. At 2 pm on June 30, Timoshenko, who was in Bessarabia, reported to the General Staff about a number of facts indicating that the Romanian side was violating the terms of the Soviet-Romanian agreement of June 28. Thus, the bridges in Balti, Kroshkautsi and Nedoboutsy were blown up, near the village of Old Bedratsy, the Romanian units threatened to open fire if the Soviet troops prevented them from taking carts from the population. When the Soviet units entered Balti, the Romanian cavalrymen opened fire on them. During the crossing of the Soviet units across the Dniester near Kossovo, the Romanian units fired two bursts of machine guns in their direction. On the Chisinau-Pirlitsa road, a column of the Red Army was fired from a machine gun and tanks, as a result of which 2 Red Army soldiers were killed.

parts[1029] . On the same day, Shaposhnikov, in a report addressed to Stalin and Molotov, reported that, according to the People's Commissar of Defense and the command of the Southern Front, "Romanian troops rob the population, take away horses, wagons and take them away, steal cattle, take away men capable of carrying weapons. In the city of Balti, the retreating units of the Romanian army blew up a bridge (the 4th Romanian cavalry division retreated through the city of Balti). To the south of Zalishchyky, the Romanians set fire to the building of the frontier outpost. In Akkerman, at the entrance of our units, the hangar was on fire. The People's Commissar of Defense asks that the question of the return of those liable for military service, natives of Bessarabia

from the entire Romanian army, be raised before the government of Romania"[1030] . On June 30, the Romanian envoy in Moscow conveyed to the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs a protest against the fact that in some places "Soviet mechanized units reached their final goal already during" June 29. The Soviet side, in turn, asked to take "all measures so that the population was not forced to leave the territory along with the troops being withdrawn" and to stop "cases when the troops being withdrawn take carts, cattle and various household items by force of arms." In addition, Moscow demanded "to take measures to make possible the return to Bessarabia of all soldiers, natives of Bessarabia, who wish this"[1031] . In the meantime, during the second meeting of the Soviet Romanian commission in Odessa at 18.00-22.00 on June 30, a draft plan for the withdrawal of Romanian troops was developed, which was to be completed by 2 pm on July 3. The document signed by the representatives of the parties at 21.45 was sent to Proskurov

and Moscow. It proposed the following evacuation order: "1.7 at 14.00, the Romanian units will withdraw from the line: Seletin, Chiudey, Gliboka, Boyan, Dinautsi, Bricheni Sat, Edinet-Tyrg, Rech, Kishkareni,

Calarasi, Chuchuleni, r. Kogilnik to Romanesti [Romanovo], China

Lake. Soviet troops should approach this line at 17.00 1.7.40. On July 2, the Romanian troops will advance from the line: Seletin, Krasna Ilski, Glyboka, the northern outskirts of Novo Sulica, Korjeutsky, Gordinesti, Zaikani, Falesti, Korneshti, Varzareshti, Lapushna, Sarata-Galbena, Comrat, Bolgrad.

Soviet troops can enter this line starting from 12.00 2.7.40.

The last frontier is the demarcation line in Bukovina, and then along the river. The Prut will be crossed by the Romanian troops at 14:00 on 03:00:40, when our and Romanian representatives will be on the ground, on the bridges, at the main crossing points of the Romanian troops across the new border. Allocate representatives to the following areas: 1) Storozhinets, Vikovuldesus. 2) Guard, Glyboka. 3) Chernivtsi, Glyboka. 4) Chernivtsi, Seret [Siret]. 5) Chernivtsi, Hertz. 6) Khotin, Sulica. 7) Khotin, Lipkany. 8) Secureni, Bricheni Sat - Lipkany. 9) Edinet-Targ, Brynzeni. 10) Nikori, Rashkani-Tyrg - Branishta. 11) Balti, Skuleni. 12) Orhei [Orgeev], Ungeni. 13) Chisinau, Calarasi, Cornesti, Ungeni. 14) Chisinau, Gancheshty, Lapushna. 15) Chisinau, Cimislia, towards Leovo and Falciu. 16) Cimislia, Comrat, Bolgrad branching towards Cahul. 17)

Tatarbunar, Bolgrad, Reni. The

points of the first meeting between the representatives will be those that are located at the intersection of directions with the border, from which the Romanian troops will withdraw on July 1 at 14.00.

Subsequent meetings are organized by the representatives— themselves . [1032] Having received this document, Zhukov, in development of his directive No. 00151 at 21.55 on June 30, ordered the Military Council of the 9th Army: "Immediately send your responsible representatives to the Prut to the advanced units that came into contact with the outgoing Romanian units. Thoroughly instruct the forward units on the procedure for advancing the Red Army troops and relations with the retreating units of the Romanian army, taking the following into account: to organize planned and order in the withdrawal of the Romanian units and the advancement of the Red Army units, to control and resolve disputes regarding the evacuation of various

military property to create mixed commissions consisting of two commanders of the Red Army and two Romanian officers. The created commissions should be in front of the crossings, where to observe and immediately determine what is subject to evacuation and what should remain on the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Only property belonging to the Romanian troops is subject to evacuation. All other property is not subject to evacuation, as property belonging to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The same commissions should decide on the distance between the retreating Romanian units and the units of the Red Army advancing forward. Units of the Red Army that have advanced ahead of the Romanian units are in no case subject to withdrawal, but must remain in place and away from the movement of the Romanian troops, without interfering with their movement. Under no circumstances should armed conflicts be —

allowed.”[1033] . At 1.15 on July 1, the General Staff of the Red Army received a telephone message from Chisinau from the head of the Political

Directorate, army commissar 1st rank Mehlis: “1. The Romanians stole over the river. Prut from the territory of Bessarabia almost the entire rolling stock (steam locomotives, wagons), which is a violation of paragraph

“4” of the requirements of the Government of the USSR of June 27, 1940. I ask the Government of the USSR to put before the government of Romania [the question] of the return of the locomotive and wagon fleet assigned to

2. Many Bessarabians were drafted into the Romanian army and are on the territory of Romania. The families raise the issue of the return of Bessarabians from the Romanian army to Soviet Bessarabia.

I ask the Government of the USSR to raise the question before the Romanian government about the return of the Bessarabians to Soviet Bessarabia”[1034] On the same day, a group of local residents of Northern Bukovina also turned to the Soviet command with a request to facilitate the return of relatives and friends called up to the Romanian army[1035].—

During a new meeting of the Mixed Commission in Odessa, which opened at 12 noon on July 1, the Soviet side stated that in those places where the Red Army had already reached the state border line, it would not interfere with the evacuation of the Romanian troops.

Where the Romanian troops have not yet withdrawn abroad, the plan of June 30 will be implemented[1036]. In the meantime, given the complaints of Romanian diplomats that Soviet troops were detaining and disarming Romanian units, seized bridges on the Prut, and Soviet paratroopers were stopping trains and columns of Romanian troops to inspect[1037], — , Shaposhnikov received an order to look into the situation and sent a corresponding request to Proskurov. In response, Zhukov reported to Moscow at 1 pm

on July 1: "1) The armies of the Southern Front, fulfilling the task assigned to them by the Government, by the end of June 30, advanced units reached the new state border along the entire length of the river. Prut and r. Danube. The mixed commission did not work until 30.6.40 due to the late arrival of representatives of the Romanian command. Therefore, until 30.6.40 there was no movement regulation by the mixed commission, and the troops of the Southern Front were guided only the tasks assigned to them.

2) The looting and looting that had begun on the part of the departing Romanian troops, who, contrary to the agreement, took away cattle, rolling stock, wagons, etc., demanded the immediate throwing of the Red Army detachments to the new state border on the route of the Romanian troops to prevent the export from Bessarabia and Bukovina everything that is not subject to evacuation. Under these detachments, mixed commissions were formed from representatives of the Red Army and the Rumanian troops, which were entrusted with the task of determining what was not subject to evacuation, and detaining all this. The release of forward detachments to the river. The Prut in no way prevents the withdrawal of the Romanian troops and at the same time is a guarantee of the implementation of the

agreement by the Romanian side. 3) Occupation of bridges across the river. Prut parts of the Red Army is also caused by the above circumstances. However, nowhere on any bridge did units of the Red Army detain, are not detaining and will not detain the withdrawal of the Romanian troops, except in cases where it is necessary to seize property that is not subject to evacuation from the departing Romanian troops.

4) Occupation of bridges across the river. The rod and the drop of paratroopers are authorized by the People's Commissar of Defense. Parachute units of the Red Army were instructed not to interfere

withdrawal of the Romanian troops, but only to ensure the exact implementation of the agreement regarding the evacuation of property by the Romanian troops.

5) The strictest instruction was given to resolve all questions only in peaceful way.

6) As for the return to the Romanian troops of weapons and materiel abandoned by them, I report that there was not a single case of the capture of these weapons by units of the Red Army, and even more so there were no cases of disarmament of the Romanian troops. The combat effectiveness of the retreating Romanian troops is falling sharply, the units are decomposing, and on a massive scale, the soldiers themselves drop their weapons up to the guns and disperse to their homes. There were cases when these weapons were dismantled by a criminal element. In order to avoid this, measures are being taken to collect weapons abandoned by the Romanian troops, to record and store them”[1038] .

On the same day, at 6 pm, Shaposhnikov informed Zhukov about the approval of the draft on the conditions for the procedure for the evacuation of Bessarabia by the Romanian troops, with the addition that the Soviet units that had already reached the state border line should let the Romanian troops through and, together with representatives of the Romanian command, control and prevent forcible withdrawal of the population, property not belonging to the Romanian army and [1039] . Thus, Moscow actually approved the actions of livestock

Command of the Southern Front.

At 23.15 on July 1, Lieutenant General Kozlov and Major General P.I. Bodan signed telegram No. 204 sent at 23.45 from Odessa to Moscow to the Chief of the General Staff, to Tiraspol to the Commissar of Defense and to Proskurov to the command of the Southern Front: “Today we signed the plan for the evacuation of the Romanian troops, which is presented to you in full. At 22.10 they handed over a draft agreement on the procedure for the evacuation of the Romanian troops with additions to the General Staff. The answer was asked today. Upon receipt of the content of the answer we will immediately report. At the same meeting, the Romanian representatives made many complaints about the behavior of our units, in particular, the attack by the tank unit in the area of Ketrushin of the Romanian cavalry brigade at the moment when the commander of the cavalry brigade allegedly negotiated with the commander of the tank brigade about the procedure for the transition of the Romanian cavalry brigade across the river. Rod. The second telegram addressed to the Rom

of the General Staff of Romania, we report verbatim: "Despite the conditional promises not to impede the withdrawal of the Romanian units, the Russian units make it very difficult to cross the river. Prut in particular in the Reni region. We again ask for precise and urgent orders from the Red Command in the sense of the free passage of the entire Romanian units that are gathering at the crossings, otherwise we will be forced to act. I ask for an answer today with the result of your petition." Reporting on the above, we ask for instructions on what tone we should follow in further negotiations"[1040] . Having received a telegram from Odessa at 1.25 on July 2, the command of the Southern Front

reacted promptly. Already at 2.50, a response telegram No. 791, sent at 3.22 by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Southern Front, Lieutenant General Malandin, was prepared: "I am transmitting the answer of the Military Council of the KOVO to your telegram No. 204. established that there were no tank attacks. This message is a complete fabrication. 2. Parts of the Red Army do not interfere, but rather contribute

the passage of the Rumtrois across the river. Rod.

3. The statement of the chief of staff of the rumarmia does not correspond to the spirit and exact meaning of the agreement between the government of the Soviet Union and the

Rumanian government. We ask the attention of the chief of the General Staff of the Rumarmiya to the fact that we understand his statement as intimidation, which we will immediately bring to the attention of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

You must keep a calm and confident tone"[1041] . In response to a new request from Lieutenant General Kozlov, at 10.45, General of the Army Zhukov and Army Commissar 2nd Rank Borisov signed telegram No. 867 sent to Odessa and Moscow at 11.10 to the Chief of the General Staff: "Inform the Romanian delegation: within the competence of the military commission should not be discussed. 2) Parts of the Red Army exactly carry out the decision of the Soviet government, as for the dropping of small detachments on the river. Prut, then this measure is called

a gross violation by the Romanian command of this obligation, according to which the Romanian troops did not have the right to steal railway transport, livestock and transport belonging to the population of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, and the population itself, and this was done by the Romanian troops in all directions. In addition, the Romanian troops were engaged in atrocities and looting, which the command of the Red Army could not allow. 3) We have no information about the presence of warehouses remaining in the territory of Bessarabia and Bukovina. Therefore, these issues are not yet subject to discussion. Let us know that this issue will be studied by us.”[1042] . In the—

meantime, at 11.15 on July 2, Kozlov reported to Shaposhnikov by telephone that the Romanian delegation wanted to obtain permission to evacuate warehouses, state institutions, officials and other persons wishing to leave for Romania, and claims that the evacuation of the Romanian army was hampered by the rapid advance of Soviet troops . Therefore, the Romanian delegation insists on including all these points in the text of the agreement, otherwise it will not sign the agreement, and all these issues will be resolved through diplomatic channels. Shaposhnikov replied that, apparently, it would be worthwhile to agree on the exchange of refugees to Bessarabia for refugees to Romania. Regarding the difficulties with the evacuation, the chief of the General Staff noted that no one interfered with the Romanian army, this is the result of its own disorganization. In his opinion, the refusal of the Romanian delegation to sign the agreement does not really bother anyone, since there are practically no Romanian troops in Bessarabia. The issue of warehouses will be decided in Moscow, so no unauthorized statements by the Soviet delegation should have been made[1043] .

At the next meeting of the Soviet-Romanian commission in Odessa on July 3, an agreement was reached on a meeting at 11 am on July 5 in Siret, Ungheni, Reni and Izmail of representatives of the parties to transfer plans and schemes for mining, communications and engineering structures transferred to the Soviet Union territories. However, the transfer of these materials by the Romanian side was delayed. So, during a meeting of Soviet and Romanian officers on July 5 in Reni, Lieutenant Colonel Krucescu said that he would show the map, but would not give it away, although it could be copied. What exactly is mined, he does not know. The Soviet representatives drew up an act in which they outlined the situation, I

the Romanian representative did not sign it, demanding the release of the detained Romanian officers who were carrying out mining work. A new meeting was scheduled for 3 p.m. on July 6. At the meetings in Siret and Ungheni, the Romanian side handed over only the schemes of mining, and refused to transfer the schemes of the barrier, defensive structures and communications. A new meeting of representatives of the parties was scheduled for 12.30 on 6 July.

Having received instructions from Moscow, on July 6, at the next meeting of the Mixed Commission, Kozlov again demanded that the Romanian side hand over communication schemes, mining and topographic maps. The Romanian representatives referred to the fact that since the communications in Bessarabia belonged to an American firm, there were no corresponding schemes in the General Staff. The transfer of the remaining materials has already been agreed, and its delay has nothing to do with the work of the commission. The Romanian side inquired about the position of the Soviet side on the issue of the evacuation of officials, families of officers and other persons wishing to return to Romania, and on warehouses. In the end, the documents on mining the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia were received by the_____

Soviet side at 12 o'clock on [July 10\[1044\]](#) . Having learned about the resolution of the Bessarabian issue, the natives of the region from other regions of Romania rushed home, but the Romanian authorities tried to make their return difficult. On June 30, in Galati, the Romanian police carried out a massacre with those wishing to return to Bessarabia. According to Romanian press reports, a Jewish-Communist armed uprising allegedly took place in the city, which was suppressed by the troops. At 10 o'clock in the morning, a communist demonstration was organized on Trajanska Street with the participation of a large number of Jews, about 10 of whose leaders were immediately shot dead. In the afternoon, up to 2 thousand people arrived at the railway station, 90% Jews, under the escort of Romanian soldiers. On the square near the station, a Jew killed a policeman with a revolver. The soldiers opened fire with machine guns, the crowd was dispersed. Romanian troops began to pursue the fleeing and cordoned off the city center. Mounted patrols rode around the city in search of Jews and arrested anyone who was unable to prove their origin. Other communist events that took place in the evening

demonstrations were also suppressed. According to the Romanian authorities, 2 soldiers and 1 policeman died, and of the rioters, 500-600 people were killed and 400-500 people were injured. Jewish pogroms also took place in Dorokhov, Siret and Yassy[1045]. In the end, wanting to achieve the return of officers and officials who remained in the territories that had ceded to the USSR, the Romanian side on July 3 agreed to the return of everyone to Bessarabia. For his

part, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria

On July 3, he sent a memorandum No. 2716 / b / ss to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:

"In order to receive the population evacuated by the Romanian government from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, who expressed a desire to return to their homeland, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to take the following

measures: 1. Organize the following checkpoints: a) at

Vasilelupu station (against the mountains of Iasi), in consisting of 15 operational workers, headed by Captain V.P. Lebedev;

b) at the Reni station (against Galati), as part of 15 operational workers, headed by Major N.A. Reshetov;

c) in the mountains Izmail, consisting of 15 operational workers, led by captain Nekrasov F.P.;

d) at Vahojneshtie station (near Chernivtsi) consisting of 15 operational workers, headed by Captain Tarasenko V.A.

2. Pass to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to be made on the basis of documents of the government bodies of Romania, proving the identity of their bearers, indicating the place of permanent residence before evacuation. 3. All citizens

returning from Romania to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina should be registered with the NKVD, those who are dubious should be obliged to report to the NKVD bodies weekly due to territoriality, and suspicious and anti-Soviet elements should be arrested.

4. Citizens returning to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

sent for resettlement in places of permanent residence.

The work of checkpoints will be carried out on the basis of the instructions developed by the NKVD of the USSR. 5.

To oblige the NKPS to provide the necessary number of rolling stock for the transportation of the returning population along

the requirements of the head[of] the Directorate of the Border Troops of the Ukrainian SSR comrade. Osokin"[1046] .

On the same day, these proposals were approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and formalized by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1144-445ss "On measures to receive the population returning from Romania to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina" [1047] . Accordingly, at 19.15 on July 5, the troops of the Southern Front received instructions from Stalin and Timoshenko to immediately organize the reception of refugees from Romania. The troops were supposed to provide the refugees with food and transport, draw up lists of those returning to Bessarabia based on their survey and send them to their place of residence or to those areas where settlers are needed. The cattle returned by the Romanians had to be sorted and, after a veterinary examination, distributed to the refugees[1048] . Fulfilling the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the troops organized the reception of refugees from Romania and their transportation to their place of residence in carts or by rail. The sick were given medical care in hospitals, children were given milk.

Refugees reported robberies, persecution and harassment by the Romanian authorities, which was confirmed during their medical examination[1049] . On July 13 and 15, the Soviet government protested against the facts of obstacles and bullying, perpetrated by the Romanian authorities, who wished to return to their native land. The Soviet side insisted that "the Romanian government take all necessary measures to ensure that these cases of bullying do not repeat and ensure normal conditions for the departure of the Bessarabians to their homeland"[1050] . By the evening of July 10, the Soviet side received 45,749 people, by the evening of July 15 - 71,789 people, by the evening of July 19 - 99,700 people, by the evening of July 25 - 149,974 people (of which 121 (0.08%) were arrested people), by the evening of July 31 - 165,402 people, and on August 13 - 204,130 people. The reception of refugees continued until December 16, 1940, when the total number of natives of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina who returned from Romania to their homeland reached 221,110 people, and about 200 thousand people left these territories along with the Romanian troops[1051] . For its part, the Soviet government agreed on July 20 to allow the evacuation of Romanian officials, military personnel and civilians wishing to

to leave for Romania, where 13,750 people were repatriated[1052]. Except—

In addition, on September 5, after short negotiations, a Soviet-German agreement was concluded on the evacuation to Germany from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina of the Germans living there. During the repatriation that began from September 23 to November 13, 1940, 133,138 people

left for Germany[1053]. Meanwhile, on July 3, at a regular meeting of the Mixed Commission in Odessa, the Romanian delegation agreed to discuss the issue proposed by the Soviet side on the return of railway rolling stock in exchange for state warehouses and institutions, officials and other persons wishing to leave for Romania. In connection with the rains, the Romanian delegation asked to extend the evacuation in central and southern Bessarabia. However, this request was rejected by the Soviet side. On July 4, an agreement was reached on the creation of two mixed commissions of railway specialists to discuss the issue of rolling stock withdrawn from the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. The commissions were supposed to start their work at 10 am on July 6 in Ungheni and Bagrinovka. On July 5, the consent of the Romanian government was received to organize three railway commissions in Bagrinovka,

Ungheni and [Reni](#)[1054]. On July 7, negotiations began in Chisinau on the return of the rolling stock of the railways of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Romanian representatives offered to return 74 steam locomotives, 125 class and 1345 freight cars, 10 railcars and 8 trailers for them. The Soviet side demanded the transfer of 419 steam locomotives, 726 class and 2334 freight cars, 3531 platforms, 1897 tanks, 1481 postal baggage cars and 35 railcars[1055]. After the return to Odessa of the Romanian representatives who had gone to Bucharest for instructions, the Mixed Commission on July 13 continued its discussion of the question of rolling stock. Romania expressed its readiness to return 137 steam locomotives, 238 class and 2371 freight wagons, 19 railcars and 25 trailers. The USSR insisted on the return of 274 steam locomotives, 551 coal and 6976 freight cars, 35 railcars and 23 trailers. According

to the

territories, the proposals of the parties were

distributed, as shown in Table 10. Table 10. [\[1056\]](#) **Proposals of the parties**

	Паровозы	Классные вагоны	Товарные вагоны	Цистерны	Авто-моторисы	Прицепы
Бессарабия						
СССР	157	256	4109	312	10	8
Румыния	74	131	1313	34	8	10
Северная Буковина						
СССР	117	295	2435	120	25	15
Румыния	63	107	1000	24	11	15

In the end, after a series of approvals and field checks of information about the state of the railway transport of the territories transferred to the USSR, the parties came to the next version of the agreement. Since on June 27 in Bessarabia there were 154 steam locomotives, 256 class and 4421 freight cars, and after the evacuation 89 steam locomotives, 112 class and 2121 freight cars remained, then 65 steam locomotives, 144 class and 2300 freight cars were subject to return. In Northern Bukovina there were 119 locomotives, 89 class and 1227 freight wagons, 25 locomotives, 14 class and 645 freight wagons remained, therefore, 94 locomotives, 75 class and 582 freight wagons were subject to return. In total, 159 steam locomotives, 219 class and 2882 freight cars will be transferred to the Soviet side. On July 28, Molotov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, approved this version of the agreement, which served as the basis for the Soviet-Romanian agreement signed on July 31. The transfer of property was to take place from August 5 to August 25, and 30 locomotives were to be [\[1057\]](#) transferred before September 25, 1940.

However, the implementation of the concluded agreement was hampered by the Romanian side. Therefore, on August 17, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Bucharest visited the Secretary General of the Romanian Foreign Ministry and made him an appropriate introduction. The Soviet side drew attention to the fact that "from August 6 to 12 inclusive, i.e., in 7 days, 15 steam locomotives were transferred instead of 49 steam locomotives and 620 wagons (of which 15 were passenger) instead of 1225 wagons. Thus, during these 7 days, 34 steam locomotives and 605 wagons were not delivered. This is due to the fact that an unsuitable transport is presented for transfer to us, which cannot be accepted by us. The Soviet government notes the failure of the Romanian side to comply with the above agreement "and asks to take appropriate [measures\[1058\]](#). On August 24

in Moscow, he informed the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR that on August 21, 52 steam locomotives, 48 passenger and 1762 freight cars were transferred to the Soviet side. However, the handover of the rolling stock is delayed by its overly meticulous scrutiny by the Soviet Commission for Acceptance and by the insufficient efficiency of the station at Shikani. Accordingly, the Romanian side asked "the Soviet government to agree to an extension of the deadline for 15 days"[1059] . Probably, the Soviet side agreed with this proposal, and on September 5, Romania transferred to the USSR 129 steam locomotives, 215 class and 2882 freight cars, 15 railcars and 15 trailers for them. In addition, 10 locomotives were delivered ahead of schedule, of those that were supposed to be delivered by September 25[1060] . The final transfer of rolling stock was completed

Meanwhile, the Mixed Commission in Odessa continued to discuss the issue of returning to Romania the military equipment remaining in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. As early as 1.55 on June 30, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered the command of the Southern Front "to organize the accounting and storage of war trophies captured on the territory of Bessarabia", and also to take under guard "barracks, stables, warehouses and other premises of the Romanian army" in order to "save them from damage and plunder"[1061] . At 10:30 p.m. on July 2, Shaposhnikov sent directive No. 02773 to the commanders of the KOVO and OdVO troops demanding that they locate the warehouses of the Romanian army and "all weapons, military equipment and property left by the Romanian troops on the territory occupied by us, immediately collect and put in order" [1062] . By September 26, 1940, the following trophies were taken into account by the Soviet troops: 64,971 rifles and carbines, 7,697 revolvers and pistols, 1 assault rifle, 1,071 light machine guns, 326 heavy machine guns, 149 small-caliber rifles, 1,080 hunting rifles, 6 anti-aircraft machine guns, 40 mortars, 258 guns, 16,976,773 cartridges, 70,189 grenades, 1,512 anti-tank mines, 23,643 mortar mines, 108,149 shells, 15 trucks and 38 cars, 2 buses, 3 tractors, 4 motorcycles with a sidecar, 17 bicycles, 125 telephones, 1 radio installation, 21,064 gas masks, 545.2 tons of fuel and lubricants, 117.5 km of telephone cable, 268,925 kg of barbed wire, 15,751 kg of explosives, sanitary, engineering, construction, baggage and clothing equipment, 10,137.8 tons of food,

36 barrels of oil, 98,600 cans and 40 boxes of canned food, 3.5 wagons of wine, 178 tons and 9 wagons of hay, straw and bran, 1176 horses, 60 cattle, 220 sheep and 70 —

pigs[1063] . At first, the Soviet side refused to consider Romanian counterclaims for military equipment left in Bessarabia, based on the statement of the Romanian delegation that the property was stolen by deserters. Then, on July 20, it was decided to detain all the military property of the Romanian army left in Bessarabia until the issue of returning the rolling stock of the railways to Romania [1064] was resolved. In addition, on August 3, the Soviet side demanded the return of 11 passenger ships, 4 tugboats, 2 self-propelled and 13 non-self-propelled barges, 4 port motor boats and an iron two-pontoon landing stage[1065] withdrawn from the river ports of Bessarabia. On August 30, Soviet requirements were reduced to 5 steamships, 3 tugboats, 2 self-propelled and 10 non-self-propelled barges[1066] . However, the concessions of the Romanian side on questions about the rolling stock of railways and floating facilities of the Bessarabian ports made it possible to find a compromise. On October 17, the Romanian delegation agreed to return to the Soviet Union 2 passenger steamships, 1 tugboat, 3 cargo barges, 2 port boats, 4 metal floating piers and all port inventory equipment (tables, chairs, cabinets, scales, etc.). With regard to military property, the Romanian side initially put forward such claims that significantly exceeded its amount collected by the Red Army units. However, in the end, a compromise was reached, and in addition to the agreed list of transferred items, it was envisaged that until the end of the work of the Odessa Commission, the Soviet side would continue to search for and collect military property for its further transfer to Romania. As a result, on October 26, agreements were initialed, and at 4 pm on October 27, agreements were signed on the return of ships to the USSR, and military property to Romania. Accordingly, on October 29 - November 15, 1940, most of the war trophies of the Red Army were returned to Romania (see table 11), and on November 13-17, ships and other port property were transferred to —

the Soviet Union[1067] . On November 21, Lieutenant General Kozlov, by telegram No. 698, sent a report from Odessa to Molotov on the trans

property left by the Romanian army during the evacuation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina: "1.

The transfer of weapons and military equipment to the Romanians, in accordance with the agreement of October 26, 1940, began on October 29, completed on November 15, 1940. Despite

the timely delivery of trains from our side, the Romanians did not reload the trains and send them to Romania on time. The reasons for this: the poor capacity of the Romanian railway [railway] from st. Ungheni inland, the poor organization of the transshipment work by the Romanians, due to which the transshipment of some trains was delayed until 12-18 hours, the careless compilation of lists for the Romanian teams sent to us for transshipment, which delayed the observance of formalities at the border checkpoint. As a result, the transfer of property to the Romanians, solely through their fault, dragged on for 3 days, i.e. until November 15 instead of November 12, as provided for in

agreement.

Table 11.

**Number of main types of military property transferred to
Romania[1068]- -**

	Подлежало передаче	Фактически передано
Винтовки	66 035	66 203
Пулеметы	1349	1350
Револьверы и пистолеты	7855	8152
Пушки	201	201
Минометы	45	25
Штыки и кинжалы	30 204	36 046
Кавалерийские сабли	4023	4300
Винтовочные патроны	16 754 800	16 937 640
Револьверные патроны	55 379	52 929
Снаряды	108 000	109 016
Ручные гранаты	67 217	73 500
Разные мины	21 810	26 352
Зенитные спаренные ручные пулеметы	5	5
Винтовочные патроны учебные и холостые	281 900	316 068
Снаряды учебные	10	94
Противогазы	19 291	20 575
Телефоны	147	153
Бикфордов шнур, м	400	6331
Взрывчатые вещества, кг	17430	16 920
Колючая проволока, кг	268 900	276 800
Цемент, тонн	1950	1681
Железо арматурное, тонн	2038	2107,1
Рельсы, тонн	5	7,5
Бетономешалки	36	36
Лесоматериалы, куб. м	1903	1 924

The lag of the Romanians in reloading trains caused a demurrage of wagons, expressed by the end of the transfer of property in 11,295 wagon hours, which amounts to 31,786 rubles according to the railway calculation. In addition, this caused a delay in the empty, which made it difficult for us when forming further echelons.

2. Soviet technical commission at st. Ungeni took all measures in her power to facilitate work at the station. Ungeni. The Romanians were given in advance a plan for the supply of echelons for reloading, indicating the hour and number of wagons; 3-4 echelons ahead, information was given on the quantity and nature of the transferred cargo. There were no complaints from the Romanian commission on the brakes in the work.

The property was accepted by the Romanian commission after its calculation at the place of transshipment or by weight. Acts on the transferred property were drawn up after its actual acceptance at a joint meeting. There were no complaints from the Romanians when drawing up acts for the acceptance of property. We

cleaned out the weapons transferred to the Romanians and smeared.

3. For the main types of weapons and military equipment transferred with a certain surplus against the amount specified in the agreement, for example: rifles, revolvers, cartridges, saddles, bayonets, etc.

This is due to the following reasons. In the units in which the Romanian property was concentrated, in some cases it was not taken into account quite accurately. From here to st. Ungeni was served in parts with some excess. It was not always possible to carry out an operation to withdraw surpluses at the transfer point itself, when the trains were already submitted for reloading. Despite this, part of the excess property was nevertheless seized at Art. Ungeni. This applies primarily to property of military value (guns, limbers, charging boxes, machine guns, serviceable rifles, etc.). The increase against the figure indicated in the agreement of October 26, 1940, for the handed over rifles and revolvers is counted towards scrap. Saddle trees and broken saddles were accepted by the Romanians as saddles. The trays were used by us as containers for shells and therefore were counted separately from the charging boxes to which they belong. Screw cartridges in the amount of several million were scattered, and the Romanians determined their number approximately.

All superfluous property in its quality is not is of any value.

A certain excess of the transferred military property, in comparison with the list attached to the agreement, can appear and be used by us as the fulfillment of the 1st chapter of the agreement, which says that the Romanians, in addition to the property transferred according to the specified list of property, "weapons and other military property will be transferred if such will be discovered and collected before the end of the work of the Odessa Commission."

Some shortfalls in secondary types of military equipment are fully compensated by surpluses in other types.

property transferred to the Romanians.

Shortages, apart from insufficiently accurate accounting of property in some cases with parts, are partly explained by different terminology between us and the Romanians. For example, cloth blankets were accepted by Romanians as cloth blankets, tree trunks as saddles, anti-tank mine fuses entered the column - different fuses, etc. Some explosives and ammunition that

are dangerous in their own way
condition for transportation, was destroyed in parts before loading.

In addition, part of the property listed for KOVO was not delivered to the station. Ungeni, for example: 23 mortars, 143.5 km of cable, 5 binoculars, 94 stands for light machine guns, 154 sniper optical sights, 355 helmets, 140 blouses, 444 winter hats, 55 pairs of boots, etc. After my telegram to the headquarters

of the KOVO about deportation of the missing property, it was (except for mortars) delivered to st. Ungeni, but already on November 17, i.e. after the end of the surrender. 4. I believe that we

have fulfilled the agreement on the transfer of arms and military property to the Romanians. There are no grounds for claims from the Romanians. I ask for the cost for

demurrage of wagons in the amount of 31,786 rubles,
in accordance with the attached act, present for payment to Romania"[1069] .

Meanwhile, on September 2, the Soviet-Romanian technical commission began work to determine the losses and destruction inflicted by the Romanian army during the withdrawal from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (from the Soviet side, Colonel V.V. Boloznev, from the Romanian side, General D. Karlaonts), which was engaged in verification of the submitted documents through witnesses or on site. Members of the commission visited Chisinau, Reni, Balti, Chernivtsi and Lipcani. During the negotiations, the Soviet side demanded from Romania that she pay for requisition bonds, receipts, receipts and invoices issued by the army for property and livestock to the population; loan bonds, savings and pension books of the population; government loan receipts; pay slips for May-June 1940; money transfers not received in Bessarabia; acts of state institutions, confirmed by testimonies, about losses during the evacuation period. General

Soviet

the amount of Soviet claims was 2683 million lei. Field checks showed that the claims of the Soviet side were, as a rule, exaggerated and in many cases were not confirmed. The Romanian side pointed

to the overestimation or unfoundedness of Soviet claims and put forward its own counterclaims for a total amount of 2130 million lei. In particular, the Soviet Union was required to pay the cost of state and military property and weapons remaining in the territories transferred to it, and the movable property of officers from the garrisons of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, as well as to return the funds seized from repatriates to Romania. The mutual intransigence of the parties and the change in the international situation in the Balkans in the autumn of 1940 led to the fact that on November 22 the technical commission ceased its work. Meanwhile, on October 30, the Romanian delegation from Odessa left for Bucharest, but never returned. In this situation, on November 12, the leaders of the Soviet delegation in Odessa sent memorandum No. 674 to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in which they indicated that "the Romanian delegation did not arrive in Odessa by the deadline promised by it on November 12 and does not report anything about its arrival. On the basis of your personal instructions, we ask for permission to stop our work and from November 13, everyone will begin to fulfill their duties, informing the Romanian government about this. However, already at 11.40 an answer was sent from Moscow indicating the work of the delegation

continue until government decides [\[1070\]](#).

Nevertheless, on November 21, Lieutenant General Kozlov sent memorandum No. 694 to Molotov, summing up the work of the commission headed by him: "You assigned the following tasks to the Soviet delegation in the Soviet Romanian mixed commission: 1. Obtain a scheme of

defensive structures, a mining scheme and topographic materials of the territory Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. 2. Return from Romania the wagon and

locomotive fleet and equipment taken by the Romanians from the railways of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and pay wages to workers and employees of the railways of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. 3. To receive vessels and port equipment from the

Bessarabian ports from the Romanians.

4. Transfer to the Romanians weapons and military equipment left by the Romanian army on the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. 5.

Determine

the losses caused by the Romanians in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. As a result of the work, the tasks assigned to the Soviet delegation were completed: 1) We received

from the Romanians a scheme of defensive structures, a mining scheme and topographic materials of the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

2) On July 31, 1940,

an agreement was concluded on the return of the wagon and steam locomotive fleet, equipment from Romania and the receipt of money to pay wages to workers and employees of the railways of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. As regards the delivery of wagons and steam locomotives to us, the agreement was fulfilled on September 25, and as regards the contribution of money for the payment of

wages, on October 28. 3) On October 26, 1940, they concluded an agreement on the return by Romania of the stolen ships and port equipment of the Bessarabian ports. The agreement was executed on 18 November.

4) 10/26/40 concluded an agreement on the transfer to the Romanians of weapons and military equipment abandoned by the Romanian army on the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The agreement was executed on 15

November. 5) In Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, claims of a different nature for the amount of two billion six hundred seventy-four million three hundred thirty-one thousand lei were collected and formalized for presentation to the Romanians. According to your instructions, the collected claims are transferred to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR for further work on them.

Thus, the tasks you set have been completed in full, so I ask you to allow the Soviet delegation to complete the work in the Soviet-Romanian commission and inform the Romanian government about the completion of work, since according to the received radiogram, the Romanian delegation intends to arrive in Odessa on November 25, 1940 to continue work ". After reviewing the document, Molotov imposed a resolution on November 22: "I agree. Comrade Kozlov must be informed." [1071] On November 23, it became known that Romania had joined the Tripartite Pact, and the Soviet delegation to the Mixed Soviet-Romanian Commission was disbanded. On the same day at 16.35

Lieutenant General Kozlov sent telegram No. 705 from Odessa to

Molotov: "According to your telegram No. 10508, the Romanian delegation to the mixed Soviet-Romanian commission on the completion of work notified.

The Soviet delegation stopped its work. The registration of cases that will be submitted to the NKID at the end of November is nearing completion.

Today, November 23, by train No. 71, Colonel Boloznev departed for Moscow to hand over cases to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR ^[1072].

On November 24, information about the termination of the activities of the Soviet-Romanian commission in Odessa was received by the Romanian side, which accepted with satisfaction the refusal of the USSR to consider a number of issues ^[1073]. The property exported from Bessarabia was sold in Romania at auction, and the income from its sale went to the state budget ^[1074].

Feast of Liberation

On the evening of June 27, the Bessarabian regional organization of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and all the illegal political and public organizations under its leadership and influence came out of hiding. On the night of June 28, an emergency joint meeting of the Bessarabian regional and Chisinau city committees of the RCP was held, at which the Bessarabian Provisional Revolutionary Committee (VRC) was formed. S.D., who was still in the Chisinau prison, was elected its chairman. Burlachenko, and members - Yu. Korotkov, G. Dobynde, M. Brashan, P. Petrov (Guzun), A. Rubinshtein, D. Ostrovsky and others. restoration of the organs of Soviet power. To implement this task, local military committees were created in counties, cities, volosts and villages, as well as armed people's squads and people's militia detachments, committees for the assistance of the Red Army, temporary working committees at industrial enterprises and transport. The meeting also approved the text of the appeal to the population of Bessarabia, which was printed the same night in one of the Chisinau printing houses: "Citizens of liberated Bessarabia! For 22 years, the population of Bessarabia, having won freedom with their blood along with other peoples of the former Tsarist Russia, groaned under the yoke of the Belarusian invaders. The ruined, destitute population looked with envy at the other shore, where our brothers worked in a friendly struggle for peace and happiness. For 22 years, people lived with a bright hope for the future and fought for it in dungeons and prisons. Today, the future that we dreamed about is becoming real... On the day of the long-awaited holiday, we will give a worthy welcome to the heroes-liberators—

the army of working people from all over the [world](#) . In accordance with the Soviet-Romanian agreement reached on the peaceful resolution of the Bessarabian issue, at 2 pm on June 28, the troops of the Southern Front entered the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. "Brothers Moldavians, Russians and Ukrainians! - said in the appeal of the front command to the local population. -

landowners, capitalists and Sigurans. The stolen Soviet land - Bessarabia - is returning to its mother-Fatherland. In the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in fraternal cooperation with the Russian, Ukrainian, Moldavian and other peoples, you

return your real Motherland..."[1076] As soon as—

the units of the Red Army crossed the demarcation line with Romania, they were greeted with great enthusiasm and joy by the population. "According to the reports of all border detachments, the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina greets our units and border guards cordially and with great enthusiasm"[1077] . At 20.15 on June 28, Zhukov reported to Moscow: "The attitude of the population in literally all settlements is extremely good. The population in an organized and joyful way meets the units of the Red Army with flowers and slogans "Long live Soviet Bessarabia!"[1078] . ~~All~~ the villages and towns of Northern Bukovina were decorated with red banners and slogans that welcomed Stalin and members of the Soviet government. "Everywhere there is jubilation, triumph and indescribable delight and joy," the report of the Political Directorate of the 12th Army stated. Local residents greeted the Red Army soldiers with bread and salt, flowers and music, helped along the way, cleared roads, and were glad to be able to speak Russian and Ukrainian[1079] . In Chernivtsi, "red flags are on the houses. Cheers are heard in honor of Comrade Stalin, in honor of the valiant Red Army. For the transfer of the city in Chernivtsi, two companies of Romanian soldiers and one general remained. [...] There are a lot of people on the streets. Ukrainian speech sounds loudly, the people rush to the first free meetings and rallies. Political prisoners have been released... Romanian soldiers are also walking in the streets - Ukrainians and Moldavians, who did not want to leave with the Romanian army"[1080] . In Bessarabia, the —

inhabitants of Pridnestrovian settlements were the first to greet the Soviet soldiers of the liberators. "With indescribable joy today, the peasants of the border Bessarabian village of Ataki, the inhabitants of the city of Khotyn, welcomed their native Red Army. The long-awaited day, the joyful moment of liberation has arrived. There is a great revival near the Dniester River. Here they went swimming one after another pontoon boats. Every few minutes more and more groups of fighters land on Bessarabian soil. They are surrounded by large crowds of peasants. Thunders a powerful "cheers" in honor of the valiant

Red Army. Those gathered wholeheartedly proclaim the slogans: "Long live the great Stalin!", "Long live Comrade Molotov!" [...] Not far from the village of Ataki lies the city of Khotyn. When the units of the Red Army entered the city, hundreds of residents came out to meet them for 2-3 kilometers, warmly welcoming the long-awaited guests. Red flags appeared on the houses"[1084] .

Everywhere, as soon as the columns of the Red Army units appeared, crowded rallies gathered, which resulted in an exciting demonstration of ardent love and gratitude of the workers of the liberated Bessarabia of the CPSU (b), the Soviet government, the fraternal peoples of the USSR, its mighty army. "Parts of the Red Army have just entered the village. Tanks crawled in, mechanized infantry drove up. And immediately, jubilant cheers sounded over the village," reported a Pravda correspondent from the village of Voronovitsa, Khotinsky district. The people enthusiastically greeted their liberators. The fighters were literally covered with flowers. Immediately, a rally arose spontaneously. In the square, in the center of the village, everyone gathered - from young to old. Eagerly, afraid to utter a word, they listened to the assembled speeches of the representatives of the Red Army. [...] The floor was taken by an old peasant woman Daria Tsyganyuk. Her fiery speech flowed from the very heart: "We lived in a dark prison for 22 years. Only from you, our sons and brothers, we waited for liberation. Many maternal thanks to you, red fighters! Thank you from us, from our children and grandchildren! Thanks to the person who sent you - thanks to my dear — -

Stalin!"[1082]. Soviet soldiers were greeted with enthusiasm in the city of Soroki, in Ataki, Rezina, Olonesti and other Pridnestrovian villages. "As soon as the units of the Red Army lowered the pontoon boats into the waters of the Dniester," the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper wrote, "the peasants of the village of Kosoutsy [Kosovtsy], who ran out of their huts and gardens, rushed to the shore ... In a few minutes, while the Red Army men crossed in boats to the Bessarabian on the shore, hundreds of peasants had already gathered there... Like their beloved brothers, the Bessarabian peasants of the Red Army soldiers hugged and kissed them. Many of the peasants threw themselves into the water to support the pontoon boats carried by the swift current of the river.

Everyone tried to help the Red Army soldiers cross the Dniester, pointed out the bes

ammunition". Residents of the villages of Sherpen and Speya greeted the Red Army with exclamations: "We have been waiting for you for 22 years." "It's not just talking to the officers, but we were also afraid to come close, and you talk to us so simply and well," a peasant from the village of Pugachen Khaboy shared his impressions

of the meeting with Soviet commanders[1083] . In Bendery, thousands of citizens came out to meet the advanced units of the Soviet troops to the railway bridge across the Dniester. "The population of Bender happily welcomes the units of the Red Army. The roofs and balconies of houses are littered with people. Red banners fly everywhere. From the crowd, exclamations are often heard: "Long live red Bessarabia, long live the great mighty Soviet country!" Border guards and fighters distributing central newspapers are showered with flowers. Commanders and commissars, surrounded by excited people, willingly answer numerous questions. Everyone strives to hug and firmly shake hands with the fighters and commanders . In an organized manner, with red banners and slogans, the railroad workers of the Bulboki station came out to meet the liberators. During a joyful meeting given to Soviet fighters and commanders, they reported that huge ammunition depots had been abandoned at the station by the Romanian troops, and voluntarily, in agreement with the Soviet command, organized an armed guard of these depots. The peasants of the village of Elizavetovka, Soroca district, responding to the call of the Committee for Assistance to the Red Army created by the Communists, repaired a large section of the road with the whole village in preparation for the meeting of the Soviet troops.

As parts of the Southern Front moved forward, more and more manifestations of the triumph of the liberated people took place. "The population of Bessarabia," stated one of the reports of the political department of the 9th Army, "with an unrelenting enthusiasm continues to meet the passing units of the Red Army, throwing flowers at them. Throughout the journey, the workers render great assistance in clearing the roads of wire obstacles and other obstacles, help to identify minefields and pull guns and other types of weapons ashore. As noted in another document, the peasants of remote villages, alone and in groups, went to the roads for 10-15 or more kilometers to greet the Red Army. Thus, a peasant from the village of Kamchik (now the village of Zarya

Saratsky district, Odessa region) F.A. Anguer, having walked more than 5 kilometers with his wife and three children, saw the first column of Soviet troops at the Sarata station, said: "I can't express in words the great joy that I am experiencing now, in connection with our liberation from the Romanian yoke"[1085] Large festive — .

rallies and demonstrations under the slogans "Long live the Red Army!", "Long live the Soviet country!" these days were held in Chisinau, Bendery, Balti, Soroca, Orhei, Izmail, Cahul, Akkerman, Edinet, Briceni and many other places. The speakers warmly thanked the Soviet Union for helping the population of Bessarabia in the struggle against the Romanian invaders, for reunification with the Soviet Motherland. "The city of Balti has never seen such a celebration, such rejoicing," Pravda wrote. - Dressed in a festive way, proudly carrying red bows on their chests, yesterday [July 1] residents flocked to the central square. By 6 pm it was filled to overflowing. Ten thousand working people, who for the first time breathed freely after twenty-two years of bondage, gathered for a rally dedicated to the liberation of Bessarabia. Everyone has happy, radiant faces. Mothers came with children in their arms. The roar of joyful voices does not subside for a minute over the square. The people welcomed the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. Toasts in honor of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet government, in honor of the great Stalin are accompanied by a loud cheers. M. Subbotina, who spoke at the rally, said: "We were waiting for you, envoys of the great Soviet people. The days we are living now are the happiest of our lives. Thank you, Bolshevik Party, thank you, Soviet people, thank you, dear Stalin!"[1086] S.I. Gorskaya is the sister of the legendary hero of the Civil War G.I. Kotovsky: "I, like all residents of Bessarabia, am happy that I have lived to see the joyful moment when I ~~can~~ be called a citizen of the USSR. It was not for nothing that the blood of the people was shed ... From the bottom of my heart I thank the Soviet government for freedom, for justice, for happiness, brought not only to me, but to everyone

working people of —

Bessarabia"[1087] . The Romanian documents paint the same picture of the joyful meeting of the Soviet troops. For example, according to the reports of the Romanian police, the population of the "city of Khotyn met Soviet troops -

June 1940 - in grandiose and full of enthusiasm forms ... showed sympathy for the invaders and hostility to our troops. As noted in another document, "the truth is that the vast majority of the population was seized with real joyful excitement, and it was so seized that the meeting with flowers in their hands, with banners, orchestras and refreshments is not a fluent fictitious information, but represents a grandiose and a spontaneous manifestation of joy at the arrival of the liberators they have desired and expected for years. In this regard, we should not make ourselves any illusion and no reproach, because it just happened and could not be otherwise .

Retired Romanian colonel N. Cherkez described the situation in Chisinau on the evening of June 28: "Immediately after the departure of the last train from Chisinau, a crowd of children and adults with red flags appeared on the platform, chanting the name of Stalin. The light came on at the entrance to the station from the direction of Tigina [Bender]. The crowd thought that the Soviet delegation was coming, and rushed with shouts of "Hurrah!" towards. 16-17-year-old teenagers, Jews were delighted. The Soviet delegation arrived much later, after it was completely dark . [1089] This the description is fully consistent with the reports of the Soviet command. When Soviet fighters landed at the Chisinau airfield, "the population greeted our pilots joyfully and solemnly, with flowers." During the entry of the advanced units of the 9th Army into the city, "the population enthusiastically greeted the troops, despite the late hour of the entry of troops into Chisinau"[1090] . On June 29, at a rally of 20,000 in Chisinau, a

member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) N.S. Khrushchev, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissar of the 1st rank L.3. Mehliis[1091] . The local residents who spoke at the rally thanked their liberators and talked about the sore. As G. Altabuk, a peasant from the village of Chimisheni, Chisinau district, said, "We have been waiting for you for 22 years. Thank God we waited. We lived in poverty and hunger, but we knew that the Red Army would soon come. Earth and sky are buzzing from your machines. If the Romanians had seen all your equipment, they would have died of a broken heart . "[1092] "I studied at the university in Bucharest," said a student who spoke at the rally

negotiations are underway on Bessarabia, then I and other comrades immediately dropped out of school and came home. Now, as you can see, we are members of the workers' militia and maintain order here. In Romania, all the books of Russian classics that were in the libraries were destroyed. In Chisinau there was a monument to Pushkin with the signature "A.S. Pushkin" in Russian. The mayor ordered this inscription to be cut down and made the same in Romanian." As the peasant Shapron, the owner of 1 hectare of land, believed, "before your arrival, our life existed only for the rich, but now we will live in a new way." In his speech, Boris Dvoretzky said: "For two years I served in the Romanian army, and all this time I suffered humiliation, insult and discontent from the Romanian officers. When I learned that the Red Army had crossed the Dniester, I threw down my weapons and fled, so as not to serve royal Romania, which I hated. Now I am a free citizen and for this I thank the Red Army and the Great Stalin, who liberated us from capitalist slavery . Then Timoshenko

visited his native village of Furmanka, Akkerman district, where he met with his brother Yefim and numerous relatives. At 09:20 on July 2, the people's commissar of defense and his entourage flew from Chisinau to Moscow, where, after 17:00, Khrushchev and Timoshenko personally reported to Stalin on—

the situation in Bessarabia[1094] . The following documents eloquently testify to the perception of the events that took place by their participants. Reporting on the events in Bessarabia, the border guard S. Sidorov wrote to his brother in Moscow: "Pavlusha, June 28, is probably the most significant day in my life. I will never forget the radiance of the sun, which dipped its face into the beautiful Dniester, and the faces shining with happiness ... And smiles! [...] People picked us up, hugged and kissed us. Paul, Paul, if only he could see the ecstasy of a liberated people pouring out. [...] We walked along the streets of Bendery as if we were carried by some invisible wave. It was impossible to get out of this flow of people. Spontaneous rallies arose at every step, Soviet soldiers were buried in flowers,——

everyone shook hands with them, many gave them red ribbons . On July 1, 1940, the newspaper "Basarabia Sovetike" published a letter from the

army: "The mighty hand of our Motherland - the Great Soviet Union pulled us out of capitalist slavery. We have been waiting for this day for a long time. But liberation came with such speed, happiness came with such lightning speed that each of us asks ourselves, is this not a dream? No! Not a dream! Like frightened jackals, the Romanian boyars fled from our dear Bessarabia. Siguranza no longer exists, no more torture chambers that have choked us for 22 years. No more gendarmes and police. The yoke put on the working people of Bessarabia has been broken forever. The streets of our city have never been the same as now. Everywhere you meet happy, joyful faces. The red color of freedom flutters over all houses, pinned to the chest of every inhabitant. No, our freedom is not a dream! Powerful tanks of the valiant and invincible Red Army pass through the streets of Chisinau, as a formidable warning to all enemies of the Great Soviet Union... June 28, 1940... will forever remain in our memory as the most beautiful, brightest day of our lives. [...] The heavy nightmare has come to an end. A new era has begun, a new life has begun for each of us. And for this life we must thank the Soviet government, the soldiers-liberators of the —

Red Army. [...] The sun of freedom has risen over Bessarabia, over our Moldavian people"[1096] . In a letter from residents of the village of Singerei, Balti district, to T. Rabey, K. Unguryan, G. Onchan, A. Krikhan and others, the newspaper said: pain. A month ago, no one remembered us. Moreover, when bitterness overflowed the cup of our suffering and we rebelled, the percheptor (tax collector. - M.M.), the gendarme, the priest and the notary - the faithful dogs of the Romanian capitalist regime - stuck their teeth into us from all sides and made our life unbearable ... Finally got rid of. The joy that seized us at the hour of liberation, we are not able to describe. The Red Army, our army of peasants and workers, has liberated us forever from the yoke of the capitalist brigands. From now on, we will not starve, for we will be guaranteed bread. The peasants will henceforth have rights and not only duties. Schools will enlighten the minds of all those who are drawn to the light of knowledge. The dawn of a new hap

Such a heated meeting with the population of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia of the Soviet troops was also facilitated by the behavior of the retreating Romanian army, which tried to "evacuate" everything that came to hand. Money, horses, pigs, poultry, oxen and wagons were taken from the population under the threat of reprisals[1098]. The rolling stock of railways was stolen from the territories transferred to the Soviet Union, fire-fighting equipment, tables and chairs were taken out. The people's militia tried to prevent the robbery of the occupiers, often coming under fire from the Romanian soldiers. In some cases, the population armed themselves with the weapons left by the Romanian soldiers, pursued the columns of the retreating Romanian troops, attacked them and took away the stolen property and horses[1099]. It is clear that the actions of the Soviet troops to inspect the departing Romanian units and seize the seized property from them supported the enthusiasm

of the local population in connection with the arrival of the Red Army. This was also facilitated by the active agitation of groups of propagandists who traveled around the settlements. During the Bessarabian operation, a train-printing house was used to publish newspapers and leaflets in Russian, Ukrainian and Romanian, the total output of which amounted to 2120 thousand copies. 8 editions of newspapers were created (3 in Russian, 1 in Ukrainian, 4 in Romanian and Moldavian), which were sent to the county centers of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, where daily newspapers were published. Later, these editorial offices were taken over by local authorities. Newspapers published in the districts made it possible to widely cover the local population with the press, for whose entertainment cinema installations and theaters of the Ukrainian SSR and KOVO were involved. The total volume

of printed books, brochures, leaflets, maps and similar publications amounted to 2539 thousand copies[1100]. Unfortunately, the advance of the Red Army was not without tragic accidents. So, when a car with soldiers of the 378th Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Infantry Division drove through the village of Grushevka, boys ran after it, to whom the Red Army soldiers threw small Soviet coins. From the crowd, several more boys rushed onto the road, and accidentally pushed an 11-year-old boy who was standing on the side of the road, who fell and hit his head under

the artillery regiment was crushed by a 16-year-old teenager who tried to jump on the bandwagon of the ~~car~~ on the move [1101] political agencies[1102] . On July 3, on the Cathedral Square of Chisinau (in Soviet times - Victory Square) at 14.00-16.00, a parade of Soviet troops took place, in which units of the 35th Rifle Corps, the 173rd Rifle

Division and the 4th Tank Brigade (people - 8364, guns - 279, tanks - 102, armored vehicles - 16, tractors - 108, cars - 79, aircraft - 336). The parade was commanded by Lieutenant General V.I. Boldin, and was received by the commander of the Southern Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov. The parade was attended by Lieutenant Balyasnikov's tank, which was the first to enter the city on June 28. "Aleksandrovskaia Street in Chisinau has taken on a festive, elegant look," Pravda wrote. - Portraits of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Comrade. Tymoshenko, posters, slogans, red flags adorn the main street... Tens of thousands of workers, employees, intellectuals with children came to see the armed forces of the socialist motherland. They lined the place of the parade in tight rows, lined up along the entire street. Joyful faces, beaming smiles, enthusiastic exclamations, cries of greeting..." After the parade, a grandiose demonstration of almost 100,000 people took place. "The whole city, young and old, was on the streets. Columns with banners and portraits of leaders, with flags and flowers, walked along the Alexander's endless line. On the sidewalks, people stood like trellises, greeting each passing column with shouts of "Hurrah". Every balcony was crowded with people. The boys hung in clusters in the trees. Songs, shouts of "Hurrah", exclamations of jubilation rolled from end to end of the ebullient southern city"[1103] . On the same day, "in commemoration of the liberation of the working people

of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from the yoke of the Romanian boyars, landlords and capitalists and the return of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the great USSR," the troops of the Southern Front held parades in Chernivtsi (the 131st Rifle, 16th Cavalry divisions and the 5th tank brigade: people - 8892, horses - 4561, tanks - 190,

aircraft - 205), Cimislia (9th cavalry division participated: people - 2739, horses - 2795, guns - 46, machine-gun carts - 48), Romanovo (32nd cavalry division participated: people - 3520, horses - 3567, guns - 46, armored vehicles - 9, machine-gun carts - 52, vehicles - 18, aircraft - 3), Benderakh (the 51st rifle division participated: people - 3139, horses - 530, guns - 120, tanks - 12, tractors - 66, vehicles - 32) and Akkerman (the 74th rifle division participated: people - 1203, horses - 130, guns - 16, aircraft - 53). In the extreme south of Bessarabia, in the vicinity of Izmail, on July 3, at the direction of the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, paratroopers of the 201st airborne brigade were parachuted into 17 settlements to organize Soviet power. This event made a great impression on the local population.

On July 4, parades were held in Storozhinets (the 34th Cavalry Division and the 23rd Tank Brigade participated: 4340 people, 4530 horses, 180 tanks), Khotyn (the 5th Cavalry Division participated: 4320 people, 4400 horses, tanks - 46), Novoselytsia (participated by the 3rd cavalry and 58th rifle divisions: people - 8300, horses - 4520, tanks - 50) and Beltsy (the 169th rifle division participated: people - 4150, tanks - 12, armored vehicles - 18). "The parades went well. The population joyfully greeted the passing units [1104] of the Red Army and its military equipment. In all cities, the parades were accompanied by thousands of demonstrations of the population.

As a result of the solution of the Bessarabian issue, the Soviet Union received a territory of 50,762 square meters. km with a population of 3776 thousand people. On July 10, 1940, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks entered the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a proposal to create the Moldavian SSR. The 7th session of the Supreme Council, which discussed this issue at the evening meeting on August 2, heard a delegation of the working people of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina convey gratitude to "all the working people of the great Soviet motherland for liberation from the chains of capitalist slavery." Speaking on behalf of the Bessarabian people, a teacher from Orgeev Z.A. Crechunescu said that "we all, as one, want only one thing: the speediest fraternal reunification with the Moldovan people." Delegate from Northern Bukovina N.S. Mikhalechuk said that the working people of his native land "are burning with an ardent desire to forever reunite with the Ukrainian people in a single

socialist state"[1105] . After a short discussion, the Supreme Council adopted the law "On the Formation of the Federal Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic", according to which the central districts of Bessarabia and 6 districts of the Moldavian ASSR were united into a new union republic of the USSR, and 8 districts of the Moldavian ASSR were included in the Odessa region. At the same meeting, the law "On the inclusion of the northern part of Bukovina and Khotyn, Akkerman and Izmail districts of Bessarabia into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" was adopted, the territory of which expanded due to the formation of Chernivtsi and Akkerman (since December 7, 1940 renamed Izmail) regions [1106] . At 20:00 on August 10, a reception was held in the Kremlin in honor of the delegation of the workers of

Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the plenipotentiary commissions of the People's Seimas of Lithuania, Latvia and the State Duma of Estonia, which became a demonstration of the friendship of the multinational Soviet people. "Today I am infinitely happy, as our entire Moldovan people is happy," Z.A. said in her speech. Crechunescu. — The heavy, nightmarish past is gone forever. The welcome we received here in Moscow, the high confidence placed in us, will be an unfading guiding star for us. We promise to work under the leadership of the Soviet Government, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, so that our Moldavia will flourish more brightly. Thanks to the Red Army and its leaders, Comrades Voroshilov and Timoshenko! Thanks to the head of the Soviet Government, Comrade Molotov, thanks to the great leader of the peoples, Comrade Stalin!" Chernivtsi worker N.S. Mikhalechuk said: "From the bottom of our hearts we thank the Communist Party, our own father, Comrade Stalin. For a long time we suffered under the yoke of the Romanian boyars. But now it's all over. Our tears have dried up, we are in our own family. Long live our father and liberator Comrade Stalin!"[1107]

In the greeting to Stalin and Molotov, conveyed on August 14 by the delegation of the working people of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina at the VII session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in particular, it was said: "The peoples of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina will never forget everything that you, Comrade Stalin, and the Soviet Government did during led by Comrade Molotov for the reunification of the Moldavian and Ukrainian

peoples. The Soviet Union and its heroic Red Army made it possible for us, as children, to cling to our mother, our beloved homeland.

A fence of Romanian bayonets separated us for many years from our half-brothers on the other side of the Dniester, where the Moldavian and Ukrainian peoples lived in a happy family of Soviet peoples.

In the most difficult years of lawlessness, want and inhuman suffering warmed us, the oppressed, one thought, one feeling:

- There is Moscow in the world! There is Stalin - the leader and father of the working people of the whole world. Your name, Comrade Stalin, inspired us to fight against

our enslavers. And now the wish has come true. We are free. The peoples of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina joined the fraternal family of their native socialist fatherland"[4108] .

The socio-economic transformations that began, and above all the agrarian reform, during which only in the new regions of the Moldavian SSR, by redistributing 258,540 hectares (11.6%) of agricultural land in favor of 184,715 (39.9%) peasant households, it was possible to completely eliminate landlessness and the lack of land of the peasants[4109] , supported the enthusiasm of the population in relation to the new government. This was clearly manifested during the elections of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the new regions of the Moldavian SSR, Chernivtsi and Izmail regions of the Ukrainian SSR, which took place on January 12, 1941. Out of 2,306,702 voters in these territories, 2,293,473 (99.6%) took part in the elections , of which 2,275,836 (99.2%) people voted for the proposed candidates. At the same time, elections of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR were held, in which 1,555,914 (99.6%) out of 1,561,872 voters took part and 1,543,880 (99.2%) people voted for the proposed candidates[1110] .

Summing up the events related to the resolution of the Bessarabian issue, Molotov, in his report at the evening meeting of the VII session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 1, 1940, noted that "as you know, the Romanian government accepted our proposal, and the conflict between the Soviet Union that had dragged on for 22 years and Romania was resolved peacefully. The Ukrainians and Moldavians living in the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, mainly, got the opportunity to enter the friendly family of the Soviet peoples and

to live a new life, the life of a people liberated from the power of the Rumanian boyars-landlords and capitalists. We now know with what great joy the population of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina joined the ranks of Soviet citizens. [...] The borders of the Soviet Union moved, in connection with this, to the west and reached the Danube River, which, after the Volga, is the most powerful river in Europe and one of the most important trade routes for a number of European countries. You know, comrades, that the entire Soviet people met with great joy and satisfaction the successful resolution of the long-awaited question of Bessarabia. On the other hand, our relations with Romania must now enter a completely normal ~~al-~~course .

Conclusion

Joint participation in the First World War, oddly enough, did not improve Russian-Romanian relations. The Romanian leadership was unhappy that, at the insistence of Russia, he had to agree to limit his territorial claims in Bukovina only to its southern part. This only fueled Bucharest's fears that, after achieving victory, Russia would be able to limit other aspirations of Romania, especially in the Banat, which was also promised to Serbia. Against the background of this latent suspicion, it does not seem strange that the Romanian leadership was confident that Russian military assistance was provided in insufficient quantities and was not effective enough. It is clear that at the same time, the fact of the almost complete defeat of the Romanian army, thrown alone into a senseless offensive, seemed to recede into the background, hiding behind the patriotic rhetoric of the creation of "Great Romania". Actually, at the front in Romania, the relationship between Russian and Romanian troops was no better. According to the correspondent of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency V. Yanchevetsky (better known later under the pseudonym V. Jan), "the attitude of the Romanian soldiers towards the Russians, as well as the officers, is unfriendly. They cannot understand our soldiers, who are indignant with the Romanians because, giving their lives for them, the arrows do not meet with the help, devotion and

thanks"[1112] . ~~It is~~

clear that the revolution that broke out in Russia in February 1917 and the growing chaos at the front in the following months, first of all, greatly frightened the Romanian elite, who feared the spread of rebellious sentiments in their own country. However, it gradually became clear that the Romanian army, which entered the war only a year ago, unlike the Russian army, was not yet imbued with a sense of the aimlessness of the war and retained a relatively high patriotic impulse, framed in the slogan of the liberation of the Romanian brothers from the yoke of Austria-Hungary. Already the August battles of 1917 showed the greater stability of the Romanian troops in comparison with the Russians, who had lost their unified targeting and

gradually split along national and political lines. After November 1917, when the

new Russian Soviet government announced its readiness to withdraw from the war, Romania faced a choice. It was necessary either to reach an agreement with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, which, in turn, required a certain agreement with the allies in the Entente, or to repeat the feat of the Serbian army - to abandon the defense of the national Romanian territory and retreat to the expanses of southern Russia. It is clear that the Romanian leadership, accustomed to enjoying the fruits of other people's victories and, therefore, more prone to diplomatic tricks, chose the first option.

Accordingly, Romania began to prove to the Entente countries that she was not in a position to continue the war alone, and therefore the Allies must agree that she would reach a separate agreement with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. At first, the Anglo-French leadership was not inclined to encourage such moods in Bucharest, but as the situation in Russia and the general situation on the former Eastern Front developed, it tacitly agreed with this Romanian position, counting on the fact that the Romanian troops could be used to suppress the Soviet movement in the border areas with Romanian regions of Russia. For their part, the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, interested in eliminating the front in the East, tried to get maximum concessions from Romania with the help of blackmail, primarily in relation to raw materials and agricultural supplies. Bessarabia was offered as compensation for the ceded territories to Romania. Moreover, it turned out that the Anglo-French allies also support this idea.

Meanwhile, in Bessarabia, in the context of the growing agrarian movement, the strengthening of the positions of the Soviets and the strengthening of the Bolshevik influence in them, as well as the inability of the Provisional Government to control the situation, the Moldavian national movement intensified its activities among the Moldavian military, which made it possible to create a regional body "Sfatul Tarii". It is clear that there was no unity among the local political forces on the issue of the future of Bessarabia: some saw it as an autonomy within Russia, others wanted to create an independent state. Only

Moldavian nationalists, acting on Romanian money, advocated unification with Romania, but their position was not popular. However, using the dissatisfaction of other political forces with the strengthening of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets and referring to the example of Ukraine, they managed to achieve on December 2 (15), 1917, the proclamation of the Moldavian People's Republic (MPR) as part of the Russian Federation. Under these conditions, only the direct occupation of Bessarabia by the Romanian army could contribute to the realization of the territorial claims of Romania. Taking

advantage of the consent of their allies and opponents and the requests of the anti-Soviet part of the officers of the Russian Romanian Front, the Romanian leadership was able to defeat the soldiers' committees and disarm the Russian units inclined to support the Soviet regime. In fact, with these December events of 1917, the open intervention of Romania in the events of the Russian revolution begins. It is clear that these actions of the Romanian authorities already caused a negative attitude of the RSFSR, which, however, was forced to limit itself to only diplomatic protests. The collapse of the former Russian Empire and political chaos in the south of the country was considered by the Romanian leadership as a necessary condition for the capture of Bessarabia. Therefore, in January 1918, the Romanian troops crossed the river. Prut and entered the territory of the RSFSR, which, naturally, led to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Romania from Petrograd.

Under the conditions of political disengagement in Bessarabia, national organizations reacted more calmly to the Romanian invasion, seeing in it a guarantee against social movements, which were generally based on the ideas of international solidarity of workers. The wealthy social strata saw in the Romanians guarantors against the leveling tendencies of the revolution, while the Bessarabian peasants, on the contrary, saw the threat of losing the land they had received. Only the top of the Moldavian national movement enthusiastically accepted this fact, but was forced to hide this position for the time being due to the generally wary attitude of the local, including the Moldavian, population towards the Romanians. Moreover, it was necessary to hide the long-term goal - the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania. In the meantime, they managed to achieve the proclamation of the independence of the MPR. So

For their part, the Romanian troops in every possible way propagated the version that their arrival in Bessarabia was connected only with the need to restore order on the railways and protect warehouses with food purchased to supply Romania.

At the same time, the Romanian invasion hastened the consolidation of supporters of the Soviet government, who were ready to defend the gains of the revolution with arms in their hands. Moreover, in this case, it was about an external invasion, and not about an internal Russian conflict. If at first the Romanians met only scattered resistance from small detachments, then by mid-February 1918 the Soviet command had already managed to organize more significant resistance along the line of the river. Dniester and in the south of Bessarabia. Moreover, by the end of February, Soviet detachments began to go on the offensive, and the Romanian units faced the prospect of repelling the Soviet offensive with a very turbulent rear, since occupied Bessarabia, which had already tasted the bitter fruits of Romanian domination, was not at all going to remain an outside spectator. Under these conditions, fearing the defeat of troops in Bessarabia, which could strengthen social movements in Romania itself, the Romanian leadership decided to settle relations with the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. Among other things, this allowed at that moment to gain time and assess the consequences of the German-Austrian-Hungarian offensive in Ukraine.

As a result, a Soviet-Romanian agreement was concluded, according to which the Romanian side undertook to withdraw its troops from Bessarabia within two months. Although under the conditions of the German-Austrian-Hungarian occupation of Ukraine, the Romanian government was not going to implement this agreement, the very fact of its signing by the Romanian side was of great importance from the point of view of international relations, since it testified to the recognition by Romania of the fact of the occupation of the territory of a neighboring state. In the meantime, the Romanian leadership, confident that Russia would no longer be reborn, under the cover of German-Austro-Hungarian bayonets, in the spring of 1918 decided to formalize the annexation of Bessarabia. For this, the Moldovan national movement, which exists on Romanian money, was used, which, with the help of bribery and threats from the Romanian troops, managed to push through the "Sfatul Tarii" the decision to unite the MPR with

Romania on terms of autonomy. Somewhat later, this fact was recognized in the peace treaty between Romania and the countries of the Quadruple union.

However, the approaching end of the First World War and the defeat of the Quadruple Alliance set before Romania the task of holding the captured Bessarabia and obtaining a number of territories of the former Austria-Hungary. The first step on this path was the return of Romania to the Entente, for which it was necessary to declare war on Germany again a day before the armistice agreement on the Western Front came into force. Now territorial issues were to be resolved at a peace conference in Paris, but before its opening by the Romanian authorities in Sfatul Tarii, "a parody was played of voting for a complete union of Bessarabia with Romania without any autonomy"[1113] . Nevertheless, at first, Romanian territorial claims did not evoke a noticeable positive reaction in Paris. However, the Romanian leadership very quickly discovered that Romania's participation in the fight against Bolshevism in Russia and especially in Hungary significantly increased its chances of realizing its territorial aspirations.

At the same time, England and France were in no hurry to recognize Bessarabia as Romanian territory, since, while providing some support to the White movement in Russia, they were forced to reckon with its negative attitude towards the rejection of the outlying territories of the country. However, as the successes of the Reds in Paris grew, the tendency to agree to the direct transfer of Bessarabia to Romania began to intensify. A significant role in making this decision was also played by the desire to prevent Soviet influence at the mouth of the Danube, which was an important economic artery of Central and South-Eastern Europe. All this, as well as the completion of the redistribution of the spheres of influence of Western countries in the Romanian oil industry, led to the signing of the Paris Protocol on Bessarabia, which was recognized as part of Romania. At the same time, it should be remembered that the countries that signed this protocol had no right to transfer Russian territory to Romania, which occupied and annexed it. All this time, the Soviet governments of Russia and

Ukraine constantly protested against the Romanian occupation and declared

non-recognition of any decisions on the rejection of Bessarabia without their consent. Moreover, in the spring of 1919, when Soviet troops again reached the Dniester, the possibility of a military solution to the Bessarabian issue arose. Unfortunately, the internal problems associated with the Grigoriev rebellion, and especially with the start of the offensive of Denikin's army in the Donbass, did not allow this opportunity to be realized. The next time the Red Army was on the Dniester in February 1920, but the general condition of the Soviet republics devastated by the Civil War did not contribute to the continuation of hostilities, and the Soviet governments tried to reach a political agreement with their western neighbors, including Romania, which, with its side, demonstrated non-interference in internal Soviet affairs. This tacit compromise became the basis for maintaining peace between the two countries, which did not even have diplomatic relations. The threat of war with Romania intensified during the period of large-

scale battles on the Soviet-Polish front and the activation of the Wrangel army in the Crimea and Northern Tavia in the summer of 1920. The Entente pushed Romania to intervene in events on the side of Poland, and the Soviet leadership tried to keep it from this step, alluding to the possibility of an agreement beneficial to Romania on Bessarabia. As a result, the internal situation in Romania contributed to its neutrality, but Moscow's attempts to start political negotiations with it were unsuccessful, since the Romanian side set the Soviet recognition of Bessarabia as part of Romania as an indispensable condition for the start of these negotiations. It is clear that the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, which considered the issue of Bessarabia as an important trump card in the dialogue with Romania, were not going to just let it go. Under these conditions, any agreement on the Soviet-Romanian border was impossible, and the rapprochement between Romania and Poland and their orientation towards France in their eastern policy did not contribute to the normalization of relations between Bucharest and the Soviet republics.

It should also be remembered that the states divided by the Dniester were in unequal conditions on the world stage. Romania was an internationally recognized state that had influential allies in Poland, the countries of the Little Entente and France, while the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR were still unrecognized republics,

trying to resolve a number of internal problems related to the consequences of the Civil War. All this pushed the Romanian leadership to be intransigent in the Bessarabian issue and to cultivate the image of a "defender of European civilization" on the Dniester. In the context of constant incidents on the Soviet-Polish border and on the demarcation line along the Dniester, the Soviet military-political leadership feared the outbreak of a new war in 1921, and the raids of various anti-Soviet formations from the territory of Poland and Romania caused retaliatory actions of the Soviet special services. It is no coincidence that the Soviet-Romanian diplomatic correspondence at that time was filled with mutual claims regarding incidents

on the demarcation line. At the same time, the parties managed to agree on the beginning of direct preliminary negotiations, which took place on September 22-October 25, 1921 in Warsaw. During these negotiations, Romania tried to achieve recognition by the Soviet side of the annexation of Bessarabia, and the Soviet representatives sought the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bucharest. As a result, no agreement was reached, since the parties were not going to make concessions. A similar outcome of the Warsaw Conference and the invasion of the Tiraspol region by the Petliura detachment from the territory of Bessarabia occupied by Romania, with the explicit support of the

Romanian border guard, of course, did not improve Soviet-Romanian relations. In addition to the territorial issue, an important problem of Soviet-Romanian relations was the issue of Romanian valuables evacuated to Russia during the First World War, payment for Russian wartime supplies to Romania, as well as the seized Russian state property in Bessarabia and Romania[1114] . It is clear that each of the parties believed that it was she who suffered the most damage. True, during 1922 the Soviet side probed Romania for its renunciation of financial claims in exchange for the Soviet renunciation of claims to Bessarabia. However, the Romanian leadership did not support this idea, although, apparently, this was the moment when Bucharest would most likely be able to get Moscow's consent to annexing Bessarabia. The formation of the USSR and the general normalization of the situation in Eastern Europe allowed

lines along the Dniester. At the same time, Romania refused to conclude a trade agreement, not wanting to allow Soviet representatives to Bucharest, where, in her opinion, they could engage in communist agitation. In the meantime,

the parties have reached an agreement to hold new talks in Vienna. For the Soviet side, this was another reason to declare their rights to Bessarabia, and the Romanian leadership tried to close the Bessarabian issue. The Soviet proposal to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia, of course, was not accepted by Romania, which understood better than anyone how exactly the vote of the Bessarabian population would end. Along with promoting the idea of a plebiscite, the Soviet leadership tried to neutralize the support of Romania in the Bessarabian issue on the part of the countries that signed the Paris Protocol of 1920. True, the influence of the Soviet Union on the world stage was so small that its position on this issue did not affect France and Italy, which ratified this protocol. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to ensure that Japan, which was in no hurry to ratify this document, practically postponed this issue for an indefinite period. Another task of Soviet foreign policy was the desire to split the Polish-Romanian military alliance, but no noticeable success was achieved along this path. The USSR tried to use the protocol on the early entry into force of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to reach a non-aggression agreement with Poland, but Warsaw achieved Romania's participation in this agreement. In addition to bilateral Soviet-Romanian relations, the Bessarabian question also touched upon the problems of the international

regime of the Danube and, consequently, the relations of the USSR with the great European powers. In the "Work Plan of the Commission on the International Political Situation and the Danger of War", the analysts of the Comintern noted that the Bessarabian issue is of fundamental importance for Moscow in terms of influence in the region, since "the entry of Bessarabia into the USSR would have as its direct result the transformation of the Soviet Republic into a Danubian power. With the mouth of the river in its hands, the Soviet Union could regulate its relations with the countries along the Danube much more successfully and [...]"

would reopen the most convenient way for the trade of the Soviet south with the Balkans and Central Europe. This circumstance, undoubtedly, also plays an important role in the Bessarabian policy of the imperialist powers... The passing of the mouth of the Danube into the hands of the Soviet Union would put an end to the French megalomaniac plans for domination over the great Danube [waterway](#) . In the——

meantime, in the spring of 1918, the policy of Romanization began to be implemented in occupied Bessarabia with the aim of incorporating it into Romania. Bucharest actually refused to fulfill its promises to preserve the autonomy of the province. The specificity of the unification policy of Romania in Bessarabia was due to the fact that the local population (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Jews, Gagauz and others) did not consider themselves Romanians and hoped for a speedy expulsion of the invaders. As a result, active and passive opposition to Romanian domination grew in the region. Accordingly, the Romanian authorities considered all Bessarabians to be troublemakers and accomplices of the Bolsheviks, and repressions in the region became the norm. The electoral system of Romania excluded the possibility for the Bessarabian population to influence state policy. The economic separation of the region from the eastern markets has led to a noticeable economic decline, the archaization of the social structure of the population and the growth of chronic socio-demographic problems. Romania's international obligations regarding the observance of the rights of national minorities did not correspond to the

goals of the Romanian elite and, as a rule, were not fulfilled in Bessarabia. Despite the accelerated planting of the Romanian language, the population of the region continued to widely use the Russian language and ended up in Romania in fact in the position of “second-class” people. As the Romanian newspaper Universul admitted on April 5, 1934, “the situation of Romanianism 15 years after the unification of Bessarabia is extremely bad. The Romanianization of Bessarabia, especially the cities and towns, is delayed... The Bessarabian soul, still living in the mirage of old Russia, cannot be close enough to the national aspirations of a united Romania.”[1116] Two years later, the head of the political department for the Romanianization of Bessarabia, O. Gibu, admitted that “by its nature, Bessarabia is now more Russian than in 1918. The fact that almost everyone knows the Romanian language does not change the situation

people speak Russian in the city, they read the Russian press, and this is very hinders the establishment of Romanianism"[1117] . The ideology of nationalism, which was the basis of Romanian domestic politics, was used by the authorities to rank national minorities. As a result, the Russians in Bessarabia turned out to be the most oppressed population. Culturally, Bessarabia was never integrated into Romania and throughout the entire interwar period remained an economically backward agrarian outskirts of the country[1118] .

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Growing contradictions in Europe at the turn of the 1920s-1930s. led to a change in the international position of the USSR. The normalization of Soviet-French relations that began in the spring of 1931 demanded that the French allies in Eastern Europe take coordinated steps towards Moscow. As a result, under pressure from France and Poland, Romania agreed to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a non-aggression pact. During these negotiations, which for both sides were a concession to France and Poland, Moscow and Bucharest achieved different goals. Romania once again tried to achieve Soviet consent to the recognition of Bessarabia as Romanian territory, and the USSR hoped to establish diplomatic relations with Bucharest. What was new in these negotiations was that the parties decided not to touch on the Bessarabian issue, although, of course, he was invisibly present behind the scenes of any of their proposals. Having failed to achieve their goals, the parties stopped negotiations, and Soviet diplomacy managed to outplay Romanian diplomacy and nevertheless conclude non-aggression pacts with France and Poland, somewhat neutralizing the anti-Soviet orientation of the Franco-Romanian and Polish-Romanian treaties. If we take into account that during 1932 the USSR concluded similar treaties with all its northwestern neighbors, then Romania retained its position as the only western neighbor, relations with which remained unsettled. In the meantime, in December 1932, Germany managed to achieve recognition of equal rights in the

matter of armaments on the part of the Western powers, which clearly indicated a new step towards the revision of the Versailles system. This, and especially the negotiations on the "Pact of Four", aroused the concern of the small Eastern European countries, who were afraid of losing French support. As a result, the countries of Malaya

The Ententes decided, on the one hand, to strengthen their alliance, and on the other hand, to try to take into account in their foreign policy the fact of the strengthening of Germany's positions. The Romanian leadership did not remain aloof from this problem, which still continued to focus on France and England, but from the beginning of the 1930s began to take into account the need to improve relations with Germany, which was becoming an increasingly significant foreign trade partner. True, Romania's contacts with the German leadership have shown that Berlin's demands go far beyond the steps that Bucharest was prepared to take. At the same time, another association arose in the Balkans aimed at maintaining the territorial status quo - the Balkan Entente, of which Romania became a member. Under these conditions, Romania, with the support of Poland, agreed to sign the convention proposed by the Soviet side on the definition of the aggressor. This document was considered in

Bucharest as Moscow's tacit consent to the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania, but the Soviet side again publicly declared its position on the Bessarabian issue. In the meantime, France initiated negotiations on problems of common European security. For its part, Moscow supported this French idea, and from the end of 1933 the policy of "collective security" became the foreign policy strategy of the USSR. The start of negotiations on the Eastern Pact showed the interest of a number of Eastern European countries, including Romania, in obtaining additional guarantees of their security. The Franco-Soviet rapprochement and the Eastern Pact negotiations pushed Romania to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The Romanian leadership again tried to use this fact to propagate the version that the Soviet side recognized the border along the Dniester, but, of course, no change in the Soviet position on this issue did not

followed.

In the second half of the 1930s. it became obvious that England and France, which had taken a course of appeasing Germany, actually abandoned the protection of their interests in Eastern Europe. Naturally, the trend towards maneuvering in the international arena has intensified in Romanian politics. Considering the maintenance of existing borders as its main task, Romania hoped that it would succeed

add to the allied obligations under the Lesser and Balkan Entente, which guaranteed the containment of Hungary and Bulgaria, also agreements on guaranteeing borders with the USSR, and then with Germany. In Bucharest, they believed that the creation of a Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance represented a convenient opportunity for an agreement with the USSR, but they were not going to annoy Germany there either. Accordingly, in the summer of 1935, the Romanian side tried to interest the USSR in a mutual assistance treaty in exchange for Soviet recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia. However, Moscow did not have confidence in Romanian foreign policy and was not going to make such a concession. As a result, the negotiations ended in vain. Since the autumn of 1936, Romanian policy has become more and more oriented towards Poland and

Germany. Table 12. **Share of countries in foreign trade of Romania (%)**[1119].

Страна		1929	1936	1937	1938	1939
Германия	Экспорт	27,6	17,8	19,2	26,5	32,3
	Импорт	24,1	36,1	28,9	36,8	39,3
	Оборот	25,8	24,5	23	31,3	35,5
Англия	Экспорт	6,3	14,4	8,8	11,1	14,1
	Импорт	7,3	7,4	9,4	8,1	5,9
	Оборот	6,9	11,8	9,0	9,7	10,3
Франция	Экспорт	4,5	8,1	5,7	4,7	3,4
	Импорт	5,5	5,9	6,1	7,7	8,2
	Оборот	5,0	7,3	5,9	6,1	5,6
Италия	Экспорт	7,7	6,1	6,6	6,2	12,1
	Импорт	6,9	1,6	4,3	5,0	8,8
	Оборот	7,3	4,4	5,7	5,6	10,6
Чехословакия	Экспорт	6,2	7,0	8,2	9,6	10,9
	Импорт	13,6	11,5	16,1	13,1	16,8
	Оборот	9,9	8,7	11,3	11,2	13,6

The events of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938 showed that Bucharest, bound by an alliance with Prague, was not going to support its ally against Germany. The Romanian leadership carefully monitored changes in the international arena and tried not to irritate either England with France, or Germany with Italy. Knowing full well the unwillingness of Western countries, and even more so of Germany, to allow

Soviet intervention in the solution of the Sudeten question, Romania took a generally negative position regarding the issue of allowing Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia. True, a formal statement about the Romanian position was never made, but the contradictory statements of Romanian diplomats in European capitals generally boiled down to refusing to allow the Red Army to pass. As a result of the separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente practically ceased to exist.

Continuing to make economic concessions to Germany, Romania tried to preserve the possibility of maneuver in its foreign policy. Refusing rapprochement with the USSR, Romania in late 1938 - early 1939 decided to seek support from England and France, but it quickly became clear that these countries did not really intend to support Bucharest. Under these conditions, it was necessary not to aggravate relations with Germany, which gradually increased its influence in the Balkans. In March 1939, the Romanian leadership tried once again to probe the positions of London and Paris regarding possible economic concessions to Berlin. Since these soundings coincided with the German occupation of the Czech Republic, Romania unexpectedly found itself drawn into the European pre-war crisis. England's proposals to involve the USSR in the defense of Romania caused at least discontent in Bucharest. As V.K. Volkov, by the spring of 1939, the small countries of South-Eastern Europe developed their own version of the strategy of "appeasement" of the aggressor, which consisted in a decisive refusal "from contacts with the Soviet Union in their foreign policy" and "from participating in any variants of international cooperation, even remotely resembling a system of collective security"[1120] . On March 23, the Romanian German Economic Agreement was signed, expanding the German economic presence in Romania. Trying to keep Romania from rapprochement with Germany, England and France on April 13 gave her guarantees of independence. True, Bucharest was not slow to inform Berlin of its readiness to cooperate with Germany. Table 13. **The share of some European powers in Romanian oil exports (thousand tons)[1121].**

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Страна	1938 г.		1939 г.	
Англия	540,4	12,0 %	625,2	15,0%
Франция	189,3	4,2 %	238,1	5,7 %
Германия	704,2	15,7%	848,6	20,3 %
Италия	556,5	12,4%	634,9	15,2%
Чехословакия	249,9	5,6%	436,6	10,4%

During the political crisis of 1939 in Europe, the situation for the Soviet Union was not very favorable. On the one hand, both Britain and France and Germany showed a desire for an agreement with it, but, on the other hand, the danger of a new Anglo-French-German agreement following the example of 1938 was by no means excluded. This was also confirmed by the position of Romania, which, being an ally of England and France, did not want rapprochement with Moscow, confirming its foreign policy imperative - any agreement with the USSR should first of all lead to Soviet agreement with the border along the Dniester. In general, the position of Romania was reduced to the formula: "No alliances against Germany and no business with the USSR." At the same time, Moscow got the opportunity to choose with whom and on what terms to negotiate, and used it to the maximum, balancing between the Anglo-French and German-Italian military-political blocs.

International relations in the spring and summer of 1939 in Europe were a tangled tangle of diplomatic activities of the great powers, each of which sought to achieve its own goals. Events developed in parallel in several directions: there were secret and overt Anglo-French-Soviet, Anglo-German and Soviet-German negotiations, the formation of the Anglo-French-Polish and German-Italian coalitions took place. Moscow in its calculations proceeded from the fact that the outbreak of war in Europe - both with the participation of the USSR in the Anglo-French bloc, and while maintaining its neutrality - opened up new prospects for strengthening Soviet influence on the continent. An alliance with Britain and France would make Moscow an equal partner with all the ensuing consequences, and the Soviet Union's preservation of neutrality in the face of the weakening of both belligerents would allow it to take the position of a kind of arbitrator, from which

depends on the outcome of the war. Based on such calculations, the Soviet foreign policy course was determined.

The Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations showed that Britain and France were not ready for equal partnership with the USSR. Under these conditions, Germany's proposals turned out to be more attractive, and on August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed in Moscow, which became a significant success for Soviet diplomacy. According to the secret additional protocol to this treaty, the Soviet side emphasized its interest in Bessarabia, while the German side declared "its political disinterest in these areas"[1122]. Thus, the USSR was able to achieve recognition of its position on the Bessarabian issue by Germany. As a result of this agreement, the USSR managed to stay out of the European war, while receiving a certain freedom of hands in Eastern Europe and more room for maneuver between the warring factions in their own interests. In 1939, Europe was split into three military-political camps: Anglo-French, German-Italian and Soviet, each of which sought to achieve its own goals, which could not but lead to war.

Now the official position of Romanian historiography on the issue of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 is as follows:

“By signing the secret Protocol, the USSR violated with regard to Romania:

Article 1 of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which condemns the use of war in the settlement of international conflicts and provides for the rejection of war as an instrument of national policy in relations between participating States;

article 2 of the same Covenant, which provides that the settlement or resolution of all disputes and conflicts of any origin that may arise between States Parties shall be carried out exclusively by peaceful means; should

The Moscow Protocol of February 9, 1929, according to which the states that signed it: the USSR, Estonia, Poland,

Latvia and Romania, - accelerated the action of the Briand-Kellogg

Pact; the decision of the London Convention on the definition of the aggressor, signed in 1933 by Romania, Estonia, Poland, Turkey and ~~the~~ USSR" [1123]

However, all these loud accusations of the Soviet Union are completely unfounded, since neither the non-aggression pact nor the secret protocol to it mentions the possibility of any military actions by Moscow in order to implement the reached Soviet-German agreements. In addition, it should be remembered that it was this agreement between Berlin and Moscow that made it possible to peacefully resolve the Bessarabian issue in the summer of 1940. In addition, new versions appear. Thus, the Romanian researcher V. Veratik believes that, under the Soviet-German agreement, "the Soviet Union undertook to put forward its claims to Bessarabia only when the Romanian government would begin to satisfy possible Hungarian or Bulgarian territorial requirements." However, the quotations from the documents he cites show that, although the German side really tried to bind Moscow with additional conditions, the Soviet leadership skillfully evaded

from their

— acceptance[1124] . Having achieved its interests in Eastern Europe thanks to the non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union closely followed the development of events, preparing to use them to its advantage. The beginning of the war in Europe and the passive position of England and France, which had the opportunity to defeat Germany already in September 1939, allowed the USSR to intensify its policy towards the Eastern European countries and begin to revise its western borders imposed on it in 1920–1921. Thus, the Soviet leadership was able to regain control over the territories, most of which had previously been part of the Russian Empire. Already in September-October 1939, Moscow managed to return the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus lost in 1921 and set up military bases in the Baltic countries. The military diplomatic successes of the USSR in establishing control over the Soviet sphere of interests in Eastern Europe turned out to be

interrupted by Finland, and throughout the winter of 1939-1940. Moscow was busy with the war in the northwest, which greatly increased the threat of clashes with England and France. Only the defeat of France in June 1940 allowed the Soviet leadership to intensify its policy in the Baltic states and towards Romania.

Not being sure of the victory of one or another European grouping, the Romanian leadership decided to wait, and literally on the eve of the start of the German-Polish war, Romania assured Germany that it would remain neutral in the event of a war in Europe and continue to supply the Third Reich with oil and food. Bucharest was not going to rush to the defense of his Polish ally and wanted to make sure that London and Paris were ready for war. The passivity of Britain and France in the war with Germany began already from the end of 1939 to push Romania towards a more careful consideration of the wishes of Berlin. Believing that it was the Third Reich that could become a new defender against possible Soviet claims, the Romanian leadership, which closely followed the course of the European war, decided from April 1940 to intensify rapprochement with Germany. The position of Romania was further complicated by the fact that Hungary, which had long since taken a course towards rapprochement with Germany, and Bulgaria had certain territorial claims against it. Under these conditions, new economic concessions to Germany were considered in Bucharest as an opportunity to enlist its support not only against Moscow, but also against Budapest and [Sofia](#)[1125] .

In the conditions of the defeat of France and the support of the Soviet position on the Bessarabian issue by Germany and Italy, Moscow was able to resolve this protracted dispute from a position of strength. Having concentrated a significant military grouping on the Dniester, the USSR demanded that Romania finally fulfill the obligations assumed back in 1918 and withdraw Romanian troops from occupied Bessarabia. At the same time, it was required to transfer to the Soviet Union and Northern Bukovina, populated mainly by Ukrainians and of great strategic importance (a railway connecting Bessarabia and Western Ukraine ran through it). Deprived of any external support, Romania was forced to agree to Soviet demands. As the former Romanian Prime Minister Tatarescu wrote in 1943: "We refused to go to war with the Soviets, because

this meant not only the disappearance of the Romanian state and the defeat of our army, but also the liquidation of the entire Romanian ruling class, with all the ensuing consequences. As a result, the Soviet leadership managed to achieve an end to the Romanian intervention that had dragged on for 22 years, and the Bessarabian issue was finally resolved

peacefully. Historiography has repeatedly raised the question of whether the Soviet notes to Romania on June 26 and 27, 1940 were ultimatums. As a rule, Soviet historians tried to avoid this issue, while foreign historians, on the contrary, focused their attention on it. To resolve this issue, it should be recalled that an ultimatum is "a demand from one state to another, accompanied by a threat to use force if it is not fulfilled within a specified period." Turning to the texts of the Soviet notes, one can see that although they did not directly mention the threat of the use of force, they contained hints of the possibility of such a development of events. All this makes it possible to evaluate the Soviet demands precisely as an ultimatum, which, by the way, was not hidden at all at that time[1127]. But before following some authors[1128] condemning these methods of Moscow, it should be remembered that the ultimatum is one of the most common methods of foreign policy in general. Especially when it comes to the relationship between a major power and a small state. Moreover, frankly speaking, there was simply no other way to resolve the Bessarabian issue in the real conditions of the summer of 1940.

It is clear that Romania considered these Soviet actions a "seizure", the same thesis was widely disseminated in the anti-Soviet literature of the post-war period. Oddly enough, now it is also voiced in Russian historiography. So, for example, E.L. Valeva writes that the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina "was occupied by Germany's ally - the USSR" [1129]. Not only did the author completely distort the current situation, she also managed to declare the Soviet Union an ally of the Third Reich. It would be interesting to hear her arguments in favor of this absolutely unsubstantiated statement, but now it is not customary to give arguments on some issues. However, in this case it should be noted that there was no question of any Soviet-German alliance.

the parties did not say a word about this, neither Moscow nor Berlin ever considered their relations in this vein, although they made such propaganda statements that could be interpreted as a certain tendency for further rapprochement between them. However, things did not go further than this.

As for the Soviet "occupation" of these territories, as the American journalist W. Maxwell wrote in the hot pursuit of the events, "despite the fact that there were attempts in the press to characterize this event as a territorial "seizure", three main factors must be taken into account. Firstly, the occupation of Bessarabia by Romania was a seizure, and the Soviet government never recognized the rights of Romania to this territory, secondly, under the Romanian domination, the population of Bessarabia was in a difficult situation and, thirdly, these events were enthusiastically received by the inhabitants of Bessarabia. [...] "Regarding the first of these three factors, it should be noted that the seizure of Bessarabia by Romania in 1918 was so blatant that the US government never officially recognized it and until 1931 did not include Bessarabia as Romanian territory in its maps." [...] "From the events in eastern Poland, the Baltic countries and now in Bessarabia and Bukovina, it is clear what the common people of the small tyrannized countries of Europe pin their hopes for freedom and well-being on, having the opportunity to make their choice." Therefore, "it is not surprising that the hospitality extended to the Red Army was very warm. When the first pontoons were built on the Dniester by the Red Army, the Bessarabian peasants sailed and waded to the boats to send them to a safe place. In the villages and along the roads, the Red Army was greeted with exclamations: "We have been — -

waiting for you for 22 [years!](#)"[1130]. Were these actions of the USSR aggression? According to the 1933 convention on the definition of aggression, proposed precisely by the Soviet side, the aggressor was the one who made "a declaration of war on another state; the invasion of its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, on the territory of another state; an attack by its land, sea or air forces, even without a declaration of war, on the territory, ships or aircraft of another state; naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another

states; support given to armed bands which, having been formed on its territory, would invade the territory of another state, or the refusal, despite the demand of the invaded state, to take, in its own territory, all measures in its power to deprive said bands of all assistance, or patronage." Moreover, the convention specifically stipulated that "no consideration of a political, military, economic or other order can justify aggression" (including the internal system and its shortcomings; unrest caused by strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war; violation of the interests of another state ; rupture of diplomatic and economic relations; economic or financial blockade; disputes, including territorial and border incidents) [1131] . First of all, it should be noted that the application of the term "Soviet

aggression" to the territory of Bessarabia occupied by Romania is simply impossible. Even if the Soviet side had committed the actions specified in the convention, they should have been qualified as measures to curb Romanian aggression and liberate Soviet territory. As for Northern Bukovina, since the entry of Soviet troops into its territory was preceded by diplomatic negotiations that ended with the Romanian side agreeing with the Soviet version of the solution to the Bessarabian issue, from a legal point of view, Moscow's actions are not aggression. As a result of the actions of the Soviet Union in

June 1940, the Soviet-Romanian border along the Prut and Danube rivers, established by the decision of the Berlin Congress of 1878, was restored. Bessarabia was liberated from the Romanian occupation and reunited with the USSR. As for Northern Bukovina, in this case, this territory was annexed to the USSR and a new border was established between the Prut and the Carpathians. In international legal terms, the Soviet-Romanian border, established by the agreement of June 28, 1940, was secured by a peace treaty the Soviet leadership, signed on with Romania, [1132] Thus, February 10, 1947, managed not only to settle the Bessarabian issue in fact, but also legally.

The defeat of France in June 1940 led to the disruption of the established system of influence of the great powers and intensified the struggle for the Balkans. The USSR was the first to use the new situation, achieving a resolution of the Bessarabian issue. Hungary and Bulgaria decided that the time had come to exercise their own territorial claims against Romania. Fearing its neighbors, the Romanian leadership decided to accelerate the rapprochement with Germany, which was supposed to help avoid new territorial concessions. Already on June 29, the Romanian leadership decided that rapprochement with the USSR was impossible, since "it would lead us with quick steps towards communism." Consequently, there remained only a course towards rapprochement with Germany, and the participation of Romania in a possible attack of the Third Reich on the Soviet Union was not excluded. On the same day, the German envoy in Bucharest was informed of the readiness of the Romanian government to "get rid of the erroneous policy of the pas

Referring to the fact that England did not even provide indirect support to her in the Bessarabian issue, Romania on July 1 refused the Anglo-French guarantees of 1939. Indeed, busy with ensuring its own security after the capitulation of France, the British government reacted neutrally to the actions of the USSR in relation to Romania[1134] .

According to the British press, the "occupation" of Bessarabia was the beginning of the war in the Balkans, and the exit of the Red Army to the Danube indicates the beginning of the collapse of Soviet-German friendship, since Germany could lose Romanian oil. Newspapers published rumors that the Russians were making claims on the Romanian ports and intending to seize

Dardanelles[1135] On July 5, TASS refuted the report of a number of English newspapers that allegedly on July 2, a Moscow radio station broadcast an appeal of the Romanian population to the Red Army for help against "the great power that the Romanian government turned to" [1136] . With these measures, the British leadership sought to worsen Soviet-German relations in order to divert Berlin's attention to the east. On July 2, in a

personal message to Hitler, Karol II declared his desire for "close cooperation with Germany in all areas, the conclusion of political agreements favorable to both countries", and asked to send a military mission to Bucharest[1137] . However, in Berlin

they were in a hurry to respond to the Romanian proposals, since Germany was faced with the task of subordinating all the Balkans to its influence, and for this it was necessary to use the contradictions of the countries of the region. Already on July 4, German diplomats informed the Romanian leadership of the need for territorial concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria. On July 6, the Romanian king reported to Berlin that he was ready to negotiate with his neighbors and expressed the hope that "this sincere statement, which demands colossal sacrifices from Romania, will be considered as proof of the spirit of cooperation and his personal high appreciation of the Fuhrer." On July 12, Romania announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations and asked Germany to send troops to the country to "train" the Romanian army[1138]. During July 1940, British and French specialists who worked in the oil fields were expelled from Romania, the largest British oil company, Astra Romany, came under the control of the Romanian government.

It is clear that all these pro-German gestures of Bucharest aroused concern in Hungary, which feared that by drawing closer to Germany, Romania would be able to enlist its support in the Transylvanian issue. However, the German leadership did not seek to take a pro-Romanian or Pro-Hungarian position, since it was interested in subordinating both states. Therefore, from the point of view of Berlin, the best policy would be to create a situation in which both Hungary and Romania would be forced to constantly turn to the Third Reich for support. On July 15, Hitler's personal message was sent to Bucharest, in which the condition for the German-Romanian rapprochement was the satisfaction of the territorial demands of Hungary and Bulgaria. "If Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria," wrote the Fuhrer, "consider it impossible to reach an agreement, then such a position, in my firm opinion, will not benefit any of these states, but, on the contrary, will punish them.

all"[1139]. In fact, it was a threat primarily against Romania. The demonstrative coldness of Berlin pushed the Romanian leadership to new concessions. During the negotiations with Germany and Italy on July 26-27, the Romanian delegation, recalling its pro-German actions in previous years, tried to achieve a softening of the German-Italian position. At the same time, she expressed readiness to normalize relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.

by changing the border and exchanging populations. In exchange, Romania asked Germany and Italy to provide territorial guarantees and issue a loan for the purchase of German weapons within 10 years. "Romania is ready to make concessions, because she clearly understands her position and knows about the desires of the Fuhrer to establish a new order in Europe, of which she wants to become a part." However, Germany and Italy refused the Romanian proposal to guarantee the borders of Romania and the role of an arbitrator in the settlement of territorial issues, demanding that she negotiate with her neighbors, taking into account their requirements. On August 8, a new Romanian-German trade agreement was signed for the supply of agricultural products. Under these conditions, in August 1940, Romania was

forced to enter into direct negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria[1140]. In July 1940, Germany, Italy and the USSR, seeking to strengthen, and England, trying to maintain its influence in the region, supported the territorial claims of Bulgaria to Romania. On August 19–21, Romanian-Bulgarian negotiations took place in the city of Craiova, as a result of which an agreement was signed on September 7 on the transfer of the territory of Southern Dobrudja with an area of 5672 square meters to Bulgaria. km and a population of 386,231 people. On September 21, the agreement was ratified, and the Bulgarian troops entered South Dobruja, and by October 2, the whole procedure was completed[1141]. For its part, Hungary informed Berlin as early as June 28 that in the current situation it did not exclude the possibility of resolving the issue of Transylvania by military force. At the same time she is ready to increase her agricultural supplies to Germany and give her the right to use the— Hungarian railways. On June 29, Hungarian troops began to

concentrate near the Romanian border[1142]. At the same time, Hungary tried to find out the position of other great powers. In July-August 1940, Moscow repeatedly stated that it considered its relations with Hungary to be normal and had no claims against it. At the same time, "the Soviet government believes that Hungary's claims to Romania are justified," and the USSR will adhere to this position "in the event that an international conference is convened, at which the question of H

promises of more specific assistance were not crowned [1143] England and the United States also supported the Hungarian claims. Behind this position of Moscow, London and Washington, one could easily guess the desire to use the Hungarian-Romanian conflict in order to quarrel potential allies of Germany and cause her economic difficulties. For their part, Germany and Italy, noting the validity of the Hungarian claims, at the beginning of July 1940 advised Hungary to refrain from the use of force and try to resolve the issue through diplomacy. The contacts with Hungary, which

began on the initiative of Romania on August 7, developed on August 16 into direct negotiations in the city of Turnu Severin. However, the cardinal divergence of the positions of the parties and the absence of even a hint of mutual concessions led to the fact that on August 24 the negotiations finally failed, and in Budapest they decided to start a war with Romania on the morning of August 29. On August 23, mobilization began in Hungary; on August 27, an air battle took place between the aircraft of the parties on the Hungarian-Romanian border. On the same day, Hungary notified Germany that the breakdown of negotiations and the concentration of the Romanian army in Transylvania forced her to consider the possibility of a military solution to the issue. The next day, the Hungarian Air Force bombed the Romanian airfield, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Hungarian armies deployed on the border (with a total of 360

thousand people) were ready for the offensive [1144]. Naturally, in Berlin they were not going to allow a Hungarian-Romanian conflict. On August 27, Germany invited Hungary and Romania to send their representatives to a conference in Vienna. On August 28, the 4th Panzer and 2nd Motorized Divisions of the Wehrmacht were put on alert "in order to quickly intervene to protect the Romanian oil regions." this operation [1145] However, on the same day, it was assumed that August 31 - September 1, 1940, in Berlin, it became known that Romania agreed to international arbitration. On August 29, in Vienna, the delegations of Hungary and Romania were informed of the need to maintain peace and the readiness of Germany and Italy to resolve the controversial issue. The next day, the decision of the Second Vienna Arbitration was issued, according to which the territory of Northern Transylvania with an area of 43,492 square meters was transferred to Hu

guarantee of their new frontiers. Such a solution to the Transylvanian issue suited Germany to the greatest extent, which, having promised the parties the possibility of revising it, received additional leverage on both sides[1146]. The population of Romania reacted with indignation to reports of the Vienna dictatorship, and protest rallies and demonstrations took place in a number of cities.

To calm public opinion, the Romanian leadership used the facts of incidents on the Soviet-Romanian border, inflating the version of the Soviet threat, which forced the decision of the Vienna Arbitration. The situation on the Soviet-Romanian border from the second half of July 1940 began to deteriorate, which was associated with an increase in the number of its violations from the Romanian side. From July 16 to July 31, Romanian aircraft violated Soviet airspace 13 times, and the land border was violated 13 times by Romanian soldiers from July 8 to 30, of which 17 were detained by Soviet border guards, and 1 was killed while resisting. Romanian soldiers spoiled or rearranged milestones marking the border line, fired at Soviet border guards. In August, the situation worsened even more, and the number of border violations increased. At this time, Romanian aircraft 17 times invaded the airspace of the USSR, and on August 26, 9 Romanian aircraft that violated the border were attacked by 2 Soviet fighters. In the air battle that took place, 1 Romanian aircraft was shot down, and the rest flew over the river. Rod[1147]. On the same day, units of the Red Army stationed on the border with Romania were ordered to put air defense systems on alert, organize careful round-the-clock surveillance of the airspace and immediately open fire "when Romanian aircraft appear in the air on our territory." At the same time, it was necessary "not to open fire on German aircraft", but to limit ourselves only to observation from the ground and from the side of the duty units raised into the air

fighters[1148]. —

Under these conditions, on August 17, Moscow protested to Bucharest against these incidents and proposed the creation of a mixed Soviet-Romanian commission to demarcate the border. On August 19, the Soviet Union handed over to Romania a new note of protest against the actions of the Romanian troops on the border. In a reply Romanian note dated 26 August

it was reported that the Romanian border guards received strict orders to avoid any incidents, and counterclaims were put forward against the actions of the Soviet border guards. On August 29 and September 12, Moscow again protested against new incidents provoked by the Romanian side, which, in a response note on September 13, again denied the facts cited by the Soviet side and put forward counterclaims. Although the parties remained to each their own opinion regarding these incidents, nevertheless, none of them

sought to aggravate relations[1149]. As a result, by the end of September 1940, the situation on the border had somewhat normalized, but continued to be difficult[1150]. To substantiate the version of the Soviet threat to Romania, the fact of the signing on September 3 of the Soviet-Hungarian treaty on trade and navigation[1151], which was considered in Bucharest as the basis of a possible anti-Romanian Soviet-Hungarian alliance, was also used. True, it should be noted that no military measures against Romania were taken by the Soviet side at that time.

planned.

Revealing the meaning of these border provocations, Pravda rightly wrote on September 9 that "Karol's entourage was negotiating a few times ago, in which preparations were made for the transfer of a significant part of Transylvania to Hungary, as well as receiving guarantees from Germany and Italy for the state territory of Romania. The king needed some external reason to somehow justify these decisions that were being prepared before the public opinion of Rumania. For these purposes, the king's entourage went to create provocative incidents on the Soviet-Romanian border. Karol, of course, correctly calculated that the attacks of the Romanian units on the Soviet border guard could not go unanswered. All this was used to spread deliberately false rumors that the Soviet Union was allegedly preparing an attack on Romania, that Romania was threatened with a military defeat, and therefore the only way to save Romania was to give Hungary part of Transylvania and receive guarantees from Germany and Italy for the territory of Romania "[1152]. The changed situation in the Balkans demanded that the tactics of the local communist parties be clarified. Already

on August 20, the ECCI approved a resolution on the situation in Hungary and the tasks of the CPV, according to which

the main threat was the rapprochement of Hungary with Germany on the basis of the revision of the Hungarian borders. The Hungarian Communist Party was tasked with fighting for an independent foreign policy of the country and the preservation of peace, which was possible only on the basis of "good neighborly, honest and unconditionally friendly relations with the great neighboring socialist power, the Soviet Union"[1153]. On September 5, the ECCI worked out a directive to the Romanian and Hungarian Communist Parties on the Transylvanian question, in which the Vienna Arbitration was directly called an imperialist dictate. The communist parties were tasked with intensifying the struggle against the reactionary ruling regimes, for proletarian solidarity workers of both countries and for rapprochement with

the USSR[1154]. The Romanian delegation, which arrived in Moscow on September 9 to negotiate the demarcation of the border line, tried again to raise the issue of changing the border in the area of the city of Hertsä, but the Soviet side rejected this proposal[1155]. In the future, the work of the demarcation commission was hampered in every possible way by the Romanian side, which did not want to recognize this line as a border. For this, disagreements were used on the issue of the border line in the area of the city of Hertz and especially in the Danube Delta, where it was not established which of the several channels of the Kiliysky arm should pass the border[1156]. This made it possible to assert that the "seizure of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina" was an act of force, which Romania "has no interest in legalizing" and giving the "Councils a legal basis for holding these provinces"[1157]. As a result, until June 22, 1941, the Soviet-Romanian border was never demarcated, which contributed to the emergence of new incidents. Subsequently, Soviet notes of protest about the facts of shelling of Soviet border guards and violation of the border by Romanian aircraft were sent to the Romanian side on January 18, 21, February 22, March 21, 31, April 12, 26, May 5, 9, 19, 1941. Only from 10 to 21 June 1941 foreign planes 17 times violated the border of the USSR from

Romania[1158]. Meanwhile, on September 5, 1940, the Romanian constitution of 1938 was repealed, on September 6, King Carol II abdicated in favor of his son Mihai I, and on September 4, General I. Antonescu, who became the head of the Romanian government, received de facto dictatorial powers. The new Romanian leadership decided to force

rapprochement with Germany, and on September 5, the new head of government notified Berlin of "the desire for close cooperation with Germany", consent to send a military mission, readiness to comply with the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration and increase the supply of necessary goods to the Third Reich. On September 13, a request was sent to Berlin, with reference, among other things, to the "Soviet threat" to send a military [mission to Romania](#)[1159] . On September 20, the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) issued an order to send troops to Romania to protect the oil fields and train the Romanian army. On October 8, German troops arrived in Romania with a total number of 22,430 people[1160] . On October 16, the USSR declared that it had not been informed about the aims and the number of German troops in Romania, which on the same day agreed to join the Tripartite Pact. The Soviet Union failed to establish economic cooperation with Romania due to the reluctance of Bucharest and the predominant economic influence of Germany. However, in order not to worsen the already cold Soviet-Romanian relations, the Romanian leadership in December 1940 agreed to start economic negotiations, which ended on February 26, 1941 with the signing of an agreement on trade and navigation and an agreement on trade and payments, but this did not affect to the ~~anti~~-Soviet position of Romania.

The decisions of the Vienna Arbitration caused dissatisfaction in Moscow, and in the course of lively diplomatic contacts with Germany on this occasion, the Soviet side pointed to the violation by Berlin of Article 3 of the non-aggression agreement on consultations. In response, the German government stated that its actions "with respect to Romania and Hungary were aimed at maintaining peace in the Danube region, which was seriously threatened by the tensions between the two countries, which was possible only with quick diplomatic intervention", so there was no time left to notify Moscow . The entry of German troops in Romania was explained by the need to help train the Romanian army and protect oil sources from possible actions of [England](#)[1162] Diplomatic discussions on these issues ~~led~~ . to the fact that on September 19, 1940, Hitler "decided not to provide Russia with any more European region" [1163] .

The strengthening of German and the weakening of English influence in the Balkans led to the fact that, at the initiative of Germany, a meeting of experts was convened to determine the mode of navigation on the Danube, bypassing the existing Danube Commissions. Not being invited to this meeting, the USSR on September 9 turned to Germany with a notification of its interest in its work. Germany attempted to dismiss the Soviet claims, citing the fact that the upcoming meeting intended to focus on the issue of shipping in the Iron Gates area. In this spirit, the official response from Berlin on September 12 was sustained, in which it was noted that Germany recognizes "the accession of the USSR to the European Danube Commission ... for granted." This answer did not satisfy Moscow, and on September 13 a message was published in the press that the USSR "hopes to receive relevant information from the German government about the meeting of experts in Vienna on international Danube issues"[1164] . On September 14, the Soviet side announced that it approved the liquidation of the International and European Danube Commissions and was in favor of creating a new Danube Commission and was interested in resolving issues of navigation on the

Danube from Bratislava to its mouth [1165] . On October 13, Germany promised to take into account Soviet wishes in matters of the Danube regime, and on October 17 notified the USSR of its agreement with its proposal "on the formation of a single Danube Commission, but considers it necessary for Italy to participate in this commission." The Soviet side pointed to the need to discuss this issue, and on October 19 expressed its readiness "to join the Interim Agreement of September 12, 1940 until the formation of the said Danube Commission." and "to take part in joint negotiations between the authorized experts of the USSR, Germany, Romania and Italy in Bucharest to consider, as an interim solution, those tasks that have so far been carried out by the European Danube Commission"[1166] . Accordingly, on October 24, the Soviet delegation received the task of replacing the Autonomous Romanian Directorate of the Maritime Danube with the creation of the Soviet Romanian Administration of the Maritime Danube in the city of Sulina, which should be entrusted with the establishment of navigation r

pilot service in the Sulinsky and Georgievsky sleeves, and in the Kiliya sleeve, the USSR and Romania would act jointly. It was supposed to achieve a ban on navigation in the sea Danube of all military ships, except for Romania and the USSR, and the transit of weapons would be possible only with the joint permission of Moscow and Bucharest [1167]. However, the negotiations that began on October 28 showed that Romania, with the tacit consent of Germany and Italy, position on the proposals of the USSR. As a result, on December 21, 1940, fruitless negotiations were postponed indefinitely [1168].

For its part, the Soviet leadership, dissatisfied with the rapprochement of Hungary and Romania with Germany, which created a barrier to Soviet penetration into the Balkans, decided to discuss the Balkan problems at the upcoming negotiations with Germany in Berlin. Thus, in the directives of the Soviet delegation dated November 9, 1940, it was envisaged to achieve during the negotiations that in the Balkans "the region of the mouth of the Danube and Bulgaria were assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR." It was also necessary "to say about our dissatisfaction with the fact that Germany and Italy did not consult with the USSR on the issue of guarantees and the introduction of troops into Romania" and to declare their interest in the further fate of Hungary, Romania and Turkey and the need for Soviet participation in resolving these issues [1169]. During negotiations in Berlin on November 12–13, Molotov told Hitler that "The Soviet government expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that, without consulting it, Germany and Italy guaranteed the inviolability of the Romanian territory. He believes that these guarantees were directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. Hitler replied that "Germany does not consider it possible for a certain time to refuse these guarantees", which "were the only thing that persuaded Romania to cede Bessarabia to Russia without a fight", drew the interlocutor's attention to the economic importance of the Romanian oil reserves for Germany and Italy and noted that "the Romanian government itself asked Germany to take over" the protection of the oil-bearing regions from England for the duration of the war [1170]. As a result, it became obvious that Germany received an

important military and economic foothold in Romania and did not intend to make any concessions. Meanwhile, the activation of England in the Eastern

oil-bearing regions of Ploiesti and military security in the region. Under these conditions, the importance of the peaceful expansion of Germany in the Balkans, which sought to consolidate the Balkan countries in the interests of fighting against England, and in the future against the USSR, increased. Not only bilateral agreements, but also the Tripartite Pact, a military-political treaty of Germany, Italy and Japan, concluded on September 27, 1940, to which Hungary joined on November 20, should have become an instrument for subordinating the Balkan states. During a visit to Berlin on November 22–23, Antonescu declared to Hitler that in the event of a war with the USSR, he was ready to take part in it in alliance with Germany. November 23 Romania joined the Tripartite Pact, finally becoming a satellite of the Third Reich [1171]

Romanian cooperation for the implementation of a ten-year plan for the development of the Romanian economy, "which was now completely subordinate to the needs of Germany, its military preparations. If in 1940 the share of the Axis powers in Romanian exports reached 63.6%, then in 1941 it increased to 95.2 % [1172] . With the help of the clearing system, Berlin was able to pump out raw materials and food from Romania. Already by December 31, 1940, the German debt to Romania in trade reached 1,050 million lei, and by the end of 1941 it had increased to

17,148

million lei [1173] . Table 14. **Oil production and export of oil products by Romania (thousand tons) [1174].**

Год	Добыча нефти	Экспорт нефтепродуктов	в том числе в Германию	
			всего	в %
1933	7377	5886	200	3,4
1934	8466	6547	444	6,8
1935	8376	6613	863	13,1
1936	8704	6885	1072	15,6
1937	7150	5668	435	7,7
1938	6594	4495	704,2	15,7
1939	6226	4178	848,6	20,3
1940	5738	3493	1147,8	32,8
1941	5520	4072	2714,8	66,7
1942	5624	3374	2163,6	64,1
1943	5323	3159	2511,3	79,5

Informed at the end of December 1940 by the command of the German troops in Romania about the preparation of Germany for war with the USSR, the Romanian leadership on January 14, 1941 offered Berlin the help of its armed forces in the event of a war in the east. The memorandum handed over to the German side stated that "Romania is today Germany's strategic center and base of political dominance in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. With the development of diplomatic and military events in the spring, Romania may become the center of hostilities. Realizing its role and geographical position, as well as the need to maintain the social European order, Romania is ready for the closest cooperation with Germany. To this end, Romania entered into the Tripartite Pact. She allowed German troops to enter her territory. Romania is ready, if necessary, to join the hostilities on the side of Germany. [...] Resolutely joining any actions of the German side, Romania is convinced that during the forthcoming reconstruction of Europe, it will find full understanding on the part of Germany and the great Fuhrer - a brilliant creator. [...] Being connected with Germany by the Danube, Romania also wishes to have a direct land connection with her in the north and northwest." The document also expressed the hope that "in the new Europe, Germany will recognize the natural role of Romania as a regional hegemon"[1175] . This pro-German policy allowed the governm

Antonescu to get the support of Berlin during the Iron Guard revolt of January 21-23, 1941. On [\[1176\]](#)


April 10, the Romanian Communist Party received from the ECCI the task of intensifying the struggle against the involvement of Romania in the war and for friendship with the USSR, which was supposed to impede the activities of the government and the actions of Germany[\[1177\]](#) . For its part, the Romanian leadership on May 10 formulated its territorial claims. In his opinion, the expansion of Romania "can be carried out at the expense of Slovakia ... and also at the expense of Galicia, along the Chernivtsi-Lvov-Krakow line, since it is an easy, direct and short way for communications between the mouth of the Danube and Germany. Based on this, we need not only Bessarabia and Bukovina ... but also Pokuttia, which would expand the common border between Romania, Slovakia and Germany through occupied Poland. South of the Danube, demands were made for the Yugoslav Banat and the Timok region. Naturally, Germany and Italy were in no hurry to determine their position in relation to these projects[\[1178\]](#) . At the same time, Germany informed the Romanian government that she was "ready to resolve all territorial issues with Romania and take into account certain wishes regarding the revision [of the borders] if Romania joins the Soviet peace policy," i.e. withdraws from [\[1179\]](#) the Tripartite Pact . However, such proposals no longer interested Bucharest. On June 1, covert mobilization began in

Romania, and on June 11-12, during a visit to Munich, Antonescu was officially informed of the upcoming war with the Soviet Union and declared to Hitler that he was ready to act together with Germany. At the same time, the Romanian leadership hoped to get not only Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, but also the territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug (the so-called Transnistria). In general, this idea was supported by the German side. On June 18, the plan of specific operations of the 11th German army stationed in Romania was brought to the attention of Antonescu[\[1180\]](#) . On June 22, 1941, without declaring war, Romania, together with Germany, attacked the Soviet Union[\[1181\]](#) . The Romanian press wrote on August 19, 1942, that "our current struggle is not only a struggle against the Bolsheviks. Until Russia is destroyed, the Russian danger will remain. The destruction of Russia and


the advance of Europe to the Urals is the main condition for the development of the Romanian people"[182] . As recognized in 1943 by G.I. Brătianu, "in the war against the USSR, Romania simultaneously found its eastern provinces, which were taken from it in 1940, as well as the meaning of its historical defensive mission on the borders of Europe"[183] . Since the idea of Romania's "defensive mission" dates back to the second half of the 19th century, it is quite obvious that it was precisely these aggressive aspirations that pushed her towards an alliance with Germany, and not at all the solution of the Bessarabian issue in the summer of 1940.

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




Operation plan at the suggestion of the chief of staff of the KOVO brigade commander N.F. Vatutin dated June 3, 1940



The plan of operation according to the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army of June 20, 1940



The plan of operation of the commander of the Southern Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov dated June 23, 1940


Дислокация румынской армии в июне 1940 г.




The entry of Soviet troops into Northern Bukovina and the northern regions of Bessarabia. June 28, 1940




The entry of Soviet troops into Bessarabia. June 28, 1940




The entry of Soviet troops into Northern Bukovina and the northern regions of Bessarabia. June 29, 1940




The entry of Soviet troops into Bessarabia. June 29, 1940




The entry of Soviet troops into Northern Bukovina and the northern regions of Bessarabia. June 30, 1940




The entry of Soviet troops into Bessarabia. June 30, 1940




The entry of Soviet troops into Northern Bukovina and the northern regions of Bessarabia. July 1, 1940



The entry of Soviet troops into Bessarabia. July 1, 1940



The entry of Soviet troops into Bessarabia. July 2, 1940



Grouping of troops of the Southern Front by the end of July 3, 1940


актуальная история

Книга посвящена изучению самого крупного в истории Советского Союза территориального спора с Румынией из-за Бессарабии. Привлечение рассекреченных материалов позволило существенно дополнить известные сведения, а в некоторых случаях впервые воссоздать события советско-румынских отношений 1917—1940 гг. Читатель узнает о том, как Румынии удалось оккупировать Бессарабию, почему Красная армия не сумела изгнать из края румынских интервентов, какое влияние оказывал бессарабский вопрос на отношения Москвы и Бухареста в межвоенный период. Основное внимание уделяется событиям лета 1940 г., когда в условиях Второй мировой войны СССР смог освободить Бессарабию. Доступные ныне архивные документы позволили подробно исследовать Бессарабский поход Красной армии 1940 г. Книга предназначена не только для специалистов, но и для всех любителей вдумчивого чтения, интересующихся историей своей страны.

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notes

Notes

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